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I.
INTRODUCTION1
An amputation is obvious to the naked eye. A broken bone shows on an
x-ray film. A herniated disk appears on an MRI scan. How do you prove a workrelated psychological injury?
In a tort case brought in the District of Columbia, in order to recover for
intentional infliction of emotional distress, “a plaintiff must show (1) extreme and
outrageous conduct on the part of the defendant which (2) intentionally or
recklessly (3) causes the plaintiff severe emotional distress.”2 Furthermore, “[t]he
conduct must be “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go
beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and
utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”3 This high burden of proof satisfies
society’s concern that an inherently invisible claim has not been fabricated for
secondary gain.
The burden of proof is even higher when attempting to recover for
negligent infliction of emotional distress. In the District of Columbia, there is no
general duty of care to avoid causing mental distress at least in part because:
We know that, from repeated scares or frights, persons are liable to
have their sensibilities easily, and in some cases morbidly
excited . . . But the law furnishes no remedy for such sensitive
condition. To attempt to furnish a legal remedy in such case,
would open the door to the wildest speculation. Without for a
moment intimating that simulation existed in this case, yet the
nature of such claim would render it easy of simulation; and if not
simulated, the temptation would be strong to exaggeration, and the
assigning of one cause for another in the production of the morbid
state of the nervous sensibilities; and all this, though it might be
without real foundation, would be most difficult to disprove by the

1

This article is in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree
program at the University of Nevada, Reno. Special thanks go to Dr. Shawn C. Marsh, Dr. Angela
M. Lee, Judge David B. Torrey, Dr. Lauren B. Edelman, and Judge Anthony J. Baratta for their
insightful comments to improve this article.
This article is dedicated to my father, Norman Harry Weiss. Dad, now your name will live
on forever.
Judge Jones is admitted to practice law in New York, the District of Columbia, Maryland,
and Virginia. She is not engaged in the practice of law, and the contents of this article are not
intended to provide legal advice. Views expressed in this article represent commentary
concerning the law, the legal system, and the administration of justice. These views should not be
mistaken for the official views of the United States Government, the United States Department of
Labor, the Benefits Review Board, nor for Judge Jones’ opinion in the context of any specific
case. The views expressed in this article do not necessarily represent the policies of the United
States Government, the United States Department of Labor, or the Benefits Review Board, and no
official endorsement by the United States Government, the United States Department of Labor, or
the Benefits Review Board is intended or should be inferred.
2
Armstrong v. Thompson, 80 A.3d 177, 189 (D.C. 2013).
3
Drejza v. Vaccaro, 650 A.2d 1308, 1312 n.10 (D.C. 1994) (quoting Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 46 cmt. d (1965)).
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party sought to be charged. Such claims for compensation are
subject to all the objections to remote and speculative damages.4
Consequently, to mitigate the concern about spurious claims that are difficult to
disprove, additional factors have been imposed—the defendant’s conduct must
have placed the plaintiff in a “zone of physical danger,” such that:
[T]he plaintiff can show that (1) the defendant has a relationship
with the plaintiff, or has undertaken an obligation to the plaintiff,
of a nature that necessarily implicates the plaintiff’s emotional
well-being, (2) there is an especially likely risk that the defendant’s
negligence would cause serious emotional distress to the plaintiff,
and (3) negligent actions or omissions of the defendant in breach
of that obligation have, in fact, caused serious emotional distress to
the plaintiff. Whether the defendant breached her obligations is to
be determined by reference to the specific terms of the undertaking
agreed upon by the parties or, otherwise, by an objective standard
of reasonableness applicable to the underlying relationship or
undertaking, e.g., in medical malpractice cases, the national
standard of care. The likelihood that the plaintiff would suffer
serious emotional distress is measured against an objective
standard: what a “reasonable person” in the defendant’s position
would have foreseen under the circumstances in light of the nature
of the relationship or undertaking. In addition, the plaintiff must
establish that she actually suffered “serious and verifiable”
emotional distress.5
Unlike the high burdens in tort cases, in a District of Columbia private
sector, workers’ compensation case there is a presumption of compensability
(“Presumption”). Specifically,
[i]n any proceeding for the enforcement of a claim for
compensation under this chapter it shall be presumed, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary:
(1) That the claim comes within the provisions of
this chapter;
(2) That sufficient notice of such claim has been
given;
(3) That the injury was not occasioned solely by the
intoxication of the injured employee; and

4
5

Wash. & Georgetown R.R. Co. v. Dashiell, 7 App. D.C. 507, 515 (1895).
Hedgepeth v. Whitman Walker Clinic, 22 A.3d 789, 810–11 (D.C. 2011) (citation omitted).
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(4) That the injury was not occasioned by the
willful intention of the injured employee to injure or
kill himself or another.6
In order to invoke the Presumption in a physical injury case, the claimant
must show an employment connection through some evidence of (1) a disability
and (2) a work-related event, activity, or requirement which has the potential to
cause or to contribute to the disability. 7 This threshold is not high. A reasonable
inference that job duties had the potential to contribute to the disability is
sufficient.8 Testimony of a work-related event coupled with medical evidence
that the employment had the potential of resulting in the injury is sufficient.9 In
fact, testimony alone may suffice to invoke the Presumption:
The claimant argues that the [administrative law judge] was in
error when she denied him the statutory presumption of
compensability. The Director [of the Department of Employment
Services (“Director”)] finds merit in claimant’s argument. The
claimant testified that he was injured while pulling some plywood
out of the trench. In order for claimant to benefit from the
statutory presumption of compensability he must make an initial
demonstration of two basic facts: a disability and a work related
event, activity, or requirement which has the potential of resulting
in or contributing to his disability. Ferreira v. Department of
Employment Services, 531 A.2d 651, 655 (D.C. 1987). The
Director finds that claimant’s job had the potential to cause his
disability. Therefore, claimant is entitled to the statutory
presumption of compensability.10
Invoking the Presumption in a physical injury case only requires a
claimant produce “some evidence” of a disability and a work-related event,
activity, or requirement.11 “Some evidence” is not a preponderance;12 it is not
expert testimony;13 and it is not “credible evidence.” At the initial stage of a case,
invoking the Presumption, it is premature to consider the credibility of evidence:
D.C. CODE § 32-1521 of the District of Columbia Workers’ Compensation Act of 1979, as
amended, § 32-1501 et seq. (“the Act”).
7
Ferreira v. D.C. Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 531 A.2d 651 (D.C. 1987).
8
Raeon v. Braude & Margulies, Dir. Dkt. No. 93-28, H&AS No. 91-782, OWC No. 151329
(Feb. 20, 1998).
9
Parodi v. Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 560 A.2d 524 (D.C. 1989).
10
Campbell v. Design Props., Inc., Dir. Dkt. No. 93-58, H&AS No. 91-106, OWC No.
0178606 (Apr. 11, 1997).
11
Ferreira, 531 A.2d 651.
12
Baker v. First Transit, CRB No. 12-105, AHD 11-258A, OWC No. 672618 (Aug. 9, 2012).
13
To ask a claimant, who already has produced substantial medical reports from the treating
physician, and other relevant documentary evidence of causally related injury arising out of and in
the course of employment, to provide sworn testimony to rebut an employer’s medical expert, no
matter how insufficient that testimony may be with respect to the presumption of compensability,
would impose too high a burden and one which is inconsistent with the purposes of the Workers’
6
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Based on our case law and the “humanitarian purposes” of the Act,
we hold that an [administrative law judge] cannot refuse to accord
an employee seeking benefits the statutory presumption on the
basis that the claimant’s evidence, which on its face is sufficient to
show both an injury and a work-related event that has the potential
of causing the injury, was simply not credible. To hold otherwise
would contravene our decision in Ferreira and its progeny, in
which we have repeatedly said that all that is required of the
claimant for the presumption to apply is an “initial demonstration”
consisting of “some evidence” of a work-related injury. 531 A.2d
at 655 (emphasis added).
Accordingly, the [administrative law judge] must afford the
statutory presumption of compensability to an employee seeking
workers’ compensation for a physical injury, so long as the
employee establishes a prima facie “‘initial demonstration’ of (1)
an injury; and (2) a work related event, activity, or requirement
which has the potential of resulting in or contributing to the
injury.” Georgetown Univ. I, . . . 830 A.2d at 870. Credibility
determinations are not an appropriate consideration at this initial
stage.14
It cannot be emphasized enough—the threshold for invoking the Presumption is
not high.
Once the claimant has invoked the Presumption, to rebut the Presumption
the employer must show that the claimant’s disability did not arise out of and in
the course of employment; it is the employer’s burden to come forth with
substantial evidence of “a nonemployment related basis”15 “specific and
comprehensive enough to sever the potential connection between a particular
injury and a job-related event.”16 “Some isolated evidence” is not sufficient to
overcome the Presumption;17 neither is a vague and nebulous opinion that many
things can cause an injury,18 nor speculation and conjecture. 19 However, the
employer is not required to prove the disability could not have been caused by a
work-related event or activity; that is too high a burden to impose. 20
Compensation Act. We decline to do so. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. Dep’t of Emp’t
Servs., 827 A.2d 35, 45 (D.C. 2003).
14
Storey v. Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 162 A.3d 793, 807 (D.C. 2017).
15
Young v. Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 918 A.2d 427, 434 (D.C. 2007).
16
Ferreira, 531 A.2d at 655.
17
Whittaker v. Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 668 A.2d 844, 847 (D.C. 1995).
18
Holder v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., Dir. Dkt. No. 99-90, H&AS No. 99-342,
OWC No. 507781 (Nov. 14, 2000) (the doctor’s opinion that “many things can cause [a tear in the
meniscus]” was not specific and comprehensive enough to rebut the Presumption).
19
Brown v. Howard Univ. Hosp., CRB No. 12-061, AHD No. 11-060, OWC No. 675904
(June 27, 2011) (the employer offered “evidence of a pre-existing back condition, prior back
injuries, a motive to lie, and prior inconsistent statements to rebut the Presumption”).
20
Wash. Hosp. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 744 A.2d 992 (D.C. 2000).
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The Presumption usually is rebutted when a doctor (even a doctor retained
for purposes of litigation) examines the claimant, reviews the relevant medical
records, and states “an unambiguous opinion that the work injury did not
contribute to the disability.”21 The difference between invoking the Presumption
and rebutting the Presumption is that in order to rebut the Presumption by this
method, the doctor must render an opinion regarding specific causationconditions at work did not cause this claimant to sustain this injury. Even so, the
administrative law judge must determine whether or not the Presumption has been
rebutted without assessing credibility:
[A]n [administrative law judge] may not assess the credibility of a
claimant’s evidence at this initial stage. Instead, the claimant is
entitled to the statutory presumption that the injury arose during
the course of employment and therefore entitled to workers’
compensation benefits, so long as he or she presents “some
evidence” to establish a prima facie case of a work-related injury.
Wash. Post v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 852
A.2d 909, 911 (D.C. 2004). The burden is then on the employer to
rebut the presumption that an employee’s injury was, in fact, not
related to his or her employment. Id. The employer can rebut the
presumption by proffering substantial evidence of non-causation,
i.e., evidence that is “specific and comprehensive enough” that a
“reasonable mind might accept it as adequate to contradict the
presumed connection between the event at work and the
employee’s subsequent disability.” Id. (footnote, citation, internal
quotation marks and brackets omitted). This, again, is not a matter
as to which the [administrative law judge] is to make credibility
determinations. Only if the employer is able to rebut the
presumption and the burden returns to the claimant is the
[administrative law judge] entitled to make credibility
determinations.22
If the employer fails to meet its burden, the claim falls within the Act; the
injury is deemed work-related, and any resulting disability is compensable. 23 If
the Presumption is rebutted, the burden shifts back to the claimant to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence any injury or disability arose out of and in the
course of employment.24 Evidence is weighed only after the employer has
rebutted the Presumption.
Frequently, the Presumption is the starting point in the analysis of litigated
private sector workers’ compensation cases. By establishing a causal connection
Wash. Post v. Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 852 A.2d 909, 910 (D.C. 2004). However, an expert
opinion is not required to rebut the Presumption. McNeal v. Dep’t of Emp. Servs.,
917 A.2d 652, 658 n.2 (D.C. 2007).
22
Storey, 162 A.3d at 797.
23
Parodi, 560 A.2d at 526.
24
Upchurch v. Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 783 A.2d 623, 628 (D.C. 2001).
21

41-1

JOURNAL OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDICIARY

30

between a disability and a work-related event, the Presumption enables a claimant
to establish entitlement to workers’ compensation benefits more easily because it
also establishes the employer’s burden to “take the initial steps to disprove
liability.”25
The Presumption applies to both physical injuries and psychological
injuries, but unlike the requirements for invoking it in a physical injury claim, in
order to invoke the Presumption in a physical-mental claim,26 the claimant must
prove “the physical accident had the potential of resulting in or contributing to the
psychological injury.”27 If the employer does not rebut the Presumption, the
injury is compensable; if the employer rebuts the Presumption, the claimant must
prove “the physical accident caused or contributed to the psychological injury.”28
In a mental-mental case, “an injured worker . . . invokes the statutory presumption
of compensability by [offering credible evidence of] a psychological injury and
actual workplace conditions or events which could have caused or aggravated the
psychological injury supported by competent medical evidence.”29 If the
employer does not rebut the Presumption, the injury is compensable; if the
employer rebuts the Presumption, the claimant must “prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the workplace conditions or events caused or aggravated the
psychological injury.”30
Psychological injuries arising out of and in the course of employment are
no less real than physical injuries arising out of and in the course of employment,
but proving psychological injuries stresses out everyone involved in District of
Columbia workers’ compensation cases. The problem started with the Dailey
test.
II.

THE THIRD-PARTY STANDARD: DAILEY v. 3M COMPANY
Ms. Dorothy Dailey is not the first claimant to allege a psychological
injury arising out of and in the course of her employment. Her appeal to the
Director of the District of Columbia Department of Employment Services
(“Director”),31 however, set the standard for adjudicating psychological injury
claims for decades to come.32
Dunston v. D.C. Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 509 A.2d 109, 111 (D.C. 1986).
In a physical-mental claim, the claimant alleges a physical injury caused a mental injury. In
a mental-mental claim, the claimant alleges an emotionally traumatic event or stressor caused a
mental injury. In a mental-physical claim, the claimant alleges an emotionally traumatic event or
stressor caused a physical injury.
27
McCamey v. D.C. Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 947 A.2d 1191, 1213 (D.C. 2008) (“McCamey
II”).
28
Id. at 1214.
29
Ramey v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., CRB No. 06-38(R), AHD No. 05-318, OWC No.
576531 (July 24, 2008) [hereinafter Ramey on Remand].
30
Id.
31
In December 2004, the Compensation Review Board assumed administrative appellate
review of Compensation Orders. D.C. CODE § 32-1521.01 of the Private Sector Workers’
Compensation Act (“the Act”). Before the creation of the Compensation Review Board, the
Director of the Department of Employment Services ruled on appeals of Compensation Orders.
32
Ms. Dailey was a private sector employee. As such, her claim for workers’ compensation
benefits was governed by the Private Sector Workers’ Compensation Act, D.C. CODE § 32-1501.
25
26
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In the early 1980s, Ms. Dailey worked as a secretary for the 3M Company.
She worked at her employer’s Indianapolis, Indiana office until 1983 when 3M
Company gave her the choice to either relocate to its Washington, D.C. office or
to separate from her employment.
Ms. Dailey relocated, and while working in 3M Company’s D.C. offices,
began to suffer from depression and an ulcer. By January 1985, she stopped
working and returned to Indiana. Sometime thereafter, Ms. Dailey requested a
formal hearing to adjudicate her claim for ongoing temporary total disability
benefits. At the formal hearing, Ms. Dailey argued that her disabling depression
was causally related to “the disruption of her job and life situation [and that] the
disorganization and pressure at [3M Company’s] District [of Columbia] office
contributed to her condition.”33 In its defense, 3M Company contended Ms.
Dailey’s condition did not constitute an accidental injury arising out of her
employment. An administrative law judge34 ruled in favor of 3M Company and
denied Ms. Dailey’s claim for relief because her psychological injury did not arise
out of her employment.
Ms. Dailey appealed the denial of her claim to the Director. She argued
she was entitled to workers’ compensation benefits for two reasons: (1) “[H]er
predisposition to a depressive condition should not bar her eligibility for benefits
when work-related events aggravated her pre-existing condition,”35 and (2) 3M
Company had not rebutted the Presumption that her injury arose out of and in the
course of her employment.
Affirming the denial of temporary total disability benefits, the Director
specifically held:
[I]n order for a claimant to establish that an emotional injury arises
out of the mental stress or mental stimulus of employment, the
claimant must show that actual conditions of employment, as
determined by an objective standard and not merely the
claimant’s subjective perception of his working conditions, were
the cause of his emotional injury. The objective standard is
satisfied where the claimant shows that the actual working
conditions could have caused similar emotional injury in a person
who was not significantly predisposed to such injury.36
In the District of Columbia, public-sector-employee claims for workers’ compensation disability
benefits are governed by a separate act, the District of Columbia Government Comprehensive
Merit Personnel Act of 1978, as amended, D.C. CODE § 1-623.01 (2021) (“Public Sector Workers’
Compensation Act”). Although this chapter focuses on private sector claims, with the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals’ resolution of McCamey II and Ramey v. D.C. Dep’t of Emp’t Servs.,
997 A.2d 694 (D.C. 2010) [hereinafter Ramey II], the tests for proving a psychological injury
under either act are the same. See “The Subjective McCamey Standard,” infra.
33
Dailey v. 3M Co., H&AS No. 85-259, OWC No. 0066512 (May 19, 1988), abrogated by
Ramey II, 997 A.2d 694.
34
Prior to April 3, 2001, workers’ compensation adjudicators in the District of Columbia were
not classified as administrative law judges. D.C. CODE § 32-1543(b) of the Act. Throughout this
article these adjudicators uniformly are referred to as administrative law judges.
35
Dailey, H&AS No. 85-259.
36
Id. (footnote omitted).

41-1

JOURNAL OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDICIARY

32

In reaching this conclusion, the Director surveyed prior workers’ compensation
cases alleging psychological injuries including McEvily v. Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority37 and Wenzel v. British Airways.38
In McEvily, Mr. Robert E. McEvily claimed he had suffered a
psychological injury as a result of a manager’s failure to respond promptly to his
work products and his professional needs. An administrative law judge denied
Mr. McEvily’s request for workers’ compensation benefits because he had not
experienced an incident at work which “would” 39 have affected anyone who was
not otherwise predisposed to psychiatric disturbance. The District of Columbia
Court of Appeals (“Court”) affirmed the denial of benefits.
Similarly, in Wenzel, the Director had elaborated on the standard for
determining when a psychological injury arises out of employment:
The Chaney decision held that, at the very least, the concept of
“arising out of the employment” requires a showing that there were
obligations placed on the employee or conditions under which the
employee performed which exposed him to risks or dangers which
could have [led] to the kind of psychological injury actually
suffered. A claimant could meet this burden by offering evidence
of a specific, articulable source of the stress injury within the
conditions of the [workplace] and medical evidence that that
source could produce the kind of stress injury which the claimant
suffered. Thus, to support the ultimate finding that a psychological
injury arises out of the employment there must be a finding,
supported by the evidence, that within the obligations or conditions
of the workplace there was a specific, articulable source of injury
in the workplace and a finding, supported by medical evidence,
that the alleged source of the injury could have produced the kind
of injury the employee suffered.
The Chaney requirement grew out of a concern that in
psychological injury cases the legal concept of arising out of the
employment would become indistinguishable from medical
causation. I noted in Chaney that often the factfinders in stress
injury cases simply based their decisions solely on the testimonies
or reports of psychiatrists or psychologists. Where the legal test
for an injury arising out of the employment depends solely on the
persuasiveness of medical experts and not on any independent
findings on the conditions in the workplace or on the legal
significance of any such conditions, the term “arises out of”
37

McEvily v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., H&AS No. 83-172, OWC No. 0009410
(Feb. 13, 1984).
38
Wenzel v. British Airways, H&AS No. 84-308, OWC No. 0037916 (Oct. 4, 1986).
39
For almost twenty years, administrative law judges interchangeably substituted “would”
and “could” in the Dailey test; the Compensation Review Board ruled that doing so has little
impact on the outcome of a case. Ward v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth., CRB No. 24-03, AHD No.
03-355, OWC No. 563614 (Apr. 14, 2006).
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becomes synonymous with “medically induced, caused or
aggravated by.” Thus, once medical causation is established, the
inquiry for these factfinders ends.
***
In requiring more than a showing that an employee had a
medically harmful, psychologically adverse reaction to the work
environment, Chaney emphasized that it is the employment, and
not the make-up of the employee, which must account for the
source of the employee’s stress. If there is nothing discernible in
the employment which for articulable reasons would ordinarily
account for the employee’s severe reaction, then the employee’s
injury does not arise out of the employment. Thus, inasmuch as
Chaney directs attention to the work environment, and not to the
employee’s perception of his work environment, a factfinder has
an objective basis on which to make his findings.40
In a footnote in Dailey, the Director acknowledged that the test applied in
that case was a departure from the purely objective Chaney test. Pursuant to
Chaney, if the claimant proved an actual and specific source of stress and if the
medical evidence established a causal connection between that source and the
psychological injury, the injury was compensable as arising out of employment
regardless of whether the source of stress would have affected a person not
otherwise predisposed to the psychological injury; 41 however, even under the
Chaney test, if the claimant had a personal predisposition to the alleged
psychological injury, an additional “accidental injury” test was imposed. The
psychological injury “would not be considered ‘accidental’ if the resulting injury
was in essence the inevitable or unavoidable consequences of the worker’s
[personal] psychological make up, and the injury’s connection to the employment
was more coincidence than causally connected.”42
Returning to the Director’s analysis of the denial of benefits to Ms. Dailey,
the Director accepted that prior to her employment Ms. Dailey had had an
obsessive-compulsive character pattern and that she had not been exposed to an
unusually intense mental stimulus at work for 3M Company which would have
caused a psychological injury in another person not so predisposed,43 but the
40

Wenzel, H&AS No. 84-308.
Dailey, H&AS No. 85-259, at n.1. See also Young, 918 A.2d at 431 n.5 (mold exposure)
(“our workers’ compensation case law relating to workplace allergens dictates against any
assumption that, because a substance present in the Hospital may not have been at dangerous or
unhealthful levels for the general public, the substance could not cause an adverse reaction in a
particular claimant”); see Howard Univ. Hosp. v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 881
A.2d 567 (D.C. 2005) (latex allergy); Wash. Post v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs.,
853 A.2d 704 (D.C. 2004) (allergy to a newspaper printing chemical).
42
Dailey, H&AS No. 85-259, at n.1.
43
The Dailey test was interpreted to require more than “common” stressors for a
psychological injury to be compensable:
[W]hile the Dailey test does not by its terms have an explicit requirement of
“unusualness”, it does by implication assume that there is something out of the
ordinary, either intrinsically, or in the frequency, persistence, severity, or
41
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Director was not persuaded by Ms. Dailey’s arguments that her predisposition
was immaterial or that the aggravation of her pre-existing condition was
compensable. First, although the Director acknowledged an aggravation of a preexisting condition may be compensable, because Ms. Dailey’s injury did not arise
out of and in the course of her employment, there was no aggravation:
[T]o say that one’s working conditions have aggravated a preexisting condition, presupposes that legal causation has already
been established between the pre-existing condition and the injury
which is attributed to the employment conditions; but in this case,
legal causation was never established. The thrust of the
[administrative law judge’s] finding was that whatever emotional
problems claimant experienced were caused by her own personal
make up and non-work related factors, as opposed to being caused
by events or conditions of her employment.44
As for Ms. Dailey’s argument that 3M Company had not rebutted the
Presumption, Ms. Dailey had not introduced persuasive evidence of an injury
sustained during the scope of her employment;45 therefore, she had not invoked
the Presumption,46 and 3M Company had no duty to rebut it. Thereafter,
intensity, about the claimed stressors, at least in connection with their capacity
to produce incapacitating anxiety or emotional harm. There would be no point
to such a test in the first instance if normal, common stressors inherent in any or
most employment were sufficient for compensability purposes. All that would
be required in the absence of such characteristics would be straightforward
cause and effect, the rejection of which as the standard in this special class of
cases is the basis of the Dailey test.
Brown v. Bloomberg, L.P., CRB No. 05-45, OHA/AHD No. 02-392, OWC No. 568405 (Jan. 10,
2006). Proving a psychological injury no longer requires unusual stressors. Johnson v. Fed.
Express Corp., CRB No. 13-077, AHD No. 12-359, OWC No. 688463 (Feb. 5, 2014).
44
Dailey, H&AS No. 85-259. This circular argument overlooks that in order for an
aggravation to be compensable, the pre-existing condition need not be work-related. Jackson v.
D.C. Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 955 A.2d 728, 734 n.7 (D.C. 2008).
45
The requirement for “persuasive” evidence is significant for two reasons: (1) The Dailey
test must be satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence, and (2) persuasive evidence requires
weighing evidence when invoking the Presumption. Dailey, H&AS No. 85-259. In a physical
injury case, all that is required to invoke the Presumption is “some” evidence, and a credibility
determination at this stage is premature. See “Breaking Down the Test: Invoking the Presumption
of Compensability—Credible Evidence that the Work-Related Conditions or Events Existed or
Occurred,” infra.
46
The Director actually replaced the test for invoking the Presumption with the result of the
Presumption:
[I]n order for the presumption of compensability to arise, claimant must
establish by reliable, credible and probative evidence, the existence of an injury
and the fact that it occurred during the course of employment. Once these two
basic facts are established, the statutory presumption arises that the injury arose
out of the employment. In this case, claimant did not establish by reliable,
credible and probative evidence that her injury occurred during the course of her
employment; and therefore, the presumption of compensability did not arise.
Dailey, H&AS No. 85-259.
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satisfying the Dailey test by a preponderance of the evidence became a
prerequisite for invoking the Presumption:
Lastly, after determining, properly in our view, that Petitioner had
failed to meet the Dailey test, [the administrative law judge] went
on to weigh the evidence again, without reference to the
presumption. This step was unnecessary, because, if the Dailey
test is not met, the inquiry ends, and the claim is non-compensable.
In that the [administrative law judge’s] conclusion remained the
same, i.e, the claim was not compensable, we do point out that it
would have been error to grant the claim following this exercise.
If the actual conditions as found by the [administrative law judge]
based upon substantial evidence in the record are not such that an
average worker of normal sensitivities, not predisposed to
emotional or psychological injury, could be expected to suffer
the same or similar psychological injury as that claimed by a
claimant, then, under the Act, the claim must be denied.
Consistent with that, the place to “weigh” the medical evidence on
this potentiality question, at least initially, is in the presumption
stage.
***
Although we recognize the complexity to the proceedings that this
might add, requiring as it does findings of fact based upon the
record as a whole as part of the initial presumption analysis, we
can see no better way to proceed in this special class of cases in
which there is a test requiring those factual findings before
proceeding to whether in a specific given case there is an actual
causal relationship between the employment and the claimed
injury. Thus, while there is no possibility on this record of
conflicting outcomes between the pre-presumption analysis and the
outcome following weighing the evidence as a whole, the proper
place for the [administrative law judge] to have considered all the
record evidence of relevance to the Dailey test must be at this
initial stage.[47]
As early as September 1990, the Dailey test was being examined critically:
Although recovery for aggravation of a preexisting condition may
seem incompatible with the Dailey test’s focus on a hypothetical
employee who is not “predisposed” to injury, we do not read
Dailey to preclude recovery where a claimant comes to the job
47
Rawlings v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., CRB No. 04-65, AHD No. 04-123, OWC
No. 590774 (Jan. 19, 2006) abrogated by Ramey II, 997 A.2d 694. When originally adjudicated
pursuant to the Dailey test, Mr. Rawlings’ claim was denied; however, during the pendency of his
case, the standard changed to the Ramey test, and benefits were awarded. See Rawlings v. Wash.
Metro. Area Transit Auth., CRB No. 10-038, AHD 04-123, OWC No. 590774 (Sept. 8, 2011).
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with a preexisting psychological condition. Under Dailey, an
employee predisposed to psychic injury could recover if he is
exposed to work conditions so stressful that a normal employee
might have suffered similar injury. Thus, an employee with a
predisposition to mental illness is not precluded from recovering
under Dailey. Only when so interpreted is the Dailey standard
compatible with the [Private Sector] Workers’ Compensation
Act.48
Whether or not a claimant is predisposed to a psychological injury, the struggle to
strike the balance between compensating for psychological injuries and imposing
an objective test to confirm a work-related psychological injury began shortly
after Dailey issued (if not in Dailey itself).49
III. THE BEGINNING OF THE END: MCCAMEY I
In an attempt to reconcile the skepticism surrounding psychological
injuries with the liberal purpose of the Act, in 2008 the Court required the
Compensation Review Board revise the test for the compensability of physicalmental injury claims. The objective Dailey test was replaced with the subjective
McCamey test, but the transition was not a smooth one.
In the mid-1990’s, Ms. Charlene McCamey experienced a serious
psychological illness due in substantial part to her parents’ deaths.50 After
treating with Dr. Maria C. Hammill, Ms. McCamey resumed her regular
employment duties without limitation.51
On September 29, 2000 while working for the District of Columbia
Department of Public Schools, Ms. McCamey fell and injured her forehead, lower
back, and neck.52 As a result of this work-related accident causing physical
48
Spartin v. D.C. Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 584 A.2d 564, 570 (D.C. 1990), abrogated by
Ramey II, 997 A.2d 694.
49
In several cases decided throughout the next seventeen years, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals specifically endorsed the requirement that in order to be compensable, a
psychological injury claim filed by a person with a significant predisposition to a particular
psychological injury must involve an event at work which “could have affected someone else who
was not significantly predisposed to that type of injury.” McCamey v. D.C. Dep’t of Emp’t
Servs., 886 A.2d 543 (D.C. 2005) [hereinafter McCamey I] vacated, McCamey v. D.C. Dep’t of
Emp’t Servs., 896 A.2d 191 (D.C. 2006) [hereinafter McCamey II]; see also Landesberg v. D.C.
Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 794 A.2d 607 (D.C. 2002); Gary v. D.C. Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 723 A.2d
1205 (D.C. 1998); McKinley v. D.C. Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 696 A.2d 1377 (D.C. 1997); Charles
P. Young Co. v. D.C. Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 681 A.2d 451 (D.C. 1996); Sturgis v. D.C. Dep’t of
Emp’t Servs., 629 A.2d 547 (D.C. 1993); Porter v. D.C. Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 625 A.2d 886
(D.C. 1993). The Court even relied on the Dailey test when ruling on an appeal of a D.C. Police
and Firefighters Retirement and Disability Act claim for administrative sick leave necessitated by
an on-duty, psychological injury. Franchak v. D.C. Metro. Police Dep’t, 932 A.2d 1086 (D.C.
2007). All of these cases at least have been abrogated in part or overruled in part by McCamey II
or Ramey II.
50
McCamey v. D.C. Public Schools, OHA No. PBL02-031, DCP No. LT2-DDT002160 (Apr.
22, 2003).
51
Id.
52
Id.

SPRING 2021

WORK-RELATED PSYCHOLOGICAL INJURY C LAIM

37

injuries, Ms. McCamey also suffered from headaches, “depression, panic attacks,
confusion, auditory hallucinations, and memory loss.”53
Ms. McCamey returned to Dr. Hammill for treatment; Dr. Hammill opined
that the work-related accident had exacerbated Ms. McCamey’s pre-existing,
psychological disorder.54 An independent medical examiner, psychiatrist Bruce
Smoller, disagreed with Dr. Hammill; Dr. Smoller asserted the source of Ms.
McCamey’s psychological injury was her pre-existing psychosis, not her workrelated accident.55
Following a formal hearing, an administrative law judge denied Ms.
McCamey’s psychological injury claim for workers’ compensation disability
benefits.56 The administrative law judge’s appropriately based the decision the
Dailey test. Ms. McCamey had failed to prove “a person of normal sensibilities
with no history of mental illness would have suffered a similar psychological
injury.”57
On appeal, the Director affirmed the administrative law judge’s decision.58
His rationale was that “the evidence did not show[] that an individual who did not
have a pre-existing anxiety disorder would have suffered a psychological injury as
a result of trauma to the head.”59
On judicial review, the Court rejected Ms. McCamey’s argument that the
Dailey test was not applicable if the aggravation of a claimant’s pre-existing
psychological condition is caused by a physical injury rather than by job stress:
Nor is it decisive that [a claimant] cites a specific job-related
accident as the cause of her disorder rather than less easily
identified conditions of stress in the employment. Whatever the
triggering event or condition, the Director may properly apply a
rule for causation in this difficult area of emotional injury that
discourages spurious claims—one focusing on the objective
conditions of the job and their effect on the “normal employee” not
predisposed to the injury by a mental disorder. 60
Furthermore, the Court acknowledged that Ms. McCamey’s aggravation argument
was not “implausible in principle,”61 but because the Court “previously [had]
approved the Director’s analysis in Dailey and [had] applied it to the very kind of
situation [in Ms. McCamey’s case,]” it was “compelled” to affirm the denial of
benefits.62
53

McCamey I, 886 A.2d at 544.
McCamey, OHA No. PBL02-031.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
McCamey I at 545.
58
McCamey v. D.C. Pub. Sch., Dir. Dkt. No. 10-03, OHA No. PBL 02-031, OBA No. LT2DDT002160 (February 10, 2004) rev’d, McCamey II, 896 A.2d 191.
59
Id.
60
McCamey I, 886 A.2d at 547 (quoting Porter, 625 A.2d at 889) (emphasis removed).
61
Id. at 548.
62
Id. at 546.
54
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To this point, it was business as usual. The Court, however,
foreshadowed the next step: Ms. McCamey’s position, though ably
and conscientiously presented, founders upon our precedents, and
it cannot prevail unless those precedents [including Porter,
McEvily, and others] are overruled by the court sitting en banc.63
On March 15, 2006, the Court granted Ms. McCamey’s petition for en banc
review.64 McCamey I was vacated,65 and the Dailey test was on the brink of being
abrogated.
IV. THE SUBJECTIVE MCCAMEY STANDARD
More than two years after issuing McCamey I, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals reconsidered Ms. McCamey’s case en banc.66 Ms. McCamey
was a public sector employee.67 Nonetheless, the Court began its analysis of the
compensability of physical-mental injuries by explaining that, pursuant to the
Private Sector Workers’ Compensation Act, an aggravation of a pre-existing
condition is compensable even if non-employment related factors contribute to or
aggravate that condition.68 Because an employer must accept its employees with
the frailties that predispose them to injury, if a disability only arises out of
employment in part, the disability is compensable. 69
Unlike in the Private Sector Workers’ Compensation Act,70 the
aggravation rule is not codified in the Public Sector Workers’ Compensation Act;
however, the Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board71 previously had ruled
that an aggravation of a pre-existing injury (physical or psychological) is
compensable under the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act.72 Despite the
differences among these workers’ compensation acts, those differences did not
materially alter the Court’s analysis of Ms. McCamey’s physical-mental claim
because of the humanitarian purpose of workers’ compensation law in general;
the application of the well-settled principle that employers take their employees as
they find them applies to both private sector employees and public sector
employees, and:

63

Id. at 548.
McCamey II, 896 A.2d 191.
65
Id.
66
McCamey II.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 744 A.2d 992.
70
Section 32-1508(6)(A) of the Act states: “If an employee receives an injury, which
combined with a previous occupational or nonoccupational disability or physical impairment
causes substantially greater disability or death, the liability of the employer shall be as if the
subsequent injury alone caused the subsequent amount of disability.” Id.
71
The Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board is the administrative, appellate body
charged with reviewing claims based upon the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. §
8101 et seq. (the predecessor of the Public Sector Workers’ Compensation Act).
72
5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.
64
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The expansion of the objective test from mental-mental cases to
physical-mental cases is inconsistent with the language, legislative
history, and purpose of the [Private Sector] Workers’
Compensation Act and the [Public Sector Workers’ Compensation
Act]. Its application deprives an entire class of employees
(including claimants with pre-existing psychological conditions) of
compensation for injuries that they can prove are connected to
workplace accidents. Because the workers’ compensation statutes
exist for the purpose of compensating employees for work-related
injuries, the objective test (at least as applied to physical-mental
claims) is inconsistent with the statute and must be overturned. 73
Based on case law that progressively foreclosed workers’ compensation
benefits for claimants predisposed to psychological injury unless a normal or
average employee would have experienced a similar injury, the Dailey test shifted
the focus from an examination of the work environment to an examination of a
hypothetical third person and created a heightened standard for claimants with
pre-existing psychological conditions. As such, the Dailey test circumvented the
aggravation rule, and claimants with pre-existing conditions were prevented from
recovering for work-related injuries:
In the context of physical-mental disabilities, the physical accident
is the unexpected occurrence supplying the necessary (and
objective) workplace connection. Thus, in cases of physical injury,
so long as the claimant proffers competent medical evidence
connecting the mental disability to the physical accident (legal
causation), the claimant has either established a prima facie case of
aggravation or a new injury. That being the case, the objective test
is simply unnecessary. Put another way, the pure objective test is
always met in physical-mental cases, provided that the claimant
proves the connection between the mental condition and the
physical accident.74
Pursuant to McCamey II, as in physical injury cases, in private sector cases
where the Presumption applies, in order to invoke that presumption in physicalmental cases the claimant now must prove “the physical accident had the potential
of resulting in or contributing to the psychological injury.”75 In private sector
physical-mental cases where the Presumption has been rebutted and in public
sector physical-mental cases where there is no Presumption, the claimant must
prove “the physical accident caused or contributed to the psychological injury.”76
On remand from the Court, the Compensation Review Board summarized the new
rule in physical-mental cases as follows:
73

McCamey II, 947 A.2d at 1202.
Id. at 1208–09.
75
Id. at 1213.
76
Id. at 1214.
74
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[W]here a claimant in a physical-mental claim presents competent
medical evidence connecting a work related physical injury to a
claimed psychiatric injury the claimant has established a prima
facie case of either a new injury or an aggravation of a pre-existing
condition. Although this case is a claim under the public sector
act, the [C]ourt did not limit its ruling or rationale to that act, but
explicitly indicated that the ruling applies to the public and private
sector acts.
Thus, under the new rule, unlike in Dailey, the injured worker,
having established a causal link between the physical injury and
the employment, bears the burden of proving by a preponderance
of the evidence that the physical injury caused or contributed to the
claimed psychological injury. The injured worker satisfies this
burden by presenting evidence not only of the occurrence of the
physical injury, but also competent medical evidence showing the
physical injury caused or contributed to the psychological injury.
The [Court] wrote that “Where the presumption is either
inapplicable or has been rebutted, the burden falls on the claimant
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the physical
accident caused or contributed to the psychological injury”.
[McCamey II at 1214.] The [Court] went on to state that “In
determining whether a claimant has met his or her burden, [an
administrative law judge] must weigh and consider the evidence as
well as make credibility determinations [and may] of course
consider the reasonableness of the testimony and whether or not
particular testimony has been contradicted or corroborated by other
evidence.” Id.
This being a public sector case in which the presumption is
“inapplicable”, the quoted language suffices to explain the
standard. That is, the physical injury satisfies the causal link to
employment, and what remains is a consideration as to whether
there is competent medical evidence connecting the physical injury
to the claimed psychological injury, thereby establishing a prima
facie case of compensability of the psychological injury, which can
then only be defeated by employer presenting a preponderance of
countervailing evidence. The [C]ourt stressed that compensability
may be shown where the claimant has a pre-existing psychological
condition that is aggravated by the physical injury, if the
aggravation is a direct and natural result of the physical injury.77

77

McCamey v. D.C. Pub. Sch., CRB No. 10-03(R), AHD No. PBL 02-031, DCP No. LT2DDT002160 (June 17, 2008).
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The objective standard examining a claimant’s particular susceptibilities was
rejected, and the Dailey test was abolished.78
V.
THE MENTAL-MENTAL TEST: THE RAMEY TEST
In McCamey II the District of Columbia Court of Appeals specifically
refrained from crafting a test to establish the necessary connection between
employment and injury in mental-mental claims.79 Nonetheless, the Court
emphasized:
[A]ny test that prevents persons predisposed to psychological
injury from recovering in all cases is inconsistent with the
legislative history and humanitarian purpose of the [Private Sector
Workers’ Compensation Act and the Public Sector Workers’
Compensation Act]. Accordingly, if the [Compensation Review]
Board decides that a special test for mental-mental claims remains
desirable, it must be one focused purely on verifying the factual
reality of stressors in the work-place environment, rather than one
requiring the claimant to prove that he or she was not predisposed
to psychological injury or illness, or that a hypothetical average or
healthy person would have suffered a similar psychological injury,
before recovery is authorized.80
Less than a month after McCamey II issued, the Court remanded a private
sector, post-traumatic stress disorder case for reconsideration in light of its
McCamey II decision—Ramey v. Potomac Electric Power Company.81
Mr. Benjamin Ramey reported to work as a conduit installer for Potomac
Electric Power Company just before midnight on August 29, 2003.82 Mr. Ramey
reported to a supervisor’s office for a job assignment, but based upon several
observable signs, the supervisor accused Mr. Ramey of drinking.83 The
supervisor transported Mr. Ramey to the employer’s downtown location and
denied Mr. Ramey’s requests to use a restroom and smoke. 84 For two hours,
another supervisor attempted to arrange a breathalyzer test for Mr. Ramey. 85
Mr. Ramey, his supervisor, a union representative, and a senior labor
relations specialist eventually loaded into an automobile and drove to a medical
facility about an hour south of the employer’s downtown location.86 The other

78

Id.
McCamey II, 947 A.2d at 1214.
80
Id. The Court’s warning here is similar to the caution issued in Young. See Young, 918
A.2d 427.
81
Ramey v. Potomac Electric Power Co, OHA No. 05-318, OWC No. 608087 (Mar. 17,
2006).
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id.
79
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men denied Mr. Ramey’s requests to use a restroom, eat, or drink. 87 When the
facility could not perform a breathalyzer test, the group traveled to another
facility; however, this facility also could not perform a breathalyzer test, so the
group returned to the employer’s downtown location.88
Almost twelve hours after he reported to work, Mr. Ramey’s employer
gave him two successive breathalyzer tests.89 The first reading was 0.070. 90 The
second reading was 0.065. After his employer inspected his car, Mr. Ramey
drove home and went to bed.91
Mr. Ramey’s employer suspended him.92 He later resumed his usual
duties, but his employer placed him on decision-making leave, which required
participation in an alcohol rehabilitation program, three years’ probation, and
random drug and alcohol testing during the first two years of probation. 93
Mr. Ramey participated in the alcohol rehabilitation program for two
weeks.94 However, because he continued to drink, the program discharged him. 95
The next day, Mr. Ramey went to the Howard University Hospital
emergency room for arm numbness and tingling. 96 Shortly thereafter, he sought
psychiatric treatment and filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits as a
result of post-traumatic stress disorder induced by his treatment on and about
August 30, 2003.97 Applying the Dailey test, an administrative law judge denied
Mr. Ramey’s claim for relief:
The credible version of the events surrounding claimant’s activities
on August 30, 2003 does not reflect the presence of stressors which
would cause emotional injury to a person not predisposed to such
injury. In that the evidence adduced by claimant has not invoked
the presumption of compensability, his claim for relief, pursuant to
the District of Columbia Workers’ Compensation Act, must fail.
Claimant testified, at hearing and at his deposition, that he was
forcibly detained with implied threats of physical harm; that he
was driven around in the dark for hours with intimidating
companions who did not respond to his questions about where and
why they were traveling; that he urinated on himself because he
was not allowed to use a restroom; that it was obvious to his
companions that he wet himself; that they laughed at him for
urinating on himself and that they later told co-workers, who
87

Id.
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id.
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ridiculed him when he returned to work. Claimant believes he was
treated like a dog or an animal, and remembers that the way he was
treated made him feel “like dirt.”
Claimant was wearing pale grey coveralls the morning of
August 30, 2003; he believes that the front of his pants all the way
down to his shins, was wet with dark stains after he urinated on
himself. He says that he felt humiliated and embarrassed when,
according to him, Mr. Johnson and Mr. Negussie looked at his
soiled pants and snickered. According to claimant’s testimony,
when he returned to work after the five-day suspension he was
embarrassed because he believed co-workers were talking about
him urinating on himself. However, these perceptions were not
corroborated by evidence from any other source.
Rather, the credible record evidence indicates that claimant was
visibly inebriated, unsteady on his feet, and incoherent; that he was
not forcibly restrained or coerced into going; that he understood
that he was being driven to find a facility which would administer
a Breathalyzer test; that it was not dark when he and the other
PEPCO employees (including a union representative who had
identified himself to claimant and was there to look out for
claimant’s interests) left the downtown office; that they were
driving around trying to find a facility for no longer than five
hours; that the atmosphere in the car was friendly and relaxed
rather than oppressive, and that no one in the car or at the office
(again, including the union representative who was present to look
out for claimant), was aware of claimant’s urinating on himself.
Clearly, it is claimant’s perception of the events of August 30,
2003, rather than the actual incident, which impacted his emotional
state. Said perception, which does not reflect the reality which
would have been experienced by the “normal employee”, cannot
invoke the presumption that the actual incidences had the potential
to cause emotional injury.98
The Compensation Review Board affirmed the administrative law judge’s
ruling.99 However, because McCamey II was decided while this case was still
pending before the Court, it vacated the Compensation Review Board’s Decision
and Order affirming the Compensation Order. 100
98

Id.
Ramey v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., CRB No. 06-38, AHD No. 05-318, OWC No. 608087
( June 14, 2006).
100
Ramey v. D.C. Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 950 A.2d 33 (D.C. 2008) [hereinafter Ramey I].
On remand, Mr. Ramey’s claim for benefits, again, was denied. Ramey v. Potomac Elec. Power
Co., OHA No. 05-318, OWC No. 608087 (D.C. Dept. Emp. Srvs. August 25, 2008), aff’d, Ramey
99
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In McCamey II, the Court had been unwilling to create a “carefully crafted
test to establish the necessary connection between mental injury and work” that
was appropriate for cases involving mental-mental claims where the objectively
verifiable work connection may be less than apparent.101 That responsibility fell
to the Compensation Review Board so it developed the Ramey test for mentalmental injuries:
[A]n injured worker alleging a mental-mental claim invokes the
statutory presumption of compensability by showing a
psychological injury and actual workplace conditions or events
which could have caused or aggravated the psychological injury.
The injured worker’s showing must be supported by competent
medical evidence. The [administrative law judge], in determining
whether the injured worker invoked the presumption, must make
findings that the workplace conditions or events existed or
occurred, and must make findings on credibility. If the
presumption is invoked, the burden shifts to the employer to show,
through substantial evidence, the psychological injury was not
caused or aggravated by workplace conditions or events. If the
employer succeeds, the statutory presumption drops out of the case
entirely and the burden reverts to the injured worker to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the workplace conditions or
events caused or aggravated the psychological injury.102
In Ramey II, the Court commented “the [Compensation Review] Board
essentially adopted the test announced by this [Court] in McCamey [II] for use in
physical-mental cases[] for application in mental-mental cases.”103 The McCamey
and Ramey tests now apply in all work-related psychological injury cases in the
District of Columbia.
VI.

BREAKING DOWN THE TEST: INVOKING THE
PRESUMPTION OF COMPENSABILITY
In McCamey II, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals created the
current test for invoking the Presumption in a physical-mental claim: in a private
sector case, the claimant must show “the physical accident had the potential of
resulting in or contributing to the psychological injury.”104 In other words, a
claimant invokes the Presumption by demonstrating correlation or general
causation (the physical accident has the potential to cause or to contribute to a
psychological injury), not specific causation (the physical accident actually
caused or contributed to a psychological injury in this claimant).
v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., CRB No. 08-217, AHD No. 05-318, OWC No. 608087 (D.C. Dept.
Emp. Srvs. October 29, 2008), aff’d, Ramey II, 997 A.2d 694.
101
Ramey I, 950 A.2d at 35 (quoting McCamey II, 947 A.2d at 1214).
102
Ramey on Remand, CRB No. 06-38(R).
103
Ramey II, 997 A.2d at 700.
104
McCamey II, 947 A.2d at 1213.
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In a case involving a mental-mental injury, there is no physical accident to
supply an obvious, yet necessary, workplace connection. Instead, pursuant to
Ramey, the claimant “invokes the statutory presumption of compensability by
showing a psychological injury and actual workplace conditions or events which
could have caused or aggravated the psychological injury.”105 Invoking involves
an issue of general causation; however, the Compensation Review Board replaced
the missing physical accident with (1) a credibility determination and (2)
competent medical evidence connecting the mental disability to the physical
accident.
Whether the injury is physical or psychological, the issue at this stage of a
workers’ compensation claim is not one of specific causation but only potential
causation—a distinct difference between workers’ compensation litigation and
tort litigation. From the outset in a civil lawsuit, the plaintiff has the burden of
proving actual causation between an act and an injury. In a tort case for
intentional infliction of emotional distress, the defendant’s outrageous conduct
actually must cause the plaintiff’s severe emotional distress. Proving the
defendant’s outrageous conduct has the potential to cause severe emotional
distress is not enough to prevail. In a tort case for negligent infliction of
emotional distress, the defendant’s actions must have, “in fact, caused serious
emotional distress to the plaintiff,”106 proving the defendant’s actions could have
caused serious emotional distress is not enough to prevail.
There also is a distinct difference between the proof necessary to invoke
the Presumption in a workers’ compensation claim for a physical injury and the
proof necessary to invoke the Presumption in a workers’ compensation claim for a
psychological injury. For example, Mr. Walter McNeal, Jr. invoked the
Presumption in his workers’ compensation claim for a physical injury through
testimony deemed not credible:
On December 3, 2002, Claimant was standing in the lower level of
the bus garage, talking to a co-worker, Felton Lowery, when a bus
rounded the corner behind where Claimant was standing. As the
bus passed Claimant, it made a minor brush with Claimant’s upper
back and shoulder area, but the contact was insufficient to cause
Claimant to experience any significant force or trauma.
***
Claimant was not injured as a result of this incident, and none of
the medical care which Claimant subsequently received, and none
of the disability experienced following the surgery, was causally
related to a work injury, there being no such injury.107
The administrative law judge did not believe the incident described by
Mr. McNeal had occurred, and the history Mr. McNeal had recounted to his
105

Ramey on Remand, CRB No. 06-38(R).
Hedgepeth, 22 A.3d at 811.
107
McNeal v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., OHA No. 03-353, 2003 WL 23303757 (D.C.
Dept. Emp. Servs. Sept. 30, 2003).
106
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treating and evaluating physicians included an incident “far more serious and
traumatic”108 than the one the administrative law judge found actually had
occurred. Nonetheless, Mr. McNeal’s discounted testimony and the medical
evidence premised upon his reported history sufficed to invoke the
Presumption.109
On the other hand, because of the Ramey criteria, Ms. Lakeisha Lewis
failed to invoke the “presumption” in her mental-mental case when the
administrative law judge did not find credible her testimony regarding workplace
events and conditions:
Claimant’s testimony and Claimant[’]s reciting of events as listed
in the records of Dr. Bartlett and Dr. Major Lewis cannot be found
to be credible. Both the workplace event or condition did not exist
as described by Claimant that would lead to a determination that
Claimant invoked the presumption under Ramey that her injury
arose out of and in the course of her employment.110
The Presumption is the starting point of the causation analysis, and there is
no distinction in the Act between physical injuries and psychological injuries.
The threshold for invoking the Presumption is higher for psychological injuries
than it is for physical injuries; however, when invoking the Presumption, any
suspicion of deception should apply equally, and the proof needed to invoke the
Presumption in a case for a physical injury or in a case for a psychological injury
should be the same.
VII.

BREAKING DOWN THE TEST: INVOKING THE
PRESUMPTION OF COMPENSABILITY—CREDIBLE
EVIDENCE THAT THE WORKPLACE CONDITIONS OR
EVENTS EXISTED OR OCCURRED
A claimant alleging a physical injury invokes the Presumption by
presenting “some evidence” of a disability and of a work-related event, activity,
or requirement that has the potential to cause or to contribute to the disability. 111
A claimant usually invokes the Presumption through direct testimony, and at this
108

Id.
This issue was beyond challenge before the Court of Appeals:
[The employer] does not challenge the [administrative law judge’s]
determination that McNeal triggered the presumption of a “medical causal
relationship between [the] alleged disability and the accidental injury,” and it
could not fairly do so. McNeal’s testimony and various medical records
reported that he was at work when a bus struck his back and neck and that
shortly thereafter he was diagnosed with neck injuries. As the [Compensation
Review Board] recognized, the [administrative law judge] “properly shifted the
burden to [the employer] to produce evidence that is substantial, specific and
comprehensive enough to sever the potential employment connection.”
McNeal v. D.C. Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 917 A.2d 652, 656 (D.C. 2007).
110
Lewis v. Wash. Metro. Transit Auth., AHD No. 19-387, OWC No. 779868 (D.C. Dept. of
Emp. Servs. Dec. 4, 2019).
111
Ferreira, 531 A.2d at 655.
109
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stage of a workers’ compensation case involving a physical injury—even if the
claimant’s testimony is not credible—the Presumption can be invoked by that
testimony.112 Based upon these fundamental tenets of District of Columbia
workers’ compensation law, the Compensation Review Board inaccurately
summarized the McCamey test. In McCamey II, the Court wrote:
Thus, we hold that it is appropriate to apply the causal standards
seen throughout D.C. workers’ compensation cases. In cases
where the statutory presumption is applicable, the claimant must
show that the physical accident had the potential of resulting in or
contributing to the psychological injury. See Smith, supra, 934
A.2d at 435 (quoting Mexicano v. District of Columbia Dep’t of
[Employment Servs.,] 806 A.2d 198, 204 (D.C. 2002)) (“‘To
benefit from the statutory presumption, the employee need only
show some evidence of a disability and a work-related event or
activity which has the potential of resulting in or contributing to
the disability.’”). Where the presumption is either inapplicable or
has been rebutted, the burden falls on the claimant to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the physical accident caused or
contributed to the psychological injury. See Washington Post v.
District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 852 A.2d 909,
911 (D.C. 2004). In determining whether a claimant has met his or
her burden, [an administrative law judge] must weigh and consider
the evidence as well as make credibility determinations. In this
regard, the [administrative law judge] may of course consider the
112

Storey, 162 A.3d at 797. Agreeing with a lengthy dissent written by the author of this
article, the Court specifically ruled that an administrative law judge is not to make credibility
determinations when assessing whether a claimant’s testimony invokes the Presumption in a
physical injury case:
This appeal asks us to consider whether an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) is
authorized to make credibility determinations and weigh a claimant’s evidence
in determining whether the claimant has met his or her “threshold requirement,”
to be entitled to the statutory presumption of compensability. For the reasons
that follow, we hold that an ALJ may not assess the credibility of a claimant’s
evidence at this initial stage. Instead, the claimant is entitled to the statutory
presumption that the injury arose during the course of employment and therefore
entitled to workers’ compensation benefits, so long as he or she presents “some
evidence” to establish a prima facie case of a work-related injury. Wash. Post v.
District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 852 A.2d 909, 911 (D.C. 2004).
The burden is then on the employer to rebut the presumption that an employee’s
injury was, in fact, not related to his or her employment. Id. The employer can
rebut the presumption by proffering substantial evidence of non-causation, i.e.,
evidence that is “specific and comprehensive enough” that a “reasonable mind
might accept it as adequate to contradict the presumed connection between the
event at work and the employee’s subsequent disability.” Id. (footnote, citation,
internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). This, again, is not a matter as to
which the ALJ is to make credibility determinations. Only if the employer is
able to rebut the presumption and the burden returns to the claimant is the ALJ
entitled to make credibility determinations.
Id. at 797.
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reasonableness of the testimony and whether or not particular
testimony has been contradicted or corroborated by other
evidence.113
In other words, the Court ruled the weighing and credibility considerations
should take place after the employer has rebutted the Presumption. However, the
Compensation Review Board requires a credibility determination to invoke the
Presumption in psychological injury cases.
In order to invoke the Presumption in mental-mental cases, the claimant
must offer credible evidence of a psychological injury and actual workplace
conditions or events that could have caused or aggravated the psychological
injury supported by competent medical evidence. 114 The added credibility
requirement is an obvious attempt to ensure the work-related condition or event as
reported by the claimant actually existed or occurred; however, whether the
claimant’s injury is physical or psychological in order to arise out of and in the
course of employment, the work-related condition or event as reported by the
claimant must actually exist or occur. Thus, if assessing the credibility of a
claimant’s testimony at this stage of a physical injury case is an inappropriate
weighing of the evidence, assessing the credibility of a claimant’s testimony at
this stage of a psychological injury case also is premature. 115 Nonetheless,
because the Compensation Review Board adopted this added requirement for
mental-mental cases, the objectivity of the credibility determination must remain
focused on the work environment; it cannot focus on the claimant’s perception or
characterization of the work environment. 116
Mr. Phillip A. Taylor, a mechanic, checked a vehicle that came into his
employer’s shop and, upon inspection, found the tires worn out, struts improperly
installed, and alignment to be off. He reported this information to the shop
manager, who instructed him to replace the tires, ignore the remaining problems,
113

McCamey II, 947 A.2d at 1213–14 (emphasis added).
Ramey on Remand, CRB No. 06-38(R).
115
See Storey, 162 A.3d at 804:
If, as the majority of the [Compensation Review Board] and [the employer]
claim, an [administrative law judge] is allowed to discredit an employee’s
evidence at the presumption stage, without even needing to consider the
employer’s rebuttal evidence, then the statutory purpose of the presumption
would be contravened. Essentially, the burden of proof would be on the
employee to demonstrate that he or she suffered a work-related injury, rather
than on the employer to show that the claimant did not suffer such an injury.
That formulation of the burden of proof is in tension with what the Council
intended when it enacted the statutory presumption. See D.C. Council, Report
on Bill 3-106, supra, at 15 (burden is on the employer to demonstrate that
employee did not suffer a compensable injury); see, e.g., McNeal, 917 A.2d at
658 (a claimant only has the burden when employer presents evidence that
“rebut[s] the presumed causal connection”); see also Clark Constr. Grp., Inc. v.
District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 123 A.3d 199, 203 (D.C. 2015)
(court will look to the legislative history where there are persuasive reasons to
do so).
116
Price-Richardson v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., CRB No. 16-015, AHD No. 13-431,
OWC No. 703466 (Jul. 8, 2016).
114
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and sign a ticket indicating he had performed all the work. Mr. Taylor was
concerned that not addressing all of the problems could result in an accident and
serious injuries, but the shop manager told Mr. Taylor to “sign the ticket and let it
go.”117 That night, Mr. Taylor began crying, had difficulty driving, and could not
sleep.
The next day, a customer specifically requested an oil change using 5W30
weight oil. Because the shop was out of that grade, the manager instructed Mr.
Taylor to use 10W30 weight oil instead. Furthermore, when Mr. Taylor was on
his way to inform the customer about the change in the grade of oil, the manager
instructed him to use the 10W30 weight oil without telling the customer. Shortly
thereafter, Mr. Taylor left work because of stomach problems and an inability to
stand; he did not return to work and received treatment for depression.
An administrative law judge ruled that although Mr. Taylor’s
psychological injury occurred in the course of employment, it did not arise out of
employment. The Director reversed the Compensation Order and awarded
benefits because the administrative law judge had disregarded the fact that the
actual work conditions Mr. Taylor asserted had caused his psychological injury
existed:
On the one hand, the [administrative law judge] appears to have
accepted claimant’s testimony that the events on December 30th
and 31st did in fact occur, and that claimant suffers from
depression. On the other hand, however, the [administrative law
judge] made the finding that claimant’s depression resulted from
his perception of events (that the new management was unethical)
in the workplace. Thus, the [administrative law judge’s] finding
that claimant’s depression resulted from claimant’s perception of
events in the workplace is not in accordance with the evidence, and
said finding does not rationally flow from the evidence. Therefore,
the [administrative law judge’s] finding must be reversed as a
matter of law.
***
As to claimant’s disability, the parties do not dispute that claimant
suffers from a psychological impairment that could have been
caused from the work. (HT 134, 137).
The question is whether claimant made a showing that the stressors
complained of were actual conditions of the employment and not
merely a subjective perception of the working conditions.
Claimant provided uncontradicted testimony that management
instructed him not to inform a customer that the services provided
were not what the customer had requested. Specifically, the
customer requested 5W30 weight oil, and since the employer did
not have 5W30 in stock it substituted with 10W30 weight oil and
117

Taylor v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Dir. Dkt. No. 96-96, H&AS No. 93-285, OWC No.
236937 (Feb. 24, 1997).
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refused to permit the claimant to inform the customer. Claimant
also testified regarding the potential damage a different oil weight
could cause to an engine. Claimant provided further
uncontradicted testimony regarding management’s refusal to
permit him to inform a customer that replacement of tires on her
vehicle would not completely resolve the whole problem with the
vehicle. Claimant also testified that to leave the vehicle in the
condition as directed by the employer could result in a failure of
the vehicle’s steering mechanism and result in serious injuries.
***
Consequently, based on this record, the claimant has adduced
substantial evidence that his reaction was from actual events that
did in fact occur in the workplace.
***
In the instant case, although the claimant has made a prima facie
showing (sufficient to invoke the presumption of compensability)
that his actual working conditions could have caused his
psychological injury, pursuant to Ferreira, supra. A special
standard has been carved out for non[-]traumatically caused mental
injuries. Thus, the focus in such case is whether the stressors of
the job [were] so great that they would have caused harm to an
average person. See Dail[e]y v. 3M Company and Northwest
National Insurance Co., H&AS No. 85-259 (Final Compensation
Order May 19, 1988). In the present case, based on the evidence
that claimant was instructed to participate in employer’s deceptive
practices as a condition of employment, claimant has established
that the conditions on his job were such that they could have
caused harm to an average person. Id.118
One of the problems demonstrated by Taylor is that the Dailey test had
implemented an additional requirement for invoking the Presumption beyond a
determination of whether or not the work-related conditions and events as
reported by the claimant actually existed or occurred. Mr. Taylor made a showing
that “his actual working conditions could have caused his psychological
injury.”119 At that point, the Presumption was invoked, and rather than shift the
focus to “an average person,” the burden should have shifted to the employer to
rebut the Presumption. Instead, Mr. Taylor’s claim for a psychological injury he
proved could have been caused by work-related events would have been barred by
Dailey’s version of objective verifiability if a third person would not have
sustained a psychological injury as a result of the work-related events Mr. Taylor
actually experienced.
The Dailey test attempted to create objective verification of a
psychological injury by imposing a hypothetical third-party requirement that an
“average person not predisposed to such injury would have suffered a similar
118
119

Id.
Id.
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injury.”120 Dailey’s inappropriate standard did not prove or disprove causation,
and that condition has been replaced by a requirement that credible evidence
objectively verifies the existence of the workplace conditions or events that
allegedly caused the mental-mental injury. This new credibility condition
precedent is unique to invoking the Presumption in mental-mental cases.
Although it arguably satisfies the underlying policy requirement that only injuries
arising out of and in the course of employment are compensable as workers’
compensation claims, it imposes an additional requirement for invoking the
Presumption in cases for psychological injuries that is not required in other cases.
VIII. BREAKING DOWN THE TEST: INVOKING THE
PRESUMPTION OF COMPENSABILITY—COMPETENT
MEDICAL EVIDENCE THAT THE WORKPLACE COULD
HAVE CAUSED THE MENTAL-MENTAL INJURY
In order to invoke the Presumption in a mental-mental case, the claimant
must present credible evidence of a psychological injury and actual workplace
conditions or events which could have caused or aggravated that psychological
injury. In addition, the claimant’s proof must be supported by competent medical
evidence.121 However, there is no regulation governing what constitutes
competent medical evidence. 122
In Ramey, on remand the administrative law judge summarized the
medical evidence sufficient to invoke the Presumption as follows:
In the instant case, the claim for benefits is premised upon an
alleged psychological injury caused or aggravated by workplace
stress (“mental-mental” claim). Claimant herein invokes the
statutory presumption of compensability by showing a
psychological injury and actual workplace conditions or events
which could have caused or aggravated the psychological injury.
Documentary evidence of a psychological injury includes the
reports of Dr. Carl Douthitt and clinical social worker Radhika
Joglekar. Claimant has adduced competent medical evidence to
support his contention that the record events which occurred
between August 30, 2003 and November 3, 2003 could have
caused or aggravated a psychological injury. 123

120

McCamey II at 1201.
Ramey on Remand, CRB No. 06-38(R).
122
The opinion of a licensed clinical social worker qualifies as competent medical evidence
sufficient to invoke the Presumption. Howard v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., CRB No. 12147(1), AHD No. 12-109, OWC No. 683290 (Oct. 30, 2013). The medical records relied on to
invoke the Presumption do not have to have been based upon a contemporaneous medical
examination. Thomas v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., CRB No. 08-226, AHD No. 08-037,
OWC No. 635214 (Mar. 22, 2010).
123
Ramey v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., OHA No. 05-318, OWC No. 608087 (Aug. 25, 2008)
aff’d, Ramey v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., CRB No. 08-217, AHD No. 05-318, OWC No. 608087
(Oct. 29, 2008) aff’d, Ramey II, 997 A.2d 694.
121
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Not a single medical opinion is quoted as a basis for general causation; the
administrative law judge relied upon just the existence of unexplained medical
records as competent medical evidence to invoke the Presumption.
An absence of medical evidence should not qualify as competent medical
evidence, and at least arguably, even though methodology and conclusion are
closely related when mental health experts assess diagnosis and causation, a
doctor’s reliance solely upon a claimant’s subjective history to form an opinion
regarding causation also should not qualify because the history of a work-related
event alone does not answer the question of whether that event had the potential
to cause or aggravate a psychological injury. 124 The mere manifestation of
symptoms while at work is not compensable:
[T]here are some injuries so thoroughly disconnected from the
workplace that they cannot be said to “aris[e] out of or in the
course of employment.” See 1 ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K.
LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 4.02 (2011)
(Some risks have “origins of harm so clearly personal that, even if
they take effect while the employee is on the job, they could not
possibly be attributed to the employment.”).125
Regardless of what evidence qualifies as competent medical evidence, the
requirement of offering competent medical evidence that supports the claimant’s
showing of a psychological injury and actual workplace conditions or events
which could have caused or aggravated the psychological injury in order to
invoke the Presumption is another requirement unique to work-related
psychological injury claims. 126 There is no such requirement in work-related
physical injury claims:
The statutory presumption applies as much to the nexus between
an employee’s malady and his employment activities as it does to
any other aspect of a claim. Swinton v. Kelly, 180 U.S. App. D.C.
at 223, 554 F.2d at 1082 (construing the Longshoremen’s and
Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, the predecessor of the Act.)
[The claimant] was not obliged to present expert opinion of
causation in order to enjoy the benefit of the presumption. “It was
not [his] burden to do that unless and until the employer presented
sufficient evidence to rebut the presumed causal connection.” Id.

A claimant’s history of symptom development and positive response to removal from the
work environment may permit a doctor to make an appropriate diagnosis or treatment
recommendations, but neither a diagnosis nor treatment is the same as an opinion regarding
causation.
125
Muhammad D.C. Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 34 A.3d 488, 496 (D.C. 2012) (footnote omitted).
126
Storey, 162 A.3d at 803 (“Physical injury cases differ from ‘mental-mental’ cases because
they do not require the claimant ‘to present expert opinion of causation in order to enjoy the
benefit of the presumption’”).
124
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at 223 n.35, 554 F.2d at 1082 n.35. Because [the employer] did
not present such evidence, the presumption controls. 127
Again, the threshold for invoking the Presumption is higher in
psychological injury claims than it is in physical injury claims. In order to
maintain fidelity to workers’ compensation policies and principles, it shouldn’t
be—but even under the Ramey test, it must be invoked properly and reasonably.
IX.

BREAKING DOWN THE TEST: REBUTTING THE
PRESUMPTION OF COMPENSABILITY
After a claimant has invoked the Presumption in a mental-mental case, in
order to rebut the Presumption, an employer must “show, through substantial
evidence,128 the psychological injury was not caused or aggravated by workplace
conditions or events.”129 This obligation is the same in a physical injury case:
This presumption operates, though, only “in the absence of
evidence to the contrary.” D.C. CODE § 32-1521. “Once the
presumption is triggered, the burden is upon the employer to bring
forth ‘substantial evidence’ showing that death or disability did not
arise out of and in the course of employment.” Ferreira, 531 A.2d
at 655 (citation omitted). The employer’s evidence simply needs
to be “specific and comprehensive enough,” id. (citation omitted),
that “a reasonable mind might accept [it] as adequate” [footnote
omitted] to contradict the presumed causal connection between the
event at work and the employee’s subsequent disability. See, e.g.,
Safeway Stores, Inc. v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment
Servs., 806 A.2d 1214, 1219-20 (D.C. 2002). Accordingly, while
we have said that “the presumption of compensability cannot be
overcome merely ‘by some isolated evidence,’” Whittaker v.
District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 668 A.2d 844,
847 (D.C. 1995) (citation omitted), neither is the presumption “so
strong as to require the employer to prove that causation is
impossible in order to rebut it.” Washington Hosp. Ctr. v. District
of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 744 A.2d 992, 1000
(D.C. 2000) (emphasis in the original). 130
To meet its burden, an employer usually offers an opinion from an
independent medical examiner: “[A]n employer has met its burden to rebut the
presumption of causation when it has proffered a qualified independent medical
expert who, having examined the employee and reviewed the employee’s medical
127

McNeal, 917 A.2d at 658.
“Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Children’s Def. Fund v. D.C.
Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 726 A.2d 1242, 1247 (D.C. 1999).
129
Ramey on Remand, CRB No. 06-38(R).
130
Wash. Post, 852 A.2d at 911.
128
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records, renders an unambiguous opinion that the work injury did not contribute
to the disability.”131
Moreover, an employer’s burden is not satisfied if a doctor espouses
anything but a clear and unambiguous opinion that employment conditions and
the claimant’s disability are not related in any way because if the claimant’s
employment contributes to an injury even in part, that injury is compensable. The
difference between invoking the Presumption and rebutting the Presumption is
that to invoke the Presumption, the claimant’s medical evidence must support
general causation, but in order to rebut the Presumption, the employer’s medical
evidence must include a negative opinion regarding specific causation.
Although causation opinions offered when invoking the Presumption and
causation opinions offered when rebutting the Presumption are both subjective,
the worker an independent medical examiner observes, arguably, differs from the
worker the treating physician observes. The treating physician examines a patient
seeking help; the independent medical examiner scrutinizes a claimant seeking
benefits mired in litigation. These differences may affect multiple aspects of the
examination, the resulting opinions, and the weighing of the evidence.
X.

BREAKING DOWN THE TEST: WEIGHING THE EVIDENCE
If and only if an employer presents substantial evidence that the claimant’s
psychological injury is not caused or aggravated by workplace conditions or
events, the administrative law judge weighs the evidence. When weighing the
evidence, the burden returns to the claimant to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the psychological injury arose out of and in the course of
employment.132 At this point in the analysis, the claimant does not receive the
benefit of the Presumption, and even though causation may be difficult to prove,
there is no provision for relaxing that burden.
A psychological injury, be it depression or anxiety or post-traumatic stress
disorder, is not a signature disease specifically linked to conditions of
employment. When a claimant reports to a doctor for treatment, the doctor
assesses the situation for therapeutic purposes, not for liability purposes.
Importantly, neither a claimant’s subjective history nor a diagnosis is a cause, and
little effort, if any, may be given to ruling in or ruling out non-employmentrelated causes or even objective reality. Undoubtedly, the complex interaction of
multiple conditions and circumstances is difficult to untangle, but when arriving
at an opinion of causation for purposes of liability, some effort is necessary. If
that opinion is based upon the claimant’s subjective complaints without some
forensic effort, it is conjecture, and all it does is bolster the claimant’s credibility
regarding whether a particular event actually occurred and the claimant’s opinion
whether a particular event caused or contributed to the claimant’s psychological
injury.133
131

Id. at 910.
McCamey II at 1214.
133
For example, Ms. Galina Hamlett alleged her psychological injury was caused by stress at
work from verbal attacks and a non-supportive work environment. Based upon this history, Ms.
Hamlett’s treating psychiatrist diagnosed her with psychosis not otherwise specified. An
132
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Admittedly, because “[m]ental disorders result from an extraordinarily
complex interrelation between an individual’s internal or subjective reality and his
external or environmental reality,”134 a precise causation determination may be
impossible. Precision, however, is not necessary in a District of Columbia
workers’ compensation case; so long as employment conditions contribute to the
existence or aggravation of an injury, that injury is compensable. 135 Thus, even
though there is no provision for relaxing the burden of proof, for a psychological
injury to be compensable, employment only needs to contribute to the
psychological injury.
XI. CONCLUSION
The issue isn’t whether or not work-related psychological injuries should
be compensable. The issue is how to prove compensability in a way that avoids
stressing out the entire workers’ compensation community. The three main
arguments for a heightened standard of proof in psychological injury cases focus
on the prejudices against psychological injuries:

1. Mental injuries are subjective.
2. It is difficult, if not impossible, to apportion personal stressors and
industrial stressors.
3. A psychological injury is difficult to disprove.
Feeding off these arguments, the error in the Dailey test was that it didn’t focus on
employment conditions; it focused on whether another person would have
administrative law judge did not accept the doctor’s testimony as competent medical evidence
because that opinion just adopted Ms. Hamlett’s reported history:
The treating physician testimony is rejected since it is not based on objective
evidence such as prior medical records, knowledge of workplace stressors, or
knowledge of Claimant’s previous mental history.
Based upon Claimant’s failure to invoke the presumption of compensability
because the distinct injury that she suffered did not have the potential of
resulting in or contributing to her disability, Claimant is not entitled to the
presumption of compensability for mental-mental injury established under
Ramey [I]. Claimant did not present objective medical evidence since her
treating physician relied solely upon Claimant’s history for the cause of her
psychotic condition.
Hamlett v. Telesec Corestaff, AHD No. 08-020, OWC No. 635852 (Apr. 21, 2009). The Director
recognized this problem more than thirty years ago:
This proceeding also demonstrates the undesirability of relying solely on
psychiatric evidence; for often physicians who find a work-connection in the
occurrence of an injury are not necessarily concerned about whether the
conditions in the workplace of which a patient complains actually existed. What
seems to be important to the physician is the perception the patient has of the
work-place.
Wenzel, H&AS No. 84-308.
134
Lawrence Joseph, The Causation Issue in Workers’ Compensation Mental Disability
Cases: An Analysis, Solutions, and a Perspective, 36 VAND. L. REV. 263, 271 (1983).
135
Ferreira, 531 A.2d 651.
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suffered a psychological injury, not whether the work condition caused an injury
to the claimant. The McCamey and Ramey tests still buy into these arguments and
make the same mistake of not focusing on employment conditions.
Until employers, insurers, adjudicators, and legislators overcome the bias
against psychological injuries, they will never be treated the same as physical
injuries. The solution is simple—just follow the law as written. In other words,
apply the Presumption to psychological injuries the same way it applies to
headaches, physical injuries that cannot be causally linked to employment through
objective diagnostic testing, and all other physical injuries. Admittedly, the
precise cause of a psychological injury is multifaceted, but under the Act, the
definition of a compensable injury is liberal—no unusual incident is needed, the
employer takes the claimant as it finds him. If conditions of employment
contribute to or aggravate an injury, the claimant is entitled to compensation. On
the other hand, if conditions of employment do not cause or contribute to an
injury, the injury does not arise out of and in the course of employment; whether
physical or mental, non-work-related injuries are not compensable. When the
Presumption and the rest of the Act is applied properly there simply is no need for
a separate test for psychological injuries.
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Appendix

Proving Psychological Injuries in Workers’ Compensation Cases136
Alabama

Mental-Mental
“‘Injury and personal injury’ shall mean only injury by
accident arising out of and in the course of the employment,
and shall not include a disease in any form, except for an
occupational disease or where it results naturally and
unavoidably from the accident. . . . Injury does not include a
mental disorder or mental injury that has neither been produced
nor been proximately caused by some physical injury to the
body.”
ALA. CODE § 25-5-1(9) (2020)
Furthermore, “an occupational disease does not include a
mental disorder resulting from exclusively nonphysical
stimuli.”
Cocking v. City of Montgomery, 48 So. 3d 647, 650 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2010)
Physical-Mental
“Under Alabama law, for an employee to recover for
psychological disorders, the employee must have suffered a
physical injury to the body and that physical injury must be a
proximate cause of the psychological disorders.”
Ex Parte Vongsouvanh, 795 So. 2d 625, 628 (Ala. 2000)
Mental-Physical137
“An employee bears the burden of proving that his injuries
arose out of and in the course of his employment. In cases
involving nonaccidental injuries, the employee must prove
both legal and medical causation to meet the ‘arising out of’
requirement. Furthermore, in cases involving gradual
deterioration or cumulative stress, the employee must establish
both legal and medical causation by clear and convincing

136

The burdens of proof set forth in this appendix may be subject to exceptions or to
interpretation by case law. Furthermore, this appendix represents the burdens that apply to generic
employees; specific rules may apply to police officers, fire fighters, first responders, or other
special categories of employee. Specific rules also may apply to claimants with pre-existing
conditions.
137
Mental-physical claims may be based on various physical injuries. In the absence of a
general burden of proof for this type of claim the burden of proof for a stress-related heart attack is
provided.
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evidence, rather than by a mere preponderance of the evidence.
Under the
Workers’ Compensation Act, ‘clear and convincing evidence’
is defined as ‘evidence that, when weighed against evidence in
opposition, will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm
conviction as to each essential element of the claim and a high
probability as to the correctness of the conclusion. Proof by
clear and convincing evidence requires a level of proof greater
than a preponderance of the evidence or the substantial weight
of the evidence, but less than beyond a reasonable doubt.’”
Ala. Code 1975 § 25-5-81(c)
“To establish legal causation, the injured employee must prove
that ‘the performance of the duties for which he [or she] is
employed … as an employee exposed [him or her] to a danger
or risk materially in excess of that to which people not so
employed are exposed [ordinarily in their everyday lives].’”
Safeco Ins. Cos. v. Blackmon, 851 So. 2d 532, 537 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2002) (internal citations omitted)
Alaska

Mental-Mental
“Compensation and benefits under this chapter are not payable
for mental injury caused by mental stress, unless it is
established that (1) the work stress was extraordinary and
unusual in comparison to pressures and tensions experienced
by individuals in a comparable work environment; and (2) the
work stress was the predominant cause of the mental injury.
The amount of work stress shall be measured by actual events.
A mental injury is not considered to arise out of and in the
course of employment if it results from a disciplinary action,
work evaluation, job transfer, layoff, demotion, termination, or
similar action taken in good faith by the employer.”
ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.010(b) (2020)
See also ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.120(c) (2020):
“The presumption of compensability established in [ALASKA
STAT. § 23.30.120(a)] does not apply to a mental injury
resulting from work-related stress.”
Physical-Mental
“Except as provided in (b) of this section, compensation or
benefits are payable under this chapter for disability or death or
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the need for medical treatment of an employee if the disability
or death of the employee or the employee’s need for medical
treatment arose out of and in the course of the employment. To
establish a presumption under AS 23.30.120(a)(1) that the
disability or death or the need for medical treatment arose out
of and in the course of the employment, the employee must
establish a causal link between the employment and the
disability or death or the need for medical treatment. A
presumption may be rebutted by a demonstration of substantial
evidence that the death or disability or the need for medical
treatment did not arise out of and in the course of the
employment. When determining whether or not the death or
disability or need for medical treatment arose out of and in the
course of the employment, the board must evaluate the relative
contribution of different causes of the disability or death or the
need for medical treatment. Compensation or benefits under
this chapter are payable for the disability or death or the need
for medical treatment if, in relation to other causes, the
employment is the substantial cause of the disability or death
or need for medical treatment.”
ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.010(a) (2020)
Mental-Physical
“Except as provided in (b) of this section, compensation or
benefits are payable under this chapter for disability or death or
the need for medical treatment of an employee if the disability
or death of the employee or the employee’s need for medical
treatment arose out of and in the course of the employment. To
establish a presumption under AS 23.30.120(a)(1) that the
disability or death or the need for medical treatment arose out
of and in the course of the employment, the employee must
establish a causal link between the employment and the
disability or death or the need for medical treatment. A
presumption may be rebutted by a demonstration of substantial
evidence that the death or disability or the need for medical
treatment did not arise out of and in the course of the
employment. When determining whether or not the death or
disability or need for medical treatment arose out of and in the
course of the employment, the board must evaluate the relative
contribution of different causes of the disability or death or the
need for medical treatment. Compensation or benefits under
this chapter are payable for the disability or death or the need
for medical treatment if, in relation to other causes, the
employment is the substantial cause of the disability or death
or need for medical treatment.”
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ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.010(a) (2020)
Arizona

Mental-Mental
“A mental injury, illness or condition shall not be considered a
personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of
employment and is not compensable pursuant to this chapter
unless some unexpected, unusual or extraordinary stress
related to the employment or some physical injury related to
the employment was a substantial contributing cause of the
mental injury, illness or condition.”
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 23-1043.01(B) (2020)
Physical-Mental
“A mental injury, illness or condition shall not be considered a
personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of
employment and is not compensable pursuant to this chapter
unless some unexpected, unusual or extraordinary stress
related to the employment or some physical injury related to
the employment was a substantial contributing cause of the
mental injury, illness or condition.”
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 23-1043.01(B) (2020)
Mental-Physical
“A heart-related or perivascular injury, illness or death shall
not be considered a personal injury by accident arising out of
and in the course of employment and is not compensable
pursuant to this chapter unless some injury, stress or exertion
related to the employment was a substantial contributing cause
of the heart-related or perivascular injury, illness or death.”
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 23-1043.01(A) (2020)

Arkansas
•

Mental-Mental
“A mental injury or illness is not a compensable injury unless
it is caused by physical injury to the employee’s body, and
shall not be considered an injury arising out of and in the
course of employment or compensable unless it is
demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence; provided,
however, that this physical injury limitation shall not apply to
any victim of a crime of violence.”
ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-113(a)(1) (2020)
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Physical-Mental
“(1) A mental injury or illness is not a compensable injury
unless it is caused by physical injury to the employee’s body,
and shall not be considered an injury arising out of and in the
course of employment or compensable unless it is
demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence; provided,
however, that this physical injury limitation shall not apply to
any victim of a crime of violence.
(2) No mental injury or illness under this section shall be
compensable unless it is also diagnosed by a licensed
psychiatrist or psychologist and unless the diagnosis of the
condition meets the criteria established in the most current
issue of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders.”

•

ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-113(a) (2020)
•

Mental-Physical
“(a) A cardiovascular, coronary, pulmonary, respiratory, or
cerebrovascular accident or myocardial infarction causing
injury, illness, or death is a compensable injury only if, in
relation to other factors contributing to the physical harm, an
accident is the major cause of the physical harm.
(b)
(1) An injury or disease included in subsection (a) of this
section shall not be deemed to be a compensable injury
unless it is shown that the exertion of the work necessary
to precipitate the disability or death was extraordinary and
unusual in comparison to the employee’s usual work in the
course of the employee’s regular employment or,
alternately, that some unusual and unpredicted incident
occurred which is found to have been the major cause of
the physical harm.
(2) Stress, physical or mental, shall not be considered in
determining whether the employee or claimant has met his
or her burden of proof.”
ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-114 (2020)

California

Mental-Mental
“(a) A psychiatric injury shall be compensable if it is a mental
disorder which causes disability or need for medical treatment,
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and it is diagnosed pursuant to procedures promulgated under
paragraph (4) of subdivision (j) of Section 139.2 or, until these
procedures are promulgated, it is diagnosed using the
terminology and criteria of the American Psychiatric
Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders, Third Edition-Revised, or the terminology and
diagnostic criteria of other psychiatric diagnostic manuals
generally approved and accepted nationally by practitioners in
the field of psychiatric medicine.
(b)
(1) In order to establish that a psychiatric injury is
compensable, an employee shall demonstrate by a
preponderance of the evidence that actual events of
employment were predominant as to all causes
combined of the psychiatric injury.
(2) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), in the case of
employees whose injuries resulted from being a victim
of a violent act or from direct exposure to a significant
violent act, the employee shall be required to
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that
actual events of employment were a substantial cause
of the injury.
(3) For the purposes of this section, ‘substantial cause’
means at least 35 to 40 percent of the causation from all
sources combined.
(c) It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this section to
establish a new and higher threshold of compensability for
psychiatric injury under this division.
(d) Notwithstanding any other provision of this division, no
compensation shall be paid pursuant to this division for a
psychiatric injury related to a claim against an employer unless
the employee has been employed by that employer for at least
six months. The six months of employment need not be
continuous. This subdivision shall not apply if the psychiatric
injury is caused by a sudden and extraordinary employment
condition. Nothing in this subdivision shall be construed to
authorize an employee, or the employee’s dependents, to bring
an action at law or equity for damages against the employer for
a psychiatric injury, where those rights would not exist
pursuant to the exclusive remedy doctrine set forth in Section
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3602 in the absence of the amendment of this section by the act
adding this subdivision.
(e) Where the claim for compensation is filed after notice of
termination of employment or layoff, including voluntary
layoff, and the claim is for an injury occurring prior to the time
of notice of termination or layoff, no compensation shall be
paid unless the employee demonstrates by a preponderance of
the evidence that actual events of employment were
predominant as to all causes combined of the psychiatric injury
and one or more of the following conditions exist:
(1) Sudden and extraordinary events of employment
were the cause of the injury.
(2) The employer has notice of the psychiatric injury
under Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 5400) prior
to the notice of termination or layoff.
(3) The employee’s medical records existing prior to
notice of termination or layoff contain evidence of
treatment of the psychiatric injury.
(4) Upon a finding of sexual or racial harassment by
any trier of fact, whether contractual, administrative,
regulatory, or judicial.
(5) Evidence that the date of injury, as specified
in Section 5411 or 5412, is subsequent to the date of
the notice of termination or layoff, but prior to the
effective date of the termination or layoff.
(f) For purposes of this section, an employee provided notice
pursuant to
Sections 44948.5, 44949, 44951, 44955, 44955.6, 72411, 8774
0, and 87743 of the Education Code shall be considered to
have been provided a notice of termination or layoff only upon
a district’s final decision not to reemploy that person.
(g) A notice of termination or layoff that is not followed within
60 days by that termination or layoff shall not be subject to the
provisions of this subdivision, and this subdivision shall not
apply until receipt of a later notice of termination or layoff.
The issuance of frequent notices of termination or layoff to an
employee shall be considered a bad faith personnel action and
shall make this subdivision inapplicable to the employee.
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(h) No compensation under this division shall be paid by an
employer for a psychiatric injury if the injury was substantially
caused by a lawful, nondiscriminatory, good faith personnel
action. The burden of proof shall rest with the party asserting
the issue.
(i) When a psychiatric injury claim is filed against an
employer, and an application for adjudication of claim is filed
by an employer or employee, the division shall provide the
employer with information concerning psychiatric injury
prevention programs.
(j) An employee who is an inmate, as defined in subdivision
(e) of Section 3351, or their family on behalf of an inmate,
shall not be entitled to compensation for a psychiatric injury
except as provided in subdivision (d) of Section 3370.
(k) An employee who is a patient, as defined in subdivision (h)
of Section 3351, or their family on behalf of a patient, shall not
be entitled to compensation for a psychiatric injury except as
provided in subdivision (d) of Section 3370.1.”
CAL. LAB. CODE § 3208.3 (2020)

Physical-Mental
“(a) A psychiatric injury shall be compensable if it is a mental
disorder which causes disability or need for medical treatment,
and it is diagnosed pursuant to procedures promulgated under
paragraph (4) of subdivision (j) of Section 139.2 or, until these
procedures are promulgated, it is diagnosed using the
terminology and criteria of the American Psychiatric
Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders, Third Edition-Revised, or the terminology and
diagnostic criteria of other psychiatric diagnostic manuals
generally approved and accepted nationally by practitioners in
the field of psychiatric medicine.
(b)
(1) In order to establish that a psychiatric injury is
compensable, an employee shall demonstrate by a
preponderance of the evidence that actual events of
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employment were predominant as to all causes
combined of the psychiatric injury.
(2) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), in the case of
employees whose injuries resulted from being a victim
of a violent act or from direct exposure to a significant
violent act, the employee shall be required to
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that
actual events of employment were a substantial cause
of the injury.
(3) For the purposes of this section, ‘substantial cause’
means at least 35 to 40 percent of the causation from all
sources combined.
(c) It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this section to
establish a new and higher threshold of compensability for
psychiatric injury under this division.
(d) Notwithstanding any other provision of this division, no
compensation shall be paid pursuant to this division for a
psychiatric injury related to a claim against an employer unless
the employee has been employed by that employer for at least
six months. The six months of employment need not be
continuous. This subdivision shall not apply if the psychiatric
injury is caused by a sudden and extraordinary employment
condition. Nothing in this subdivision shall be construed to
authorize an employee, or the employee’s dependents, to bring
an action at law or equity for damages against the employer for
a psychiatric injury, where those rights would not exist
pursuant to the exclusive remedy doctrine set forth in Section
3602 in the absence of the amendment of this section by the act
adding this subdivision.
(e) Where the claim for compensation is filed after notice of
termination of employment or layoff, including voluntary
layoff, and the claim is for an injury occurring prior to the time
of notice of termination or layoff, no compensation shall be
paid unless the employee demonstrates by a preponderance of
the evidence that actual events of employment were
predominant as to all causes combined of the psychiatric injury
and one or more of the following conditions exist:
(1) Sudden and extraordinary events of employment
were the cause of the injury.
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(2) The employer has notice of the psychiatric injury
under Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 5400) prior
to the notice of termination or layoff.
(3) The employee’s medical records existing prior to
notice of termination or layoff contain evidence of
treatment of the psychiatric injury.
(4) Upon a finding of sexual or racial harassment by
any trier of fact, whether contractual, administrative,
regulatory, or judicial.
(5) Evidence that the date of injury, as specified
in Section 5411 or 5412, is subsequent to the date of
the notice of termination or layoff, but prior to the
effective date of the termination or layoff.
(f) For purposes of this section, an employee provided notice
pursuant to
Sections 44948.5, 44949, 44951, 44955, 44955.6, 72411, 8774
0, and 87743 of the Education Code shall be considered to
have been provided a notice of termination or layoff only upon
a district’s final decision not to reemploy that person.
(g) A notice of termination or layoff that is not followed within
60 days by that termination or layoff shall not be subject to the
provisions of this subdivision, and this subdivision shall not
apply until receipt of a later notice of termination or layoff.
The issuance of frequent notices of termination or layoff to an
employee shall be considered a bad faith personnel action and
shall make this subdivision inapplicable to the employee.
(h) No compensation under this division shall be paid by an
employer for a psychiatric injury if the injury was substantially
caused by a lawful, nondiscriminatory, good faith personnel
action. The burden of proof shall rest with the party asserting
the issue.
(i) When a psychiatric injury claim is filed against an
employer, and an application for adjudication of claim is filed
by an employer or employee, the division shall provide the
employer with information concerning psychiatric injury
prevention programs.
(j) An employee who is an inmate, as defined in subdivision
(e) of Section 3351, or their family on behalf of an inmate,
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shall not be entitled to compensation for a psychiatric injury
except as provided in subdivision (d) of Section 3370.
(k) An employee who is a patient, as defined in subdivision (h)
of Section 3351, or their family on behalf of a patient, shall not
be entitled to compensation for a psychiatric injury except as
provided in subdivision (d) of Section 3370.1.”
CAL. LAB. CODE § 3208.3 (2020)
Mental-Physical
The claimant must prove employment is a contributing cause
of the heart attack. Lamb v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd., 11
Cal. 3d 274 (1974).
Colorado

Mental-Mental
“(2) (a) A claim of mental impairment must be proven by
evidence supported by the testimony of a licensed psychiatrist
or psychologist. A mental impairment shall not be considered
to arise out of and in the course of employment if it results
from a disciplinary action, work evaluation, job transfer, layoff, demotion, promotion, termination, retirement, or similar
action taken in good faith by the employer. The mental
impairment that is the basis of the claim must have arisen
primarily from the claimant’s then occupation and place of
employment in order to be compensable.
***
(c) The claim of mental impairment cannot be based, in
whole or in part, upon facts and circumstances that are
common to all fields of employment.
(d) The mental impairment which is the basis of the
claim must be, in and of itself, either sufficient to
render the employee temporarily or permanently
disabled from pursuing the occupation from which the
claim arose or to require medical or psychological
treatment.
(3) For the purposes of this section:
(a) ‘Mental impairment’ means a recognized,
permanent disability arising from an accidental injury
arising out of and in the course of employment when
the accidental injury involves no physical injury and
consists of a psychologically traumatic event. ‘Mental
impairment’ also includes a disability arising from an
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accidental physical injury that leads to a recognized
permanent psychological disability.
(b)
(I) ‘Psychologically traumatic event’ means an
event that is generally outside of a worker’s
usual experience and would evoke significant
symptoms of distress in a worker in similar
circumstances.
(II) ‘Psychologically traumatic event’ also
includes an event that is within a worker’s usual
experience only when the worker is diagnosed
with post-traumatic stress disorder by a licensed
psychiatrist or psychologist after the worker
experienced exposure to one or more of the
following events:
(A) The worker is the subject of an
attempt by another person to cause the
worker serious bodily injury or death
through the use of deadly force, and the
worker reasonably believes the worker is
the subject of the attempt;
(B) The worker visually or audibly, or
both visually and audibly, witnesses a
death, or the immediate aftermath of the
death, of one or more people as the
result of a violent event; or
(C) The worker repeatedly and either
visually or audibly, or both visually and
audibly, witnesses the serious bodily
injury, or the immediate aftermath of the
serious bodily injury, of one or more
people as the result of the intentional act
of another person or an accident.
(c) ‘Serious bodily injury’ means bodily injury that,
either at the time of the actual injury or a later time,
involves a substantial risk of death, a substantial risk of
serious permanent disfigurement, or a substantial risk
of protracted loss or impairment of the function of any
part or organ of the body.”

SPRING 2021

WORK-RELATED PSYCHOLOGICAL INJURY C LAIM

69

COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-41-301 (2020)
See also COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-41-302(1) (2020):
“‘Accident,’ ‘injury,’ and ‘occupational disease’ shall not be
construed to include disability or death caused by or resulting
from mental or emotional stress unless it is shown by
competent evidence that such mental or emotional stress is
proximately caused solely by hazards to which the worker
would not have been equally exposed outside the
employment.”
Physical-Mental
“(2) (a) A claim of mental impairment must be proven by
evidence supported by the testimony of a licensed psychiatrist
or psychologist. A mental impairment shall not be considered
to arise out of and in the course of employment if it results
from a disciplinary action, work evaluation, job transfer, layoff, demotion, promotion, termination, retirement, or similar
action taken in good faith by the employer. The mental
impairment that is the basis of the claim must have arisen
primarily from the claimant’s then occupation and place of
employment
in order to be compensable.
***
(c) The claim of mental impairment cannot be based, in
whole or in part, upon facts and circumstances that are
common to all fields of employment.
(d) The mental impairment which is the basis of the
claim must be, in and of itself, either sufficient to
render the employee temporarily or permanently
disabled from pursuing the occupation from which the
claim arose or to require medical or psychological
treatment.
(3) For the purposes of this section:
(a) ‘Mental impairment’ means a recognized,
permanent disability arising from an accidental injury
arising out of and in the course of employment when
the accidental injury involves no physical injury and
consists of a psychologically traumatic event. ‘Mental
impairment’ also includes a disability arising from an
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accidental physical injury that leads to a recognized
permanent psychological disability.”
COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-41-301 (2020)

Mental-Physical
“‘Accident,’ ‘injury,’ and ‘occupational disease’ shall not be
construed to include disability or death caused by heart attack
unless it is shown by competent evidence that such heart attack
was proximately caused by an unusual exertion arising out of
and within the course of the employment.”
COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-41-302(2) (2020)
Connecticut

Mental-Mental
“‘Personal injury’ or ‘injury’ shall not be construed to include:
***
(ii) A mental or emotional impairment, unless such
impairment [] arises from a physical injury or occupational
disease. . .
(iii) A mental or emotional impairment that results from a
personnel action, including, but not limited to, a transfer,
promotion, demotion or termination.”
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-275(16)(B) (2020)
Physical-Mental
“[B]oth this court and our Supreme Court explicitly have
interpreted the term ‘arises from’ in § 31-275(16)(B)(ii) to
require a causal relationship between a physical injury or
occupational disease and a claimed mental impairment in order
for the mental impairment to be compensable under the act.
The plaintiff’s argument that under § 31-275(16)(B)(ii) he
need only show that the mental impairment was ‘accompanied
by’ a physical injury, therefore is contrary to both the plain
meaning of ‘arises from’ and prior judicial interpretations of §
31-275(16)(B)(ii). For these reasons, we conclude that the
board properly interpreted ‘arises from’ in § 31-275(16)(B)(ii)
to require a causal relationship between the plaintiff’s injury
and his disorder.”
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Biasetti v. City of Stamford, 1 A.3d 1231, 1235–36 (Conn.
App. Ct. 2010) (although the claimant in this case is a police
officer, the rule of law applies generally to all employees)
Mental-Physical
“[A] physical injury precipitated by work-related stress is a
compensable injury under § 31-275(16)(B)(ii) and (iii). . . .
[T]he [claimant] has the burden of proving that the injury
claimed arose out of the employment and occurred in the
course of the employment. There must be a conjunction of
[these] two requirements . . . to permit compensation.”
Chesler v. City of Derby, 899 A.2d 624, 627–29 (Conn. App.
Ct. 2006)
(internal quotation marks omitted)
Delaware

Mental-Mental
“[I]n order to be compensated for a mental injury in the
absence of a specific and identifiable industrial accident (i.e., a
mental injury which is gradually caused by stress), a claimant
must offer evidence demonstrating objectively that his or her
work conditions were actually stressful and that such
conditions were a substantial cause of claimant’s mental
disorder. . . . The stress causing the injury need not be unusual
or extraordinary, but it must be real and proved by objective
evidence. Where a claimant merely imagines or subjectively
concludes that his or her work conditions have caused a
psychological illness, there is no basis for holding the
employer responsible since the connection between work and
injury is perceived only by the impaired worker.”
State v. Cephas, 637 A.2d 20, 27–28 (Del. 1994)
Physical-Mental
“The law seems settled that, provided a sufficient causal
connection is proved by competent evidence between an
industrial accident and a resulting psychological or neurotic
disorder resulting therefrom, such disability is compensable
under Workmen’s Compensation Law.”
Rice’s Bakery v. Adkins, 269 A.2d 215, 216–17 (Del. 1970)
Mental-Physical
“[T]he ‘usual exertion’ rule . . . provides that irrespective of [a]
previous condition, an injury is compensable if the ordinary
stress and strain of employment is a substantial cause of the
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injury.”
Duvall v. Charles Connell Roofing, 564 A.2d 1132, 1136 (Del.
1989)
District of
Columbia

Mental-Mental
“[A]n injured worker alleging a mental-mental claim invokes
the statutory presumption of compensability by showing a
psychological injury and actual workplace conditions or events
which could have caused or aggravated the psychological
injury. The injured worker’s showing must be supported by
competent medical evidence. The [administrative law judge],
in determining whether the injured worker invoked the
presumption, must make findings that the workplace
conditions or events existed or occurred, and must make
findings on credibility. If the presumption is invoked, the
burden shifts to the employer to show, through substantial
evidence, the psychological injury was not caused or
aggravated by workplace conditions or events. If the employer
succeeds, the statutory presumption drops out of the case
entirely and the burden reverts to the injured worker to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that the workplace
conditions or events caused or aggravated the psychological
injury.”
Ramey v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., CRB No. 06-38(R),
AHD No. 05-318, OWC No. 576531 (July 24, 2008)
Physical-Mental
“[W]here a claimant in a physical-mental claim presents
competent medical evidence connecting a work related
physical injury to a claimed psychiatric injury the claimant has
established a prima facie case of either a new injury or an
aggravation of a pre-existing condition. Although this case is a
claim under the public sector act, the [District of Columbia
Court of Appeals] did not limit its ruling or rationale to that
act, but explicitly indicated that the ruling applies to the public
and private sector acts.
Thus, under the new rule, . . . the injured worker, having
established a causal link between the physical injury and the
employment, bears the burden of proving by a preponderance
of the evidence that the physical injury caused or contributed
to the claimed psychological injury. The injured worker
satisfies this burden by presenting evidence not only of the
occurrence of the physical injury, but also competent medical
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evidence showing the physical injury caused or contributed to
the psychological injury. The [Court] wrote that ‘Where the
presumption is either inapplicable or has been rebutted, the
burden falls on the claimant to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the physical accident caused or contributed to the
psychological injury.’ [McCamey v. D.C. Dep’t of Employment
Servs., 947 A.2d 1191, 1214 (D.C. 2008)] The [Court] went on
to state that ‘In determining whether a claimant has met his or
her burden, [an administrative law judge] must weigh and
consider the evidence as well as make credibility
determinations [and may] of course consider the
reasonableness of the testimony and whether or not particular
testimony has been contradicted or corroborated by other
evidence.’ [Id.]”
McCamey v. D.C. Pub. Sch., CRB No. 10-03(R), AHD No.
PBL 02-031, DCP No. LT2-DDT002160 (June 17, 2008)
Mental-Physical
“[T]he question whether a claim presents a compensable
‘accidental injury’ does not depend on whether the
employment event which allegedly caused it was an emotional
or a physical stressor, or whether that stressor was usual or
unusual. Rather, the injury, to be ‘accidental,’ need only be
something that unexpectedly goes wrong within the human
frame. A heart attack clearly can meet that test.”
Jones v. D.C. Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 519 A.2d 704, 708–09
(D.C. 1987)
Florida

Mental-Mental
“A mental or nervous injury due to stress, fright, or excitement
only is not an injury by accident arising out of the
employment. Nothing in this section shall be construed to
allow for the payment of benefits under this chapter for mental
or nervous injuries without an accompanying
physical injury requiring medical treatment.”
FLA. STAT. § 440.093(1) (2020)
Physical-Mental
“(2) Mental or nervous injuries occurring as a manifestation of
an injury compensable under this chapter shall be
demonstrated by clear and convincing medical evidence by a
licensed psychiatrist meeting criteria established in the most
recent edition of the diagnostic and statistical manual of mental
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disorders published by the American Psychiatric Association.
The compensable physical injury must be and remain the major
contributing cause of the mental or nervous condition and the
compensable physical injury as determined by reasonable
medical certainty must be at least 50 percent responsible for
the mental or nervous condition as compared to all other
contributing causes combined. Compensation is not payable
for the mental, psychological, or emotional injury arising out
of depression from being out of work or losing employment
opportunities, resulting from a preexisting mental,
psychological, or emotional condition or due to pain or other
subjective complaints that cannot be substantiated by
objective, relevant medical findings.
(3) Subject to the payment of permanent benefits under s.
440.15, in no event shall temporary benefits for a compensable
mental or nervous injury be paid for more than 6 months after
the date of maximum medical improvement for the injured
employee’s physical injury or injuries, which shall be included
in the period of 104 weeks as provided in s. 440.15(2) and (4).
Mental or nervous injuries are compensable only in accordance
with the terms of this section.”
FLA. STAT. § 440.093 (2020)
Mental-Physical
“A physical injury resulting from mental or nervous injuries
unaccompanied by physical trauma requiring medical
treatment shall not be compensable under this chapter.”
FLA. STAT. § 440.093(1) (2020)
Georgia

Mental-Mental
“[T]o be compensable a psychic trauma must arise naturally
and unavoidably from some discernible physical occurrence.”
Hanson Buick, Inc. v. Chatham, 295 S.E.2d 846, 847 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1982)
Physical-Mental
“[A] psychological injury or disease is compensable if it arises
‘‘naturally and unavoidably’ . . . from some discernible
physical occurrence.’ . . . [A] claimant is entitled to benefits
under the Workers’ Compensation Act for mental disability
and psychic treatment which, while not necessarily precipitated
by a physical injury, arose out of an accident in which a
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compensable physical injury was sustained, and that injury
contributes to the continuation of the psychic trauma. The
physical injury need not be the precipitating cause of the
psychic trauma; it is compensable if the physical injury
contributes to the continuation of the psychic trauma.”
Southwire Co. v. George, 470 S.E.2d 865, 866–67 (Ga. 1996)
Mental-Physical
“‘[I]njury’ and ‘personal injury’ [shall not] include heart
disease, heart attack, the failure or occlusion of any of the
coronary blood vessels, stroke, or thrombosis unless it is
shown by a preponderance of competent and credible evidence,
which shall include medical evidence, that any of such
conditions were attributable to the performance of the usual
work of employment.”
GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-1(4) (2020)
Hawaii

Mental-Mental
“‘Disability’ means loss or impairment of a physical or mental
function.”
HAW. REV. STAT. § 386-1 (2020)
Also, “[i]n any proceeding for the enforcement of a claim for
compensation under this chapter it shall be presumed, in the
absence of substantial evidence to the contrary:
(1) That the claim is for a covered work injury.”
HAW. REV. STAT. § 386-85 (2020)
In addition, “an employee suffers a work-related injury within
the meaning of HRS § 386-3 when he sustains a psychogenic
disability
precipitated by the circumstances of his employment.”
Royal State Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Labor & Indus. Relations Appeal
Bd., 487 P.2d 278, 282 (Haw. 1971)
However, “[a] claim for mental stress resulting solely from
disciplinary action taken in good faith by the employer shall
not be allowed; provided that if a collective bargaining
agreement or other employment agreement specifies a different
standard than good faith for disciplinary actions, the standards
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set in the collective bargaining agreement or other employment
agreement shall be applied in lieu of the good faith standard.
For purposes of this subsection, the standards set in the
collective bargaining agreement or other employment
agreement shall be applied in any proceeding before the
department, the appellate board, and the appellate courts.”
HAW. REV. STAT. § 386-3(c) (2020)
Physical-Mental
“‘Disability’ means loss or impairment of a physical or mental
function.”
HAW. REV. STAT. § 386-1 (2020)
Also, “[i]n any proceeding for the enforcement of a claim for
compensation under this chapter it shall be presumed, in the
absence of substantial evidence to the contrary:
(1) That the claim is for a covered work injury.”
HAW. REV. STAT. § 386-85 (2020)
Mental-Physical
“Operation of the statutory presumption [HAW. REV. STAT. §
386-85(1)] is crucial in cardiac cases where the causes of heart
disease are not readily identifiable.”
Akamine v. Hawaiian Packing & Crating Co., Ltd., 495 P.2d
1164, 1166 (Haw. 1972)
Idaho

Mental-Mental
“‘Injury’ and ‘personal injury’ shall be construed to include
only an injury caused by an accident, which results in violence
to the physical structure of the body. The terms shall in no case
be construed to include an occupational disease and only such
nonoccupational diseases as result directly from an injury.”
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-102(18)(c) (2020)
See also IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-451(2) (2020):
“Nothing in subsection (1) of this section shall be construed as
allowing compensation for psychological injuries from
psychological causes without accompanying physical injury.”
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Physical-Mental
“(1) Psychological injuries, disorders or conditions shall not be
compensated under this title, unless the following conditions
are met:
(a) Such injuries of any kind or nature emanating from
the workplace shall be compensated only if caused by
accident and physical injury as defined in section 72102(18)(a) through (18)(c), Idaho Code, or only if
accompanying an occupational disease with resultant
physical injury, except that a psychological mishap or
event may constitute an accident where:
(i) It results in resultant physical injury as long
as the psychological mishap or event meets the
other criteria of this section;
(ii) It is readily recognized and identifiable as
having occurred in the workplace; and
(iii) It must be the product of a sudden and
extraordinary event;
(b) No compensation shall be paid for such injuries
arising from conditions generally inherent in every
working situation or from a personnel-related action
including, but not limited to, disciplinary action,
changes in duty, job evaluation or employment
termination;
(c) Such accident and injury must be the predominant
cause as compared to all other causes combined of any
consequence for which benefits are claimed under this
section;
(d) Where psychological causes or injuries are
recognized by this section, such causes or injuries must
exist in a real and objective sense;
(e) Any permanent impairment or permanent disability
for psychological injury recognizable under the Idaho
worker’s compensation law must be based on a
condition sufficient to constitute a diagnosis using the
terminology and criteria of the American psychiatric
association’s diagnostic and statistical manual of
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mental disorders, third edition revised, or any successor
manual promulgated by the American psychiatric
association, and must be made by a psychologist or
psychiatrist duly licensed to practice in the jurisdiction
in which treatment is rendered; and
(f) Clear and convincing evidence that the
psychological injuries arose out of and in the course of
the employment from an accident or occupational
disease as contemplated in this section is required.
***
(3) The provisions of subsection (1) of this section shall apply
to accidents and injuries occurring on or after July 1, 1994, and
to causes of action for benefits accruing on or after July 1,
1994, notwithstanding that the original worker’s compensation
claim may have occurred prior to July 1, 1994.
***
(5) No compensation shall be paid for such injuries described
in subsection (2) of this section arising from a personnelrelated action including, but not limited to, disciplinary action,
changes in duty, job evaluation, or employment termination.”
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-451 (2020)
Mental-Physical
“(1) Psychological injuries, disorders or conditions shall not be
compensated under this title, unless the following conditions
are met:
(a) Such injuries of any kind or nature emanating from
the workplace shall be compensated only if caused by
accident and physical injury as defined in section 72102(18)(a) through (18)(c), Idaho Code, or only if
accompanying an occupational disease with resultant
physical injury, except that a psychological mishap or
event may constitute an accident where:
(i) It results in resultant physical injury as long
as the psychological mishap or event meets the
other criteria of this section;
(ii) It is readily recognized and identifiable as
having occurred in the workplace; and
(iii) It must be the product of a sudden and
extraordinary event;
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(b) No compensation shall be paid for such injuries
arising from conditions generally inherent in every
working situation or from a personnel-related action
including, but not limited to, disciplinary action,
changes in duty, job evaluation or employment
termination;
(c) Such accident and injury must be the predominant
cause as compared to all other causes combined of any
consequence for which benefits are claimed under this
section;
(d) Where psychological causes or injuries are
recognized by this section, such causes or injuries must
exist in a real and objective sense;
(e) Any permanent impairment or permanent disability
for psychological injury recognizable under the Idaho
worker’s compensation law must be based on a
condition sufficient to constitute a diagnosis using the
terminology and criteria of the American psychiatric
association’s diagnostic and statistical manual of
mental disorders, third edition revised, or any successor
manual promulgated by the American psychiatric
association, and must be made by a psychologist or
psychiatrist duly licensed to practice in the jurisdiction
in which treatment is rendered; and
(f) Clear and convincing evidence that the
psychological injuries arose out of and in the course of
the employment from an accident or occupational
disease as contemplated in this section is required.
***
(3) The provisions of subsection (1) of this section shall apply
to accidents and injuries occurring on or after July 1, 1994, and
to causes of action for benefits accruing on or after July 1,
1994, notwithstanding that the original worker’s compensation
claim may have occurred prior to July 1, 1994.
***
(5) No compensation shall be paid for such injuries described
in subsection (2) of this section arising from a personnelrelated action including, but not limited to, disciplinary action,
changes in duty, job evaluation, or employment termination.”
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IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-451 (2020)
Illinois

Mental-Mental
“[A]n employee who, like the claimant here, suffers a sudden,
severe emotional shock traceable to a definite time, place and
cause which causes psychological injury or harm has suffered
an accident within the meaning of the Act, though no physical
trauma or injury was sustained.”
Pathfinder Co. v. Indus. Comm’n, 343 N.E.2d 913, 917 (Ill.
1976)
However, “[r]ecovery for nontraumatically induced mental
disease is limited to those who can establish that: (1) the
mental disorder arose in a situation of greater dimensions than
the day-to-day emotional strain and tension which all
employees must experience; (2) the conditions exist in reality,
from an objective standpoint; and (3) the employment
conditions, when compared with the nonemployment
conditions, were the ‘major contributory cause’ of the mental
disorder.”
Runion v. Indus. Comm’n, 615 N.E.2d 8, 10 (Ill. App. Ct.
1993)
Physical-Mental
“Psychological injuries are compensable under the Act when
they are related to and caused by a work-related physical
injury. Matlock v. Indus. Comm’n, 321 Ill. App. 3d 167, 171
(2001). In these so-called ‘physical-mental’ cases, even a
minor physical contact or injury may be sufficient to trigger
compensability. Id.; see also Marshall Field & Co. v. Indus.
Comm’n, 305 Ill. 134 (1922); Chicago Park Dist. v. Indus.
Comm’n, 263 Ill. App. 3d 835, 842 (1994). Moreover, the
work-related physical trauma need not be the sole causative
factor, but need only be a causative factor of the subsequent
mental condition. City of Springfield v. Industrial Comm’n,
291 Ill. App. 3d 734, 738 (1997); see also Amoco Oil Co. v.
Indus. Comm’n, 218 Ill. App. 3d 737, 747, (1991).”
Boyer v. Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n, 2015 IL App (3d)
130184WC-U, ¶ 33 (April 27, 2015) (unpublished decision)
Mental-Physical
“Generally, even when an employee suffers from heart disease,
if the heart attack which brings on disability or death is work
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related, the employee may recover workers’ compensation.
Associates Corp. of North America v. Indus. Comm’n (1988)
167 Ill. App. 3d 988. It is well established that if there is workrelated stress, either physical or emotional, that aggravates the
disease so as to cause the heart attack, then there is an
accidental injury or death arising out of and during the course
of the employment. Associates Corp. v. Indus. Comm’n, citing
City of Des Plaines v. Indus. Comm’n (1983) 95 Ill. 2d 83, 88–
89. Further, while the claimant must prove that some act of
employment was a causative factor, the act need not be the
sole, or even the principal, causative factor. Northern Illinois
Gas Co. v. Indus. Comm’n (1986) 148 Ill. App. 3d 48. In
addition, a preexisting heart condition does not preclude the
Commission’s finding that the heart attack is compensable.
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Indus. Comm’n (1980) 79 Ill. 2d 59.”
Wheelan Funeral Home v. Indus. Comm’n, 567 N.E.2d 662,
665 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)
Indiana

Mental-Mental
“Whether the injury is mental or physical, the determinative
standard should be the same. The issue is not whether the
injury resulted from the ordinary events of employment.
Rather, it is simply whether the injury arose out of and in the
course of employment.”
Hansen v. Von Duprin, Inc., 507 N.E.2d 573, 576 (Ind. 1987).
Physical-Mental
“It is our opinion that when a purely mental condition known
as a neurosis is shown by competent evidence to be the direct
result of a physical injury sustained by an employee arising out
of and in the course of the employment and which neurosis,
through functional disturbances of the nervous system, disables
the employee from working at his former occupation, he has
suffered a compensable injury under the terms of the Indiana
Workmen’s Compensation Act.”
E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Green, 63 N.E.2d 547, 548
(Ind. Ct. App. 1945).
Mental-Physical
“Indiana courts have held that in order for a heart attack to be
considered a work-related injury, it must be shown that:
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the employment, or the conditions of the employment,
must have been, in some proximate way, accountable
for, conducive to, or in aggravation of or the hastening
of, the failing activity of the heart.
Douglas v. Warner Gear Division of Borg Warner Corp.
(1961) 131 Ind. App. 664, 174 N.E.2d 584, 588; see also
Harris v. Rainsoft of Allen County, Inc. (1981) Ind. App., 416
N.E.2d 1320. In other words, the claimant must demonstrate
that the heart attack was precipitated by some unusual stress
related to his employment.”
Hansen v. Von Duprin, Inc., 496 N.E.2d 1348, 1350–51
(Ind. Ct. App. 1986)
Iowa

Mental-Mental
“[W]e adopt an objective standard of legal causation and place
the burden on the employee to establish that the mental injury
was caused by workplace stress of greater magnitude than the
day-to-day mental stresses experienced by other workers
employed in the same or similar jobs, regardless of their
employer. Although evidence of workers with similar jobs
employed by a different employer is relevant, evidence of the
stresses of other workers employed by the same employer with
the same or similar jobs will usually be most persuasive and
determinative on the issue.”
Dunlavey v. Econ. Fire & Cas. Co., 526 N.W.2d 845, 858
(Iowa 1995)
Physical-Mental
“An employee has the burden to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that her injuries arose out of and in the course of
employment. See Quaker Oats Co. v. Ciha, 552 N.W.2d 143,
150 (Iowa 1996). An injury is considered to arise out of
employment ‘if there is a causal connection between the
employment and the injury.’ St. Luke’s Hosp. v. Gray, 604
N.W.2d 646, 652 (Iowa 2000). In this case, the employer
questions whether Schneberger’s mental health problems are
causally
related to the physical trauma she sustained on the job.”
Menard, Inc. v. Schneberger, 2015 Iowa App. LEXIS 101, at
*2–3 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015)
Mental-Physical
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“One issue is determining which legal causation standard
should be applied, the heart attack standard, or the mental
injury standard. Legal causation standards were developed in
order to distinguish the injuries that are actually caused by the
employment from those that simply occur in the course of
employment. The employment must be more than merely the
setting in which a preexisting condition manifests
itself. Miedema v. Dial Corp, 551 N.W.2d 309 (Iowa 1996);
Newman v. John Deere Ottumwa Works of Deere & Co., 372
N.W.2d 199 (Iowa 1985). The agency previously ruled that a
heart attack induced by mental stress is governed by the heart
attack standard. Jackson v. The Britwill Company, No. 976793
(Iowa App. August 29, 1995). That precedent is well founded.
A heart attack of any variety that is brought about by
mental stress is a mental-physical injury that has been
compensated in Iowa using the heart attack standard.
There are three classes of mental injury, (1) physical-mental,
(2) mental-physical and (3) mental-mental. The normal
standard for recovery under workers’ compensation is proof by
a preponderance of the evidence that the injury arose out of
and in the course of employment. Mental injuries were
traditionally viewed with skepticism due to the belief that they
could be feigned. A legal causation standard of unusual stress
developed for mental-mental injuries as a means of
determining the legitimacy of claims.
A legal causation standard for unusual stress is not applied to
physical-mental or mental-physical injuries because the
physical component is considered to be adequate corroboration
for the genuineness of the mental injury claim.”
Kimrey v. Digital Data Res., 2002 IA Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 368,
at *2–4 (July 22, 2002)
Kansas

Mental-Mental
“[T]he obligation of an employer under K.S.A. 44-501 et seq.
does not extend to mental disorders or injuries unless the
mental problems stem from an actual physical injury to the
claimant.”
Followill v. Emerson Elec. Co., 674 P.2d 1050, 1053 (Kan.
1984)
Physical-Mental
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“There is no distinction between physical and psychological
injuries for the purpose of determining whether a workman’s
disability from an
injury is compensable.”
Reese v. Gas Eng’g & Constr. Co., 532 P.2d 1044, 1046 (Kan.
1975)
Mental-Physical
“[C]ompensation shall not be paid in case of coronary or
coronary artery disease or cerebrovascular injury unless it is
shown that the exertion of the work necessary to precipitate the
disability was more than the employee’s usual work in the
course of the employee’s regular employment.”
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-501(c)(1) (2020)

Kentucky

Mental-Mental
“‘Injury’ means any work-related traumatic event or series of
traumatic events, including cumulative trauma, arising out of
and in the course of employment which is the proximate cause
producing a harmful change in the human organism evidenced
by objective medical findings. ‘Injury’ does not include the
effects of the natural aging process, and does not include any
communicable disease unless the risk of contracting the
disease is increased by the nature of the employment. ‘Injury’
when used generally, unless the context indicates otherwise,
shall include an occupational disease and damage to a
prosthetic appliance, but shall not include a psychological,
psychiatric, or stress-related change in the human organism,
unless it is a direct result of a physical injury.”
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.0011(1) (2020)
Physical-Mental
“‘Injury’ means any work-related traumatic event or series of
traumatic events, including cumulative trauma, arising out of
and in the course of employment which is the proximate cause
producing a harmful change in the human organism evidenced
by objective medical findings. ‘Injury’ does not include the
effects of the natural aging process, and does not include any
communicable disease unless the risk of contracting the
disease is increased by the nature of the employment. ‘Injury’
when used generally, unless the context indicates otherwise,
shall include an occupational disease and damage to a
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prosthetic appliance, but shall not include a psychological,
psychiatric, or stress-related change in the human organism,
unless it is a direct result of a
physical injury.”
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.0011(1) (2020)
Mental-Physical
“[T]he apparent goal of the disputed amendment [to KRS
342.0011(1)] was to prevent compensation for so-called
‘mental-mental’ claims. The legislature attempted to do so in
1994, and we are persuaded that its goal in 1996 was to do so
more effectively by preventing compensation for all mental
changes that resulted from mental stress or trauma, including
those that resulted from a physical change. There is no
indication that it intended to preclude compensation for
‘mental-physical’ claims as well. Furthermore, had that been
the legislature’s intent, it would have defined ‘injury’ as a
work-related physically traumatic event, thereby
precluding both ‘mental-mental’ and ‘mental-physical’ claims.
But it did not. In view of this and of the fact that the last
sentence of KRS 342.0011(1) refers to psychological and
psychiatric changes but not to physical changes, we are
convinced that by including the term ‘stress-related,’ the
legislature intended to denote another type of mental condition.
We conclude, therefore, that the last sentence of
KRS 342.0011(1) applies only to mental changes and requires
that such changes must directly result from a physically
traumatic event in order to be compensable.”
McCowan v. Matsushita Appliance Co., 95 S.W.3d 30, 32–33
(Ky. 2002)
Louisiana

Mental-Mental
“(b) Mental injury caused by mental stress. Mental injury or
illness resulting from work-related stress shall not be
considered a personal injury by accident arising out of and in
the course of employment and is not compensable pursuant to
this Chapter, unless the mental injury was the result of a
sudden, unexpected, and extraordinary stress related to the
employment and is demonstrated by clear and convincing
evidence.
***
(d) No mental injury or illness shall be compensable under . . .
Subparagraph (b) . . . unless the mental injury or illness is
diagnosed by a licensed psychiatrist or psychologist and the
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diagnosis of the condition meets the criteria as established in
the most current issue of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders presented by the American Psychiatric
Association.”
LA. R.S. § 23:1021(8) (2020)
Physical-Mental
“(c) Mental injury caused by physical injury. A mental injury
or illness caused by a physical injury to the employee’s body
shall not be considered a personal injury by accident arising
out of and in the course of employment and is not compensable
pursuant to this Chapter unless it is demonstrated by clear and
convincing evidence.
(d) No mental injury or illness shall be compensable under . . .
Subparagraph . . . (c) unless the mental injury or illness is
diagnosed by a licensed psychiatrist or psychologist and the
diagnosis of the condition meets the criteria as established in
the most current issue of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders presented by the American Psychiatric
Association.”
LA. R.S. § 23:1021(8) (2020)
Mental-Physical
“Heart-related or perivascular injuries. A heart-related or
perivascular injury, illness, or death shall not be considered a
personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of
employment and is not compensable pursuant to this Chapter
unless it is demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence
that:
(i) The physical work stress was extraordinary and
unusual in comparison to the stress or exertion
experienced by the average employee in that
occupation, and
(ii) The physical work stress or exertion, and not some
other source of stress or preexisting condition, was the
predominant and major cause of the heart-related or
perivascular injury, illness, or death.”
LA. R.S. § 23:1021(8)(e) (2020)
Maine

Mental-Mental
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“Mental injury caused by mental stress. Mental injury resulting
from work-related stress does not arise out of and in the course
of employment unless:
A. It is demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence
that:
(1) The work stress was extraordinary and
unusual in comparison to pressures and tensions
experienced by the average employee; and
(2) The work stress, and not some other source
of stress, was the predominant cause of the
mental injury.
The amount of work stress must be measured by objective
standards and actual events rather than any misperceptions by
the employee[.]
***
“A mental injury is not considered to arise out of and in the
course of employment if it results from any disciplinary action,
work evaluation, job transfer, layoff, demotion, termination or
any similar action, taken in good faith by the employer.”
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A § 201(3-A) (2020)
Physical-Mental
“A long-standing principle in workers’ compensation
jurisprudence provides that a mental or psychological
abnormality which is ‘caused by [a physical work] injury, or...a
preexisting state of mental abnormality or sub-abnormality
[which] was excited and caused to flame up with overpowering
vigor by her injury’ is compensable. [citations omitted] In this
regard, a so-called ‘physical-mental’ injury was distinguished
by the Law Court, in 1979, from a gradual mental injury due to
work stresses, with the latter requiring a higher standard of
proof as to causation.”
Sincyr v. M.S.A.D. #54, 2009 ME Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 468, at
*2 (April 08, 2009)
Mental-Physical
A heart attack caused by stress is compensable if it arises out
of and in the course of employment. Stadler v. Nativity
Lutheran Church, 438 A.2d 898 (Me. 1981).
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Mental-Mental
“‘[A]n injury under the Act may be psychological in nature if
the mental state for which recovery is sought is capable of
objective determination.’ [Belcher v. T. Rowe Price Found.,
Inc., 621 A.2d 872, 890 (1993); however,] ‘a mere showing
that a mental injury was related to general conditions of
employment, or to incidents occurring over an extended period
of time, is not enough to entitle the claimant to compensation.
The mental injury must be precipitated by an accident, i.e., an
unexpected and unforeseen event that occurs suddenly or
violently.’”
Davis v. Dynacorp, 647 A.2d 446, 448 (Md. 1994)
See also Means v. Baltimore County., 689 A.2d 1238, 1242
(Md. 1997):
“PTSD may be compensable as an occupational disease under
the Workers’ Compensation Act if the claimant can present
sufficient evidence to meet the statutory requirements. See §
9-101(g) (disease must be contracted as the result of and in the
course of employment and the disease must cause the
employee to become incapacitated); § 9-502(d)(1)(i) (disease
must be due to nature of an employment in which the hazards
of the occupational disease exist).”
Physical-Mental
“‘[A]n injury under the Act may be psychological in nature if
the mental state for which recovery is sought is capable of
objective determination.’ [Belcher v. T. Rowe Price Found.,
Inc., 621 A.2d 872, 890 (1993); however,] ‘a mere showing
that a mental injury was related to general conditions of
employment, or to incidents occurring over an extended period
of time, is not enough to entitle the claimant to compensation.
The mental injury must be precipitated by an accident, i.e., an
unexpected and unforeseen event that occurs suddenly or
violently.’”
Davis v. Dynacorp, 647 A.2d 446, 448 (Md. 1994)
Mental-Physical
A heart attack caused by stress is compensable if it arises out
of and in the course of employment. Huffman v. Koppers Co.,
616 A.2d 451 (Md. 1992).

Massachusetts Mental-Mental
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“Personal injuries shall include mental or emotional disabilities
only where the predominant contributing cause of such
disability is an event or series of events occurring within any
employment. If a compensable injury or disease combines with
a pre-existing condition, which resulted from an injury or
disease not compensable under this chapter, to cause or
prolong disability or a need for treatment, the resultant
condition shall be compensable only to the extent such
compensable injury or disease remains a major but not
necessarily predominant cause of disability or need for
treatment. No mental or emotional disability arising principally
out of a bona fide, personnel action including a transfer,
promotion, demotion, or termination except such action which
is the intentional infliction of emotional harm shall be deemed
to be a personal injury within the meaning of this chapter.”
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 152, § 1(7A) (2020)
Physical-Mental
“[T]he third sentence of [MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 152, §
1(7A) setting out a heightened standard of causation for claims
for psychological disabilities] applies only to those mental or
emotional disabilities that are not consequential to workrelated physical injury.”
Cornetta’s Case, 860 N.E.2d 687, 695 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007)
Mental-Physical
A heart attack caused by stress is compensable if it arises out
of and in the course of employment. Larocque’s Case, 582
N.E.2d 959 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991).
Michigan

Mental-Mental
“‘Personal injury’ includes a disease or disability that is due to
causes and conditions that are characteristic of and peculiar to
the business of the employer and that arises out of and in the
course of the employment. An ordinary disease of life to which
the public is generally exposed outside of the employment is
not compensable. A personal injury under this act is
compensable if work causes, contributes to, or aggravates
pathology in a manner so as to create a pathology that is
medically distinguishable from any pathology that existed prior
to the injury. Mental disabilities and conditions of the aging
process, including but not limited to heart and cardiovascular
conditions, and degenerative arthritis shall be compensable if
contributed to or aggravated or accelerated by the employment
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in a significant manner. Mental disabilities shall be
compensable when arising out of actual events of employment,
not unfounded perceptions thereof, and if the employee’s
perception of the actual events is reasonably grounded in fact
or reality.”
MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 418.401(2)(b) (2020)
Physical-Mental
“‘Personal injury’ includes a disease or disability that is due to
causes and conditions that are characteristic of and peculiar to
the business of the employer and that arises out of and in the
course of the employment. An ordinary disease of life to which
the public is generally exposed outside of the employment is
not compensable. A personal injury under this act is
compensable if work causes, contributes to, or aggravates
pathology in a manner so as to create a pathology that is
medically distinguishable from any pathology that existed prior
to the injury. Mental disabilities and conditions of the aging
process, including but not limited to heart and cardiovascular
conditions, and degenerative arthritis shall be compensable if
contributed to or aggravated or accelerated by the employment
in a significant manner. Mental disabilities shall be
compensable when arising out of actual events of employment,
not unfounded perceptions thereof, and if the employee’s
perception of the
actual events is reasonably grounded in fact or reality.”
MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 418.401(2)(b) (2020)
Mental-Physical
“Mental disabilities and conditions of the aging process,
including but not limited to heart and cardiovascular conditions
and degenerative arthritis, are compensable if contributed to or
aggravated or accelerated by the employment in a significant
manner. Mental disabilities are compensable if arising out of
actual events of employment, not unfounded perceptions
thereof, and if the employee’s perception of the actual events is
reasonably grounded in fact or reality.”
MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 418.301(2) (2020)
Minnesota

Mental-Mental
“Subd. 15. Occupational disease.
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(a) ‘Occupational disease’ means a mental impairment
as defined in paragraph (d) or physical disease arising
out of and in the course of employment peculiar to the
occupation in which the employee is engaged and due
to causes in excess of the hazards ordinary of
employment and shall include undulant fever. Physical
stimulus resulting in mental injury and mental stimulus
resulting in physical injury shall remain compensable.
Mental impairment is not considered a disease if it
results from a disciplinary action, work evaluation, job
transfer, layoff, demotion, promotion, termination,
retirement, or similar action taken in good faith by the
employer. Ordinary diseases of life to which the
general public is equally exposed outside of
employment are not compensable, except where the
diseases follow as an incident of an occupational
disease, or where the exposure peculiar to the
occupation makes the disease an occupational disease
hazard. A disease arises out of the employment only if
there be a direct causal connection between the
conditions under which the work is performed and if
the occupational disease follows as a natural incident of
the work as a result of the exposure occasioned by the
nature of the employment. An employer is not liable for
compensation for any occupational disease which
cannot be traced to the employment as a direct and
proximate cause and is not recognized as a hazard
characteristic of and peculiar to the trade, occupation,
process, or employment or which results from a hazard
to which the worker
would have been equally exposed outside of the
employment.
***
(d) For the purposes of this chapter [for injuries
occurring on or after October 1, 2013], ‘mental
impairment’ means a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress
disorder by a licensed psychiatrist or psychologist. For
the purposes of this chapter, ‘post-traumatic stress
disorder’ means the condition as described in the most
recently published edition of the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders by the
American Psychiatric Association.
***
Subd. 16. Personal injury. — ‘Personal injury’ means any
mental impairment as defined in subdivision 15, paragraph (d),
or physical injury arising out of and in the course of
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employment and includes personal injury caused by
occupational disease; but does not cover an employee except
while engaged in, on, or about the premises where the
employee’s services require the employee’s presence as a part
of that service at the time of the injury and during the hours of
that service. Where the employer regularly furnished
transportation to employees to and from the place of
employment, those employees are subject to this chapter while
being so transported. Physical stimulus resulting in mental
injury and mental stimulus resulting in physical injury shall
remain compensable. Mental impairment is not considered a
personal injury if it results from a disciplinary action, work
evaluation, job transfer, layoff, demotion, promotion,
termination, retirement, or similar action taken in good faith by
the employer. Personal injury does not include an injury
caused by the act of a third person or fellow employee intended
to injure the employee because of personal reasons, and not
directed against the employee as an employee, or because of
the employment. An injury or disease resulting from a vaccine
in response to a declaration by the Secretary of the United
States Department of Health and Human Services under the
Public Health Service Act to address an actual or potential
health risk related to the employee’s employment is an injury
or disease arising out of and in the course of employment.”
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.011 (2020)
Physical-Mental
“Cases in which work-related physical injury or trauma causes,
aggravates, accelerates or precipitates mental injury are
compensable. Hartman v. Cold Spring Granite Co., 67 N.W.2d
656 (Minn. 1954). It is not necessary the physical injury be the
sole cause of the mental injury; it is sufficient the work-related
physical injury be a substantial contributing factor to
producing the mental injury. Miels v. NW Bell Tel. Co., 355
N.W.2d 710 (Minn. 1984). Minnesota courts have not required
a physical injury be of a specific degree or severity when a
physical injury results in a mental injury. The employee, to
prove a compensable mental injury, must merely show a
physical stimulus/injury caused the resulting mental injury.
Mitchell v. White Castle Sys. Inc., N.W.2d 710 (1984).
However, there must be ‘a clear medical opinion connecting
the psychological condition to the injury.’ Westling v. Untiedt
& Vegetable Farm, slip op. (W.C.C.A. Apr. 29, 2004). See
also Dotolo v. FMC Corporation, 375 N.W.2d 25 (1985);
Steinbach v. B.E. & K Construction Co., W.C.C.A. (1991);
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Nelson v. Hobart Corporation, W.C.C.A. (1992); Rindahl v.
Brighton Wood Farms, Inc., 382 N.W.2d 855 (1986), Dahlman
v. Deer River Community Clinic, 47 W.C.D. 183 (1992),
Castner v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 415 N.W.2d 873 (1988),
Goodwin v. Tek Mechanical, W.C.C.A. 7-29-93, Kvenvold v.
Freeborn County Sheriff’s Dep’t., W.C.C.A. 9-15-93, Schmidt
v. Healtheast/Bethesda Hospital, W.C.C.A. 5-6-94, Poppitz v.
Minnegasco, slip op. (W.C.C.A. Nov. 30, 1998), Underhill v.
Minn. Dep’t of Veteran’s Affairs, slip op. (W.C.C.A. May 5,
1997), Cartagena Quijada v. Heikes Farm, Inc., slip op., No.
WC10-5222 (W.C.C.A. May 4, 2011), Polecheck v. State, slip
op., No. WC09-157 (W.C.C.A. Oct. 5, 2009), Dunn v. U.S.,
West, slip op. (W.C.C.A. Mar. 21, 1995) Harrison v. Special
School District No. 1, (W.C.C.A. 1993).”
Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry, “Workers’
compensation: Post-traumatic stress disorder and mental
injuries,”
https://www.dli.mn.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/infosheet_ptsd_a
nd_mental_injuries.pdf (last visited October 5, 2020).
Mental-Physical
“Cases in which work-related mental stress or stimulus
produces identifiable physical ailments may be compensable
workers’ compensation injuries. The work-related stress need
not be the only cause of the physical injury; it is sufficient for
the stress to be a substantial contributing factor. Aker v.
Minnesota, 282 N.W.2d 533 (Minn. 1979); Wever v.
Farmhand, Inc., 243 N.W.2d 37 (Minn. 1976). A two-step test
is necessary to prove causation for a stress-induced injury; the
employee must prove elements of both legal and medical
causation to prevail with this type of claim. Courtney v. City of
Orono, 463 N.W.2d 514 (Minn. 1990). Romens v. Ballet of
Dolls, Inc., W.C.C.A. 1-19-17. Medical causation requires
proof that the mental stress resulted in the employee’s physical
condition. Legal causation requires the employee to show that
the mental stress was extreme or at least ‘beyond the ordinary
day-to-day stress to which all employees are exposed.’
Egeland v. City of Minneapolis, 344 N.W.2d 597 (Minn.
1984). The test of ‘beyond day-to-day stress’ includes
situations where stress has accumulated over a long period of
time. The mental stress must relate to the nature, conditions
and obligations or incidents of the employment relationship.
Solem v. College of St. Scholastica, slip op. (W.C.C.A. June
27, 2000).
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Also, to be compensable, the physical ailments caused by the
mental stress must be susceptible to medical treatment that is
separate and independent of treatment for the employee’s
mental condition. If the physical ailments are ‘characterized
not as independently treatable physical injuries but as physical
symptoms or manifestations of employee’s anxiety or
personality disorder and amenable to treatment only as an
inseparable aspect of employee’s psychiatric condition, the
claim is not compensable.”
Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry, “Workers’
compensation: Post-traumatic stress disorder and mental
injuries,”
https://www.dli.mn.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/infosheet_ptsd_a
nd_mental_injuries.pdf (last visited October 5, 2020).
Mississippi

Mental-Mental
“[W]hen a claimant seeks compensation benefits for disability
resulting from a mental or psychological injury, the claimant
has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence the
connection between the employment and the injury.
Furthermore, to be compensable, a mental injury,
unaccompanied by physical trauma, must have been caused by
something more than the ordinary incidents of employment.”
Fought v. Stuart C. Irby Co., 523 So. 2d 314, 317 (Miss. 1988)
(internal citations omitted)
Physical-Mental
“While Powers [v. Armstrong Tire & Rubber Co., 173 So. 2d
670, 672 (1965)] held that the causal connection between an
industrial accident and a mental injury must be proven by
‘clear evidence,’ a review of this state’s precedent shows that
‘clear evidence’ and ‘clear and convincing evidence’ are used
synonymously, and apply to a claimant’s burden of proof
under either a mental/mental or physical/mental case.”
Hosp. Housekeeping Sys. v. Townsend, 993 So. 2d 418, 424
(Miss. Ct. App. 2008)
Mental-Physical
“[U]nder the rule in Mississippi in heart cases, the injury must
be shown to have arisen within the time and space boundaries
of the employment and within the course of activity whose
purpose is related to the employment.”
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Mississippi Research & Dev. Ctr. v. Dependents of Shults,
287 So. 2d 273, 276 (Miss. 1973)
Missouri

Mental-Mental
“8. Mental injury resulting from work-related stress does not
arise out of and in the course of the employment, unless it is
demonstrated that the stress is work related and was
extraordinary and unusual. The amount of work stress shall be
measured by objective standards and actual events.
9. A mental injury is not considered to arise out of and in the
course of the employment if it resulted from any disciplinary
action, work evaluation, job transfer, layoff, demotion,
termination or any similar action taken in good faith by the
employer.”
MO. REV. STAT. § 287.120 (2020)
Physical-Mental
“We conclude that the Commission erred in applying Section
287.120.8 to determine that Claimant did not sustain an
accidental injury arising out of and in the course of her
employment. The plain language of Section 287.120.8
indicates that it applies only to claims of mental injury
resulting from work-related stress. Claimant’s claim of mental
injury was not based upon work-related stress, i.e., based upon
work conditions over a period of time. [citations omitted]
Rather, Claimant’s claim of mental injury was based upon the
physical assault that occurred on December 30, 2000.
Claimant’s claim is for mental injury resulting from a
traumatic incident, one which included the physical contact or
impact of Patient grabbing Claimant’s breast, not from workrelated stress. Therefore, by its terms, Section 287.120.8 does
not apply to Claimant’s claim, and she was not required to
prove that the stress was extraordinary and unusual. [citation
omitted] Thus, the compensability of Claimant’s claim should
be determined under Section 287.120.1. . . .
The Final Award of the Commission is reversed and remanded
with instructions to apply Section 287.120.1 to determine
whether Claimant sustained an accidental injury arising out of
and in the course of her
employment and, if necessary, to address the remaining issues
for determination.”
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Jones v. Washington Univ., 199 S.W.3d 793, 796–97 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2006)
Mental-Physical
“A cardiovascular, pulmonary, respiratory, or other disease, or
cerebrovascular accident or myocardial infarction suffered by a
worker is an injury only if the accident is the prevailing factor
in causing the resulting medical condition.”
MO. REV. STAT. § 287.020(3)(4) (2020).
Also, “[t]he word ‘accident’ as used in this chapter shall mean
an unexpected traumatic event or unusual strain identifiable by
time and place of occurrence and producing at the time
objective symptoms of an injury caused by a specific event
during a single work shift. An injury is not compensable
because work was a triggering or precipitating factor.”
MO. REV. STAT. §287.020(2) (2020).
Montana

Mental-Mental
“‘Injury’ or ‘injured’ does not mean a physical or mental
condition arising from:
(a) emotional or mental stress; or
(b) a nonphysical stimulus or activity.”
MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-119(3) (2019)
In addition,
“(a) ‘Occupational disease’ means harm, damage, or death
arising out of or contracted in the course and scope of
employment caused by events occurring on more than a single
day or work shift.
(b) The term does not include a physical or mental condition
arising from emotional or mental stress or from a nonphysical
stimulus or activity.”
MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-116(23) (2019)
Finally, “[i]t is the intent of the legislature that:
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(a) a stress claim, often referred to as a ‘mental-mental
claim’ or a ‘mental-physical claim’, is not compensable
under Montana’s workers’ compensation and
occupational disease laws. The legislature recognizes
that these claims are difficult to objectively verify and
that the claims have a potential to place an economic
burden on the workers’ compensation and occupational
disease system. The legislature also recognizes that
there are other states that do not provide compensation
for various categories of stress claims and that stress
claims have presented economic problems for certain
other jurisdictions. In addition, not all injuries are
compensable under the present system, and it is within
the legislature’s authority to define the limits of the
workers’ compensation and occupational disease
system.”
MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-105(6) (2019)
Physical-Mental
In order to be compensable, a mental injury must “directly
result[] from those physical injuries [defined in MONT. CODE
ANN. § 39-71-119(1)(a).]”
Burgan v. Liberty Northwest Ins. Co., 2003 MT Wrk. Comp.
LEXIS 61 (August 27, 2003)
Mental-Physical
“‘Injury’ or ‘injured’ does not mean a physical or mental
condition arising from:
(a) emotional or mental stress; or
(b) a nonphysical stimulus or activity.”
MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-119(3) (2019)
In addition,
“(a) ‘Occupational disease’ means harm, damage, or death
arising out of or contracted in the course and scope of
employment caused by events occurring on more than a single
day or work shift.
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(b) The term does not include a physical or mental condition
arising from emotional or mental stress or from a nonphysical
stimulus or activity.”
MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-116(23) (2019)
Finally, “[i]t is the intent of the legislature that:
(a) a stress claim, often referred to as a ‘mental-mental
claim’ or a ‘mental-physical claim’, is not compensable
under Montana’s workers’ compensation and
occupational disease laws. The legislature recognizes
that these claims are difficult to objectively verify and
that the claims have a potential to place an economic
burden on the workers’ compensation and occupational
disease system. The legislature also recognizes that
there are other states that do not provide compensation
for various categories of stress claims and that stress
claims have presented economic problems for certain
other jurisdictions. In addition, not all injuries are
compensable under the present system, and it is within
the legislature’s authority to define the limits of the
workers’ compensation and occupational disease
system.”
MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-105(6) (2019)
Nebraska

Mental-Mental
“A claim for a psychological or mental condition requires that
the mental condition must be related to or caused by the
physical injury. See Zach v. Nebraska State Patrol, 273 Neb. 1
(2007). An injury caused by a mental stimulus does not meet
the requirement that a compensable accidental injury involve
violence to the physical structure of the body. Id.”
Hynes v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 869 N.W.2d 78, 88 (Neb.
2015)
Physical-Mental
“Compensation may be recovered for emotional or
psychological conditions which are proximately caused by a
work-related injury and result in disability.”
Van Winkle v. Elec. Hose & Rubber Co., 332 N.W.2d 209, 210
(Neb. 1983)
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Mental-Physical
“Injury and personal injuries mean only violence to the
physical structure of the body and such disease or infection as
naturally results therefrom and personal injuries described
in section 48-101.01. The terms include disablement resulting
from occupational disease arising out of and in the course of
the employment in which the employee was engaged and
which was contracted in such employment. The terms include
an aggravation of a preexisting occupational disease, the
employer being liable only for the degree of aggravation of the
preexisting occupational disease. The terms do not include
disability or death due to natural causes but occurring while the
employee is at work and do not include an injury, disability, or
death that is the result of a natural progression of any
preexisting condition.”
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-151(4) (2020)
Nevada

Mental-Mental
“1. Except as otherwise provided in this section, an injury or
disease sustained by an employee that is caused by stress is
compensable pursuant to the provisions of chapters 616A to
616D, inclusive, or chapter 617 of NRS if it arose out of and in
the course of his or her employment.
2. Any ailment or disorder caused by any gradual mental
stimulus, and any death or disability ensuing therefrom, shall
be deemed not to be an injury or disease arising out of and in
the course of employment.
3. Except as otherwise provided by subsections 4 and 5
[regarding first responders and state employees], an injury or
disease caused by stress shall be deemed to arise out of and in
the course of employment only if the employee proves by clear
and convincing medical or psychiatric evidence that:
(a) The employee has a mental injury caused by
extreme stress in time of danger;
(b) The primary cause of the injury was an event that
arose out of and during the course of his or her
employment; and
(c) The stress was not caused by his or her layoff, the
termination of his or her employment or any
disciplinary action taken against him or her.”
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NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 616C.180 (2020)
Physical-Mental
Physical-mental injuries are compensable if they are a “direct
consequence of physical injuries sustained in the workplace.”
Roberts v. State Indus. Ins. Sys., 956 P.2d 790, 792 (Nev.
1998)
Mental-Physical
“2. For the purposes of chapters 616A to 616D, inclusive, of
NRS:
(a) Coronary thrombosis, coronary occlusion, or any
other ailment or disorder of the heart, and any death or
disability ensuing therefrom, shall be deemed not to be
an injury by accident sustained by an employee arising
out of and in the course of his or her employment.”
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 616A.265 (2020)
New
Hampshire

Mental-Mental
“‘Injury’ or ‘personal injury’ as used in and covered by this
chapter means accidental injury or death arising out of and in
the course of employment, or any occupational disease or
resulting death arising out of and in the course of employment,
including disability due to radioactive properties or substances
or exposure to ionizing radiation. ‘Injury’ or ‘personal injury’
shall not include diseases or death resulting from stress without
physical manifestation. . . . ‘Injury’ or ‘personal injury’ shall
not include a mental injury if it results from any disciplinary
action, work evaluation, job transfer, layoff, demotion,
termination, or any similar action, taken in good faith by an
employer.”
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 281-A:2(XI) (2020)
Physical-Mental
“‘Injury’ or ‘personal injury’ as used in and covered by this
chapter means accidental injury or death arising out of and in
the course of employment, or any occupational disease or
resulting death arising out of and in the course of employment,
including disability due to radioactive properties or substances
or exposure to ionizing radiation. ‘Injury’ or ‘personal injury’
shall not include diseases or death resulting from stress without
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physical manifestation. . . . ‘Injury’ or ‘personal injury’ shall
not include a mental injury if it results from any disciplinary
action, work evaluation, job transfer, layoff, demotion,
termination, or any similar action, taken in good faith by an
employer.”
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 281-A:2(XI) (2020)
Mental-Physical
“[P]sychological stress and overexertion can cause a workrelated heart attack. Once the causal relationship is accepted as
possible the claimant still must prove that ‘the work-related
stresses in the particular case at issue were a causal factor in
the heart attack which ensued.’ In each case, analysis should
therefore focus on whether there is sufficient proof of causal
work-related stress. The claimants had to show by a
preponderance of evidence that the actual work-related stress
precipitated decedent’s heart attack. In other words, the
claimants had to prove both medical and legal causation.
The legal causation test defines the degree of exertion that is
necessary to make the injury work-connected. . . . Thus, heart
attacks that actually result from work-related stress are
distinguished from those that occur at work merely as a result
of natural physiological process. If there is no prior weakness
or disease of the heart, any exertion connected with the heart
attack as a matter of medical fact is adequate to satisfy the
legal test of causation so as to make the injury or death
compensable.
In addition to legal causation, that is, that the stress was workconnected, the claimants must also prove as a fact medical
causation. In other words, the claimant must medically prove
that the work stress or exertion probably caused or contributed
to decedent’s heart attack.”
N.H. Supply Co. v. Steinberg, 400 A.2d 1163, 1168–69 (N.H.
1979) (internal citations omitted).
New Jersey

Mental-Mental
“[F]or a worker’s mental condition to be compensable, the
working conditions must be stressful, viewed objectively, and
the believable evidence must support a finding that the worker
reacted to them as stressful. In addition, for a present-day
claimant to succeed, the objectively stressful working
conditions must be ‘peculiar’ to the particular workplace, and
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there must be objective evidence supporting a medical opinion
of the resulting psychiatric disability, in addition to ‘the bare
statement of the patient.’”
Goyden v. State, Judiciary, Superior Court of N.J., 607 A.2d
651, 655 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991)
Physical-Mental
“There is no doubt that psychiatric illness secondary to injuries
is compensable under New Jersey Worker’s Compensation
Law providing
that the essential elements of the psychiatric impairment are
established by competent medical criteria.”
Borkowski v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 2003 NJ Wrk. Comp.
LEXIS 6, at *8 (January 6, 2003)
Mental-Physical
“In any claim for compensation for injury or death from
cardiovascular or cerebral vascular causes, the claimant shall
prove by a preponderance of the credible evidence that the
injury or death was produced by the work effort or strain
involving a substantial condition, event or happening in excess
of the wear and tear of the claimant’s daily living and in
reasonable medical probability caused in a material degree the
cardiovascular or cerebral vascular injury or death resulting
therefrom.
Material degree means an appreciable degree or a degree
substantially greater than de minimis.”
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-7.2 (2020)
New Mexico

Mental-Mental
“As used in the Workers’ Compensation Act [52-1-1 NMSA
1978]:
***
B. ‘primary mental impairment’ means a mental illness arising
from an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of
employment when the accidental injury involves no physical
injury and consists of a psychologically traumatic event that is
generally outside of a worker’s usual experience and would
evoke significant symptoms of distress in a worker in similar
circumstances, but is not an event in connection with
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disciplinary, corrective or job evaluation action or cessation of
the worker’s employment[.]”
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-24 (2020)
Physical-Mental
“As used in the Workers’ Compensation Act [52-1-1 NMSA
1978]:
***
“C. ‘secondary mental impairment’ means a mental illness
resulting from a physical impairment caused by an accidental
injury arising out of and in the course of employment.”
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-24 (2020)
Mental-Physical
“[W]here an employer denies a disability is a result of an
accident, the claimant ‘must establish that causal connection as
a probability by expert testimony of a health care provider.’ In
other words, Herman had to show by medical evidence that
decedent’s death and heart attack was a medically probable
result of the work-related stress.”
Herman v. Miners’ Hosp., 807 P.2d 734, 736 (N.M. 1991)
New York

Mental-Mental
“It is well settled that mental injuries caused by work-related
stress are compensable if the claimant can establish that the
stress that caused the injury was ‘greater than that which other
similarly situated workers experienced in the normal work
environment.’”
Matter of Lozowski v. The Wiz, 134 A.D.3d 1177, 1178
(N.Y. App. Div. 2015)
However, “‘[i]njury’ and ‘personal injury’ mean only
accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of
employment and such disease or infection as may naturally and
unavoidably result therefrom. The terms ‘injury’ and ‘personal
injury’ shall not include an injury which is solely mental and is
based on work-related stress if such mental injury is a direct
consequence of a lawful personnel decision involving a
disciplinary action, work evaluation, job transfer, demotion, or
termination taken in good faith by the employer.”

41-1

JOURNAL OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDICIARY

104

N.Y. WORKERS’ COMP. LAW § 2(7) (2020)
Physical-Mental
“Since there is no statutory definition of [accidental injury] we
turn to the relevant decisions. These may be divided into three
categories: (1) psychic trauma which produces physical injury,
(2) physical impact which produces psychological injury, and
(3) psychic trauma which produces psychological injury.
[citations omitted] As to the first class our court has
consistently recognized the principle that an injury caused by
emotional stress or shock may be accidental within the purview
of the compensation law. [citations omitted] Cases falling into
the second
category have uniformly sustained awards to those incurring
nervous or psychological disorders as a result of physical
impact.”
Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 330 N.E.2d 603, 605
(N.Y. 1975)
Mental-Physical
“Since there is no statutory definition of [accidental injury] we
turn to the relevant decisions. These may be divided into three
categories: (1) psychic trauma which produces physical injury,
(2) physical impact which produces psychological injury, and
(3) psychic trauma which produces psychological injury.
[citations omitted] As to the first class our court has
consistently recognized the principle that an injury caused by
emotional stress or shock may be accidental within the purview
of the compensation law. [citations omitted] Cases falling into
the second category have uniformly sustained awards to those
incurring nervous or psychological disorders as a result of
physical impact. [citations omitted] As to those cases in the
third category the decisions are not as clear.”
Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 330 N.E.2d 603, 605
(N.Y. 1975)
North
Carolina

Mental-Mental
“An occupational disease is compensable under
N.C. Gen. Stat.
§97-53(13) where it is ‘characteristic of persons engaged in the
particular trade or occupation in which the claimant is
engaged; [and] not an ordinary disease of life to which the
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public generally is equally exposed with those engaged in that
particular trade or occupation.’
Rutledge v. Tultex Corp., 308 N.C. 85, 93 (1983) (citation
omitted). In addition, ‘there must be a causal connection
between the disease and the [claimant’s]
employment.’ Id. (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). ‘In cases where the employment exposed the worker
to a greater risk of contracting the disease than the general
public, the first two elements are satisfied.’ Chambers v.
Transit Mgmt., 360 N.C. 609, 612 (2006) (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted).
It is well established that ‘[u]nder appropriate circumstances,
work-related depression or other mental illness may be a
compensable occupational disease’ pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 97-53. Pitillo v. N.C. Dep’t of Envtl. Health & Natural Res.,
151 N.C. App. 641, 648 (2002) (citation
omitted); accord Clark v. City of Asheville, 161 N.C. App. 717,
721 (2003). In such cases, ‘the claimant must prove that the
mental illness or injury was due to stresses or conditions
different from those borne by the general public.’ Pitillo,
151 N.C. App. at 648 (citation omitted).”
Day v. Travelers Ins. Co., 845 S.E.2d 208 (N.C. Ct. App.
2020) (unpublished decision).
Physical-Mental
“This case is properly characterized as a ‘physical/mental case’
-- i.e., physical insult resulting in mental injury -- as opposed
to the ‘mental/mental’ or ‘mental/physical’ scenario that
requires a more difficult evaluation of whether the mental
insult is ‘objectively’ causative, ‘in light of the commonsense
viewpoint of the average man[.’ T]his is not a case of a minor
work-related injury that ‘triggers’ or ‘precipitates’ an extreme
and unpredictable reaction in the claimant far out of proportion
to what one might expect from ‘the average reasonable man’ or
normal run of employees. . ., so that the cause is seen as arising
out of the employee and not the employment. While plaintiff’s
physical problems were more persistent and painful than her
orthopaedists would have anticipated, and were worse because
of her mental vulnerability as Dr. Comer testified, they were
significant enough to justify substantial impairment ratings by
her treating physician. The employee had an established
pattern of difficulty with mental stressors, and it would have
been surprising if the situational depression that most people
experience due to the pain and hardship of a significant injury
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had not affected her more markedly than normal. Our Courts
long ago established that when the physical injury is
substantial enough to cause disability, pain and the likelihood
of situational depression in the average or normal employee,
the ‘thin skull’ principle conventionally applied in
‘physical/physical’ workers’ compensation cases will be
applicable.”
Ring v. Hillcrest Foods d/b/a Waffle House,
1997 NC Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 5393, at *3–5 (February 10,
1997)
Mental-Physical
“Ordinarily a death from heart disease is not an injury by
accident arising out of and in the course of the employment,
nor an occupational disease, so as to be compensable under our
statute.”
Lewter v. Abercrombie Enters., Inc., 82 S.E.2d 410, 414 (N.C.
1954)
North Dakota

Mental-Mental
“‘Compensable injury’ means an injury by accident arising out
of and in the course of hazardous employment which must be
established by
medical evidence supported by objective medical findings.
***
b. The term does not include:
(10) A mental injury arising from mental
stimulus.”
N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(11) (2019)
Physical-Mental
“‘Compensable injury’ means an injury by accident arising out
of and in the course of hazardous employment which must be
established by medical evidence supported by objective
medical findings.
a. The term includes:
***
(6) A mental or psychological condition caused
by a physical injury, but only when the physical
injury is determined with reasonable medical
certainty to be at least fifty percent of the cause

SPRING 2021

WORK-RELATED PSYCHOLOGICAL INJURY C LAIM

107

of the condition as compared with all other
contributing causes combined, and only when
the condition did not pre-exist the work injury.”
N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(11) (2019)
Mental-Physical
“‘Compensable injury’ means an injury by accident arising out
of and in the course of hazardous employment which must be
established by medical evidence supported by objective
medical findings.
a. The term includes:
***
(3) Injuries due to heart attack or other heartrelated disease, stroke, and physical injury
caused by mental stimulus, but only when
caused by the employee’s employment with
reasonable medical certainty, and only when it
is determined with reasonable medical certainty
that unusual stress is at least fifty percent of the
cause of the injury or disease as compared with
all other contributing causes combined. Unusual
stress means stress greater than the highest level
of stress normally experienced or anticipated in
that position or line of work.”
N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(11) (2019)
Ohio

Mental-Mental
“‘Injury’ includes any injury, whether caused by external
accidental means or accidental in character and result, received
in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee’s
employment. ‘Injury’ does not include:
(1) Psychiatric conditions except where the claimant’s
psychiatric conditions have arisen from an injury or
occupational disease sustained by that claimant or
where the claimant’s psychiatric conditions have arisen
from sexual conduct in which the claimant was forced
by threat of physical harm to engage or participate.”
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.01(C) (2020)
Physical-Mental
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“Armstrong [v. John R. Jurgensen Co., 990 N.E.2d 568 (Ohio
2013)] holds that there must be a causal connection between
the physical and psychological injuries in order to obtain
workers’ compensation for the psychological injury, but it does
not discuss or in any way suggest that the psychological injury
must occur contemporaneously with or within a certain period
of time of the physical injury to be compensable. Of course,
the passage of time is one factor to be considered in factually
determining whether a causal connection has been established,
and may make it more difficult for the claimant to establish
such a connection. But Armstrong does not stand for the
proposition that the absence of a psychological injury at the
time of the physical injury, or sooner thereafter, is
determinative.”
Coleman v. KBO, Inc., 2018 Ohio App. LEXIS 799
(Ohio Ct. App. March 2, 2018)
Mental-Physical
“Because stress is experienced by every person in everyday
life, it is necessary to define what kind of mental or emotional
stress is legally sufficient to give rise to a compensable injury.
Much stress occurring in the course of, and arising out of,
employment, is simply a result of the demands of functioning
in our society, and participating in the work force, in and of
itself, is a stressful activity. In order for a stress-related injury
to be compensable, therefore, it must be the result of mental or
emotional stress that is, in some respect, unusual. Over twenty
years ago, the New York Court of Appeals developed a test
that has since effectively been applied by the courts of a
number of jurisdictions to determine whether the stress alleged
to be the cause of a claimant’s injury is legally sufficient to
merit an award of workers’ compensation. We, too, adopt this
test and hold that in order for a stress-related injury to be
compensable, the claimant must show that the injury resulted
from ‘greater emotional strain or tension than that to which all
workers are occasionally subjected * * *.’
Once a claimant has met this first test, he still must establish
that the stress to which he (or claimant’s decedent) was
subjected in his employment was, in fact, the medical cause of
his injury. In this regard, the claimant must show a substantial
causal relationship between the stress and the injury for which
compensation is sought. The claimant therefore must ‘show by
a preponderance of the evidence, medical or otherwise, * * *
that a direct or proximate causal relationship existed between *
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* * [the stress] and his harm or disability,’ or, when death
benefits are sought, that the claimant’s decedent’s death was
‘accelerated by a substantial period of time as a direct and
proximate result of the * * * [stress].’”
Ryan v. Connor, 503 N.E.2d 1379, 1382 (Ohio 1986) (internal
citations omitted)
Oklahoma

Mental-Mental
“1. A mental injury or illness is not a compensable injury
unless caused by a physical injury to the employee, and shall
not be considered an injury arising out of and in the course and
scope of employment or compensable unless demonstrated by
a preponderance of the evidence; provided, however, that this
physical injury limitation shall not apply to any victim of a
crime of violence.
2. No mental injury or illness under this section shall be
compensable unless it is also diagnosed by a licensed
psychiatrist or psychologist and unless the diagnosis of the
condition meets the criteria established in the most current
issue of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders.”
OKLA. STAT. tit. 85A, § 13(A) (2020)
Physical-Mental
“1. A mental injury or illness is not a compensable injury
unless caused by a physical injury to the employee, and shall
not be considered an injury arising out of and in the course and
scope of employment or compensable unless demonstrated by
a preponderance of the evidence; provided, however, that this
physical injury limitation shall not apply to any victim of a
crime of violence.
2. No mental injury or illness under this section shall be
compensable unless it is also diagnosed by a licensed
psychiatrist or psychologist and unless the diagnosis of the
condition meets the criteria established in the most current
issue of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders.”
OKLA. STAT. tit. 85A, § 13(A) (2020)
Mental-Physical
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“A. A cardiovascular, coronary, pulmonary, respiratory, or
cerebrovascular accident or myocardial infarction causing
injury, illness, or death is a compensable injury only if, in
relation to other factors contributing to the physical harm, the
course and scope of employment was the major cause.
B. An injury or disease included in subsection A of this section
shall not be deemed to be a compensable injury unless it is
shown that the exertion of the work necessary to precipitate the
disability or death was extraordinary and unusual in
comparison to the employee’s usual work in the course of the
employee’s regular employment, or that some unusual and
unpredicted incident occurred which is found to have been the
major cause of the physical harm.”
OKLA. STAT. tit. 85A, § 14 (2020)
Oregon

Mental-Mental
“(1)
(a) As used in this chapter, ‘occupational disease’
means any disease or infection arising out of and in the
course of employment caused by substances or
activities to which an employee is not ordinarily
subjected or exposed other than during a period of
regular actual employment therein, and which requires
medical services or results in disability or death,
including:
***
(B) Any mental disorder, whether sudden or
gradual in onset, which requires medical
services or results in physical or mental
disability or death.
(C) Any series of traumatic events or
occurrences which requires medical services or
results in physical disability or death.
(b) As used in this chapter, ‘mental disorder’ includes
any physical disorder caused or worsened by mental
stress.
(2)
(a) The worker must prove that employment conditions
were the major contributing cause of the disease.
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***
(c) Occupational diseases shall be subject to all of the
same limitations and exclusions as accidental injuries
under ORS 656.005(7).
(d) Existence of an occupational disease or worsening
of a preexisting disease must be established by medical
evidence supported by objective findings.
***
(3) Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, a
mental disorder is not compensable under this chapter unless
the worker establishes all of the following:
(a) The employment conditions producing the mental
disorder exist in a real and objective sense.
(b) The employment conditions producing the mental
disorder are conditions other than conditions generally
inherent in every working situation or reasonable
disciplinary, corrective or job performance evaluation
actions by the employer, or cessation of employment or
employment decisions attendant upon ordinary business
or financial cycles.
(c) There is a diagnosis of a mental or emotional
disorder which is generally recognized in the medical
or psychological community.
(d) There is clear and convincing evidence that the
mental disorder arose out of and in the course of
employment.”
OR. REV. STAT. § 656.802 (2020)
Physical-Mental
“If . . . ORS 656.802 (relating to occupational diseases in the
form of mental disorders) applies, [] the requirements of that
provision must be met, whether the cause of the mental
disorder was physical, non-physical, or both.”
DiBrito v. SAIF Corp. (In re DiBrito), 875 P.2d 459, 462 (Or.
1994)
Mental-Physical
“[A] heart attack, whether it is caused by physical exertion, by
job stress, or by both, is an accidental injury within the
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meaning of ORS 656.005(7). A heart attack is not a ‘mental
disorder’ within the meaning of ORS 656.802. Accordingly,
the requirements relating to mental disorders established in
ORS 656.802(3) do not apply to a claim for compensation for a
heart attack.”
Mathel v. Josephine County (In re Mathel), 875 P.2d 455, 459
(Or. 1994)
Pennsylvania

Mental-Mental
“[W]hile establishing a causal nexus between an injury and the
work place is ordinarily sufficient to establish one’s
entitlement to benefits under the Act, there exists a heightened
burden of proof for individuals who wish to recover benefits
for purely psychological injuries. In the so called
‘mental/mental’ case, a claimant has the burden of proving not
only that he or she suffered a work-related injury, but also that
the mental injury was the result of abnormal working
conditions and not simply a subjective reaction to normal
events in the work place.”
Grimes v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Proctor & Gamble),
679 A.2d 1356, 1360 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996) (internal
citations omitted)
Physical-Mental
“As in all cases where a claimant seeks [workers’
compensation] benefits via claim petition, Claimant has the
initial ‘burden of proving all the elements necessary to support
an award’ of benefits. Where, as here, a claimant asserts a
claim under the physical/mental standard, the claimant must
establish, in relevant part, that the mental injury resulted from
a triggering physical stimulus and arose during the course of
employment. ‘A claimant need not prove that he or she
suffered a physical disability that caused a mental disability for
which he or she may receive benefits. Nor must a claimant
show that the physical injury continues during the life of the
[mental] disability.’ However, . . . our precedent has
interpreted the term ‘physical stimulus’ as a physical injury
that requires medical treatment, even if that physical injury is
not disabling under the Law. Additionally, the mental injury
must be related to the physical stimulus.”
Murphy v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Ace Check Cashing,
Inc.), 110 A.3d 227, 234 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2015) (internal
citations omitted)
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Furthermore, “[i]f the casual [sic] relationship between the
claimant’s work and the injury is not clear, the claimant must
provide unequivocal
medical testimony to establish the necessary relationship.”
Bartholetti v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Sch. Dist.),
927 A.2d 743, 746 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2007)
Mental-Physical
“In 1972, the General Assembly enacted substantial changes in
the Act which shifted the focus from injuries by accidents in
the course of employment to injuries arising from and related
to the course of employment. [citation omitted] With these
amendments, the legislature clearly manifested its intention to
expand workmen’s compensation coverage to include stress
heart attack victims. [citation omitted]
***
A straightforward reading of the Act demonstrates there are
only two requirements for compensability -- (1) that the injury
arose in the course of employment and (2) that the injury was
related to that employment.
The operative language in section 301(a), 77 P.S. § 431 is
‘[e]very employer shall be liable for compensation for personal
injury to, or for the death of each employee, by an injury in the
course of employment.’ In section 301(c), 77 P.S. § 411(1), the
operative language is ‘‘injury’ and ‘personal injury’ . . . shall
be construed to mean an injury to an employe [sic], regardless
of his previous physical condition, arising in the course of his
employment and related thereto . . . .’ This Court and the
Commonwealth Court have consistently construed section
301(c) to require the establishment by the claimant of only two
facts -- that the injury arose in the course of employment and
was related thereto. See, e.g., . . . Workmen’s Compensation
Appeal Board v. Bernard S. Pincus Co., [479 Pa. 286 (1978)]
(under the amended Workmen’s Compensation Act, a heart
attack is a compensable injury as long as the claimant proves
that it occurred in the course of employment and was related
thereto.); Faust v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 55
Pa. Cmwth. 285 (1980) (‘heart attacks are compensable
injuries . . . if they (1) arise in the course of employment and
(2) are related thereto.’).”
Krawchuk v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 439 A.2d 627, 630 (Pa.
1981)
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Mental-Mental
“The disablement of any employee resulting from an
occupational disease or condition described in the following
schedule shall be treated as the happening of a personal injury,
as defined in § 28-33-1, within the meaning of chapters 29 - 38
of this title, and the procedure and practice provided in those
chapters shall apply to all proceedings under this chapter,
except where specifically provided otherwise in this chapter:
***
(36) The disablement of an employee resulting from mental
injury caused or accompanied by identifiable physical trauma
or from a mental injury caused by emotional stress resulting
from a situation of greater dimensions than the day-to-day
emotional strain and tension which all employees encounter
daily without serious mental injury shall be treated as an injury
as defined in § 28-29-2(7).”
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-34-2 (2020)
Physical-Mental
“The disablement of any employee resulting from an
occupational disease or condition described in the following
schedule shall be treated as the happening of a personal injury,
as defined in §28-33-1, within the meaning of chapters 29 - 38
of this title, and the procedure and practice provided in those
chapters shall apply to all proceedings under this chapter,
except where specifically provided otherwise in this chapter:
***
(36) The disablement of an employee resulting from mental
injury caused or accompanied by identifiable physical trauma
or from a mental injury caused by emotional stress resulting
from a situation of greater dimensions than the day-to-day
emotional strain and tension which all
employees encounter daily without serious mental injury shall
be treated as an injury as defined in § 28-29-2(7).”
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-34-2 (2020)
Mental-Physical
“In heart-attack cases the inquiry centers not on whether the
work activity involved physical exertion but rather whether
there existed a causal connection between the employee’s work
and the resulting heart attack.”
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Blecha v. Wells Fargo Guard-Company Serv., 610 A.2d 98,
103 (R.I. 1992)
South
Carolina

Mental-Mental
“(B) Stress, mental injuries, and mental illness arising out of
and in the course of employment unaccompanied by physical
injury and resulting in mental illness or injury are not
considered a personal injury unless the employee establishes,
by a preponderance of the evidence:
(1) that the employee’s employment conditions causing
the stress, mental injury, or mental illness were
extraordinary and unusual in comparison to the normal
conditions of the particular employment; and
(2) the medical causation between the stress, mental
injury, or mental illness, and the stressful employment
conditions by medical evidence.
(C) Stress, mental injuries, heart attacks, strokes, embolisms,
or aneurisms arising out of and in the course of employment
unaccompanied by physical injury are not considered
compensable if they result from any event or series of events
which are incidental to normal employer/employee relations
including, but not limited to, personnel actions by the employer
such as disciplinary actions, work evaluations, transfers,
promotions, demotions, salary reviews, or terminations, except
when these actions are taken in an extraordinary and unusual
manner.”
S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-160 (2020)
Physical-Mental
“Where . . . the mental injury is induced by physical injury, it
is not necessary that it result from unusual or extraordinary
conditions of employment.
A condition which is induced by a physical injury, is thereby
causally related to that injury. [citations omitted] It is a new
symptom manifesting from the same harm to the body. In such
circumstances, it may properly be compensated in a change of
condition proceeding as a part of the original injury.”
Estridge v. Joslyn Clark Controls, 482 S.E.2d 577, 580–81
(S.C. Ct. App. 1997)
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Mental-Physical
“(B) Stress, mental injuries, and mental illness arising out of
and in the course of employment unaccompanied by physical
injury and resulting in mental illness or injury are not
considered a personal injury unless the employee establishes,
by a preponderance of the evidence:
(1) that the employee’s employment conditions
causing the stress, mental injury, or mental illness were
extraordinary and unusual in comparison to the normal
conditions of the particular employment; and
(2) the medical causation between the stress, mental
injury, or mental illness, and the stressful employment
conditions by medical evidence.
(C) Stress, mental injuries, heart attacks, strokes, embolisms,
or aneurisms arising out of and in the course of employment
unaccompanied by physical injury are not considered
compensable if they result from any event or series of events
which are incidental to normal employer/employee relations
including, but not limited to, personnel actions by the employer
such as disciplinary actions, work evaluations, transfers,
promotions, demotions, salary reviews, or terminations, except
when these actions are taken in an extraordinary and unusual
manner.”
S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-160 (2020)
South Dakota

Mental-Mental
“‘Injury’ or ‘personal injury,’ only injury arising out of and in
the course of the employment, and does not include a disease
in any form except as it results from the injury. An injury is
compensable only if it is established by medical evidence,
subject to the following conditions:
***
The term does not include a mental injury arising from
emotional, mental, or nonphysical stress or stimuli. A mental
injury is compensable only if a compensable physical injury is
and remains a major contributing cause of the mental injury, as
shown by clear and convincing evidence. A mental injury is
any psychological, psychiatric, or emotional condition for
which compensation is sought.”
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 62-1-1(7) (2020)
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Physical-Mental
“‘Injury’ or ‘personal injury,’ only injury arising out of and in
the course of the employment, and does not include a disease
in any form except as it results from the injury. An injury is
compensable only if it is established by medical evidence,
subject to the following conditions:
(a) No injury is compensable unless the employment or
employment related activities are a major contributing
cause of the condition complained of; []
. . . A mental injury is compensable only if a compensable
physical injury is and remains a major contributing cause of
the mental injury, as shown by clear and convincing evidence.
A mental injury is any psychological, psychiatric, or emotional
condition for which compensation is sought.”
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 62-1-1(7) (2020)
Mental-Physical
“‘Injury’ or ‘personal injury,’ only injury arising out of and in
the course of the employment, and does not include a disease
in any form except as it results from the injury. An injury is
compensable only if it is established by medical evidence,
subject to the following conditions:
(a) No injury is compensable unless the employment or
employment related activities are a major contributing
cause of the condition complained of.”
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 62-1-1(7) (2020)
Tennessee

Mental-Mental
“‘Injury’ and ‘personal injury’ mean an injury by accident, a
mental injury, occupational disease including diseases of the
heart, lung and hypertension, or cumulative trauma conditions
including hearing loss, carpal tunnel syndrome or any other
repetitive motion conditions, arising primarily out of and in the
course and scope of employment, that causes death,
disablement or the need for medical treatment of the employee;
provided, that:
(A) An injury is ‘accidental’ only if the injury is caused
by a specific incident, or set of incidents, arising
primarily out of and in the course and scope of
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employment, and is identifiable by time and place of
occurrence, and shall not include the aggravation of a
preexisting disease, condition or ailment unless it can
be shown to a reasonable degree of medical certainty
that the aggravation arose primarily out of and in the
course and scope of employment;
(B) An injury ‘arises primarily out of and in the course
and scope of employment’ only if it has been shown by
a preponderance of the evidence that the employment
contributed more than fifty percent (50%) in causing
the injury, considering all causes;
(C) An injury causes death, disablement or the need for
medical treatment only if it has been shown to a
reasonable degree of medical certainty that it
contributed more than fifty percent (50%) in causing
the death, disablement or need for medical treatment,
considering all causes;
(D) ‘Shown to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty’ means that, in the opinion of the physician, it
is more likely than not considering all causes, as
opposed to speculation or possibility;
(E) The opinion of the treating physician, selected by
the employee from the employer’s designated panel of
physicians pursuant to § 50-6-204(a)(3), shall be
presumed correct on the issue of causation but this
presumption shall be rebuttable by a preponderance of
the evidence.”
TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-102(14) (2020) (for injuries
occurring on or after July 1, 2014)
In addition, “‘[m]ental injury’ means a loss of mental faculties
or a mental or behavioral disorder, arising primarily out of a
compensable physical injury or an identifiable work related
event resulting in a sudden or unusual stimulus, and shall not
include a psychological or
psychiatric response due to the loss of employment or
employment opportunities.”
TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-102(17) (2020) (for injuries
occurring on or after July 1, 2014)
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Physical-Mental
“‘Injury’ and ‘personal injury’ mean an injury by accident, a
mental injury, occupational disease including diseases of the
heart, lung and hypertension, or cumulative trauma conditions
including hearing loss, carpal tunnel syndrome or any other
repetitive motion conditions, arising primarily out of and in the
course and scope of employment, that causes death,
disablement or the need for medical treatment of the employee;
provided, that:
(A) An injury is ‘accidental’ only if the injury is caused
by a specific incident, or set of incidents, arising
primarily out of and in the course and scope of
employment, and is identifiable by time and place of
occurrence, and shall not include the aggravation of a
preexisting disease, condition or ailment unless it can
be shown to a reasonable degree of medical certainty
that the aggravation arose primarily out of and in the
course and scope of employment;
(B) An injury ‘arises primarily out of and in the course
and scope of employment’ only if it has been shown by
a preponderance of the evidence that the employment
contributed more than fifty percent (50%) in causing
the injury, considering all causes;
(C) An injury causes death, disablement or the need for
medical treatment only if it has been shown to a
reasonable degree of medical certainty that it
contributed more than fifty percent (50%) in causing
the death, disablement or need for medical treatment,
considering all causes;
(D) ‘Shown to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty’ means that, in the opinion of the physician, it
is more likely than not considering all causes, as
opposed to speculation or possibility;
(E) The opinion of the treating physician, selected by
the employee from the employer’s designated panel of
physicians pursuant to §50-6-204(a)(3), shall be
presumed correct on the
issue of causation but this presumption shall be
rebuttable by a preponderance of the evidence.”
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TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-102(14) (2020) (for injuries
occurring on or after July 1, 2014)
In addition, “‘[m]ental injury’ means a loss of mental faculties
or a mental or behavioral disorder, arising primarily out of a
compensable physical injury or an identifiable work related
event resulting in a sudden or unusual stimulus, and shall not
include a psychological or psychiatric response due to the loss
of employment or employment opportunities.”
TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-102(17) (2020) (for injuries
occurring on or after July 1, 2014)
Mental-Physical
“‘Injury’ and ‘personal injury’ mean an injury by accident, a
mental injury, occupational disease including diseases of the
heart, lung and hypertension, or cumulative trauma conditions
including hearing loss, carpal tunnel syndrome or any other
repetitive motion conditions, arising primarily out of and in the
course and scope of employment, that causes death,
disablement or the need for medical treatment of the employee;
provided, that:
(A) An injury is ‘accidental’ only if the injury is caused
by a specific incident, or set of incidents, arising
primarily out of and in the course and scope of
employment, and is identifiable by time and place of
occurrence, and shall not include the aggravation of a
preexisting disease, condition or ailment unless it can
be shown to a reasonable degree of medical certainty
that the aggravation arose primarily out of and in the
course and scope of employment;
(B) An injury ‘arises primarily out of and in the course
and scope of employment’ only if it has been shown by
a preponderance of the evidence that the employment
contributed more than fifty percent (50%) in causing
the injury, considering all causes;
(C) An injury causes death, disablement or the need for
medical treatment only if it has been shown to a
reasonable degree of medical certainty that it
contributed more than fifty percent (50%) in causing
the death, disablement or need for medical treatment,
considering all causes;
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(D) ‘Shown to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty’ means that, in the opinion of the physician, it
is more likely than not considering all causes, as
opposed to speculation or possibility;
(E) The opinion of the treating physician, selected by
the employee from the employer’s designated panel of
physicians pursuant to § 50-6-204(a)(3), shall be
presumed correct on the issue of causation but this
presumption shall be rebuttable by a preponderance of
the evidence.”
TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-102(14) (2020) (for injuries
occurring on or after July 1, 2014)
Texas

Mental-Mental
“It is well-settled that mental trauma, even without an
accompanying physical injury, can produce a compensable
injury if it arises in the course and scope of employment and
can be traced to a definite time, place and cause. Bailey v.
American General Insurance Co., 279 S.W.2d 315 (Tex.
1955); Olson v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 477
S.W.2d 859 (Tex. 1972). However, the Texas Supreme Court
has specifically held that damage or harm caused by repetitious
mentally traumatic activity, as opposed to physical activity,
cannot constitute an occupational disease. Transportation Ins.
Co. v. Maksyn, 580 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. 1979); see also [Texas
Workers’ Compensation Commission] Appeal No. 941551,
[decided December 23, 1994]; and Texas Workers’
Compensation Commission Appeal No. 94785, decided
July 29, 1994.”
Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeal No.
000445, 2000 TX Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 407, at *8–9 (April 12,
2000)
See also TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 408.006 (2019):
“(a) It is the express intent of the legislature that nothing in this
subtitle shall be construed to limit or expand recovery in cases
of mental trauma injuries.
(b) Notwithstanding Section 504.019 [Coverage for PostTraumatic Stress Disorder for Certain First Responders], a
mental or emotional injury that arises principally from a
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legitimate personnel action, including a transfer, promotion,
demotion, or termination, is not a compensable injury under
this subtitle.”
Physical-Mental
“The 1989 Act defines ‘injury’ as ‘damage or harm to the
physical structure of the body and a disease or infection
naturally resulting from the damage or harm.’ Section
401.011(26). The scope of an injury thus can encompass
ancillary conditions which are connected to the injury.”
Texas Workers’ Compensation Appeal No. 93697,
1993 TX Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 3564, at *10 (September 23,
1993)
In addition, “in finding that the hearing officer was sufficiently
supported in concluding that claimant’s psychiatric conditions
are compensable, we do not hold that a ‘direct result,’ as
opposed to a ‘result,’ must be found in order to find a mental
condition compensable in every case in which a mental
condition arises after sustaining a physical compensable
injury.”
Texas Workers’ Compensation Appeal No. 960526,
1996 TX Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 4294, at *8 (April 29, 1996)
Mental-Physical
“A heart attack is a compensable injury under this subtitle only
if:
(1) the attack can be identified as:
(A) occurring at a definite time and place; and
(B) caused by a specific event occurring in the
course and scope of the employee’s employment;
(2) the preponderance of the medical evidence
regarding the attack indicates that the employee’s work
rather than the natural progression of a preexisting
heart condition or disease was a substantial contributing
factor of the attack; and
(3) the attack was not triggered solely by emotional or
mental stress factors, unless it was precipitated by a
sudden stimulus.”
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TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 408.008 (2019)
Utah

Mental-Mental
“(1) Physical, mental, or emotional injuries related to mental
stress arising out of and in the course of employment shall be
compensable under this chapter only when there is a sufficient
legal and medical causal connection between the employee’s
injury and employment.
(2)
(a) Legal causation requires proof of extraordinary
mental stress from a sudden stimulus arising
predominantly and directly from employment.
(b) The extraordinary and sudden nature of the alleged
mental stress is judged according to an objective
standard in comparison with contemporary national
employment and nonemployment life.
(3) Medical causation requires proof that the physical, mental,
or emotional injury was medically caused by the mental stress
that is the legal cause of the physical, mental, or emotional
injury.
(4) Good faith employer personnel actions including
disciplinary actions, work evaluations, job transfers, layoffs,
demotions, promotions, terminations, or retirements, may not
form the basis of compensable mental stress claims under this
chapter.
(5) Alleged discrimination, harassment, or unfair labor
practices otherwise actionable at law may not form the basis
of compensable mental stress claims under this chapter.
(6) An employee who alleges a compensable industrial
accident involving mental stress bears the burden of proof to
establish legal and medical causation by a preponderance of
the evidence.”
UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-402 (2020)
See also UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-3-106 (2020) pertaining to
occupational diseases:
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“(1) Physical, mental, or emotional diseases related to mental
stress arising out of and in the course of employment shall be
compensable under this chapter only when there is a sufficient
legal and medical causal connection between the employee’s
disease and employment.
(2)
(a) Legal causation requires proof of extraordinary
mental stress arising predominantly and directly from
employment.
(b) The extraordinary nature of the alleged mental
stress is judged according to an objective standard in
comparison with contemporary national employment
and nonemployment life.
(3) Medical causation requires proof that the physical, mental,
or emotional disease was medically caused by the mental
stress that is the legal cause of the physical, mental, or
emotional disease.
(4) Good faith employer personnel actions including
disciplinary actions, work evaluations, job transfers, layoffs,
demotions, promotions, terminations, or retirements, may not
form the basis of compensable mental stress claims under this
chapter.
(5) Alleged discrimination, harassment, or unfair labor
practices otherwise actionable at law may not form the basis
of compensable mental stress claims under this chapter.
(6) An employee who alleges a compensable occupational
disease involving mental stress bears the burden of proof to
establish legal and medical causation by a preponderance of
the evidence.”
Physical-Mental
(1) Physical, mental, or emotional injuries related to mental
stress arising out of and in the course of employment shall be
compensable under this chapter only when there is a sufficient
legal and medical causal connection between the employee’s
injury and employment.
(2)
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(a) Legal causation requires proof of extraordinary
mental stress from a sudden stimulus arising
predominantly and directly from employment.
(b) The extraordinary and sudden nature of the alleged
mental stress is judged according to an objective
standard in comparison with contemporary national
employment and nonemployment life.
(3) Medical causation requires proof that the physical, mental,
or emotional injury was medically caused by the mental stress
that is the legal cause of the physical, mental, or emotional
injury.
(4) Good faith employer personnel actions including
disciplinary actions, work evaluations, job transfers, layoffs,
demotions, promotions, terminations, or retirements, may not
form the basis of compensable mental stress claims under this
chapter.
(5) Alleged discrimination, harassment, or unfair labor
practices otherwise actionable at law may not form the basis
of compensable mental stress claims under this chapter.
(6) An employee who alleges a compensable industrial
accident involving mental stress bears the burden of proof to
establish legal and medical causation by a preponderance of
the evidence.”
UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-402 (2020)
See also UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-3-106 (2020) pertaining to
occupational diseases:
“(1) Physical, mental, or emotional diseases related to mental
stress arising out of and in the course of employment shall be
compensable under this chapter only when there is a sufficient
legal and medical causal connection between the employee’s
disease and employment.
(2)
(a) Legal causation requires proof of extraordinary
mental stress arising predominantly and directly from
employment.
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(b) The extraordinary nature of the alleged mental
stress is judged according to an objective standard in
comparison with contemporary national employment
and nonemployment life.
(3) Medical causation requires proof that the physical, mental,
or emotional disease was medically caused by the mental
stress that is the legal cause of the physical, mental, or
emotional disease.
(4) Good faith employer personnel actions including
disciplinary actions, work evaluations, job transfers, layoffs,
demotions, promotions, terminations, or retirements, may not
form the basis of compensable mental stress claims under this
chapter.
(5) Alleged discrimination, harassment, or unfair labor
practices otherwise actionable at law may not form the basis
of compensable mental stress claims under this chapter.
(6) An employee who alleges a compensable occupational
disease involving mental stress bears the burden of proof to
establish legal and medical causation by a preponderance of
the evidence.”
Mental-Physical
“(1) Physical, mental, or emotional injuries related to mental
stress arising out of and in the course of employment shall be
compensable under this chapter only when there is a sufficient
legal and medical causal connection between the employee’s
injury and employment.
(2)
(a) Legal causation requires proof of extraordinary
mental stress from a sudden stimulus arising
predominantly and directly from employment.
(b) The extraordinary and sudden nature of the alleged
mental stress is judged according to an objective
standard in comparison with contemporary national
employment and nonemployment life.
(3) Medical causation requires proof that the physical, mental,
or emotional injury was medically caused by the mental stress
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that is the legal cause of the physical, mental, or emotional
injury.
(4) Good faith employer personnel actions including
disciplinary actions, work evaluations, job transfers, layoffs,
demotions, promotions, terminations, or retirements, may not
form the basis of compensable mental stress claims under this
chapter.
(5) Alleged discrimination, harassment, or unfair labor
practices otherwise actionable at law may not form the basis
of compensable mental stress claims under this chapter.
(6) An employee who alleges a compensable industrial
accident involving mental stress bears the burden of proof to
establish legal and medical causation by a preponderance of
the evidence.”
UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-402 (2020)
See also UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-3-106 (2020) (pertaining to
occupational diseases):
“(1) Physical, mental, or emotional diseases related to mental
stress arising out of and in the course of employment shall be
compensable under this chapter only when there is a sufficient
legal and medical causal connection between the employee’s
disease and employment.
(2)
(a) Legal causation requires proof of extraordinary
mental stress arising predominantly and directly from
employment.
(b) The extraordinary nature of the alleged mental
stress is judged according to an objective standard in
comparison with contemporary national employment
and nonemployment life.
(3) Medical causation requires proof that the physical,
mental, or emotional disease was medically caused by the
mental stress that is the legal cause of the physical, mental, or
emotional disease.
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(4) Good faith employer personnel actions including
disciplinary actions, work evaluations, job transfers, layoffs,
demotions, promotions, terminations, or retirements, may not
form the basis of compensable mental stress claims under this
chapter.
(5) Alleged discrimination, harassment, or unfair labor
practices otherwise actionable at law may not form the basis
of compensable mental stress claims under this chapter.
(6) An employee who alleges a compensable occupational
disease involving mental stress bears the burden of proof to
establish legal and medical causation by a preponderance of
the evidence.”
Vermont

Mental-Mental
“(i) A mental condition resulting from a work-related event or
work-related stress shall be considered a personal injury by
accident arising out of and in the course of employment and
be compensable if it is demonstrated by the preponderance of
the evidence that:
(I) the work-related event or work-related stress was
extraordinary and unusual in comparison to pressures
and tensions experienced by the average employee
across all occupations; and
(II) the work-related event or work-related stress, and
not some other event or source of stress, was the
predominant cause of the mental condition.
(ii) A mental condition shall not be considered
a personal injury by accident arising out of and
in the course of employment if it results from
any disciplinary action, work evaluation, job
transfer, layoff, demotion, termination, or
similar action taken in good faith by the
employer.”
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 601(11)(J) (2019)
Physical-Mental
“The key component of any workers’ compensation claim is
the causal nexus between a work-related accident and a
resulting injury. 21 V.S.A. 618. Most compensable claims
originate with a physical stimulus, a slip and fall, for example,
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and result in a physical injury, such as a disc herniation or a
ligament tear. The same causal nexus is required in a
physical-mental claim, the only difference being that the
work-related physical stimulus gives rise to a psychological
injury rather than a physical one.”
Lydy v. Trustaff, Inc., 2012 VT Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 3, at *17
(2012)
Mental-Physical
“In determining the compensability of heart attacks, Vermont
follows those jurisdictions that require evidence that the heart
attack was the product of some unusual or extraordinary
exertion or stress in the work
environment.”
Mattson v. C.E. Bradley Labs., 1995 VT Wrk. Comp. LEXIS
157, at *9 (November 1, 1995)
Virginia

Mental-Mental
“A claimant establishes an injury by accident if there is ‘(1)
an identifiable incident; (2) that occurs at some reasonably
definite time; (3) an obvious sudden mechanical or structural
change in the body; and (4) a causal connection between the
incident and the bodily change.’ Chesterfield County v. Dunn,
9 Va. App. 475, 476 (1990). Whenever the injury is strictly
psychological, it ‘must be causally related to a physical injury
or be causally related to an obvious sudden shock or fright
arising in the course of employment.’ Id. at 477. However,
disagreements over managerial decisions and conflicts with
supervisory personnel that cause stressful consequences
which result in purely psychological disability ordinarily are
not compensable.”
Teasley v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 415 S.E.2d 596, 597–98
(Va. 1992)
A mental-mental claim may be compensable as an
occupational disease if it satisfies the requirements of VA.
CODE ANN. § 65.2-400 (2020):
“A. As used in this title, unless the context clearly indicates
otherwise, the term ‘occupational disease’ means a disease
arising out of and in the course of employment, but not an
ordinary disease of life to which the general public is exposed
outside of the employment.
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B. A disease shall be deemed to arise out of the employment
only if there is apparent to the rational mind, upon
consideration of all the circumstances:
1. A direct causal connection between the conditions
under which work is performed and the occupational
disease;
2. It can be seen to have followed as a natural incident
of the work as a result of the exposure occasioned by
the nature of the employment;
3. It can be fairly traced to the employment as the
proximate cause;
4. It is neither a disease to which an employee may
have had substantial exposure outside of the
employment, nor any condition of the neck, back or
spinal column;
5. It is incidental to the character of the business and
not independent of the relation of employer and
employee; and
6. It had its origin in a risk connected with the
employment and flowed from that source as a natural
consequence, though it need not have been foreseen or
expected before its contraction.”
Physical-Mental
“The burden was upon the claimant to satisfy the Commission
by a preponderance of the evidence both that he suffered from
a psychological disability and that the disability was causally
related to
his industrial accident.”
Daniel Constr. Co. v. Baker, 331 S.E.2d 396, 398 (Va. 1985)
Mental-Physical
“The claimant, however, did not prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that his heart attack was an injury by accident
arising out of his employment by Winkler. To show an ‘injury
by accident,’ a claimant must prove both ‘an indentifiable
[sic] incident that occurs at some reasonably definite time’
and that such incident caused ‘an obvious sudden mechanical
or structural change in the body.’ Lane Co. v. Saunders, 229

SPRING 2021

WORK-RELATED PSYCHOLOGICAL INJURY C LAIM

131

Va. 196, 198 (1985). The opinion of the deputy commissioner
correctly sets forth the applicable standard under the Supreme
Court’s cases, beginning with Badische Corporation v.
Starks, 221 Va. 910 (1981) and culminating in Saunders:
[T]he claimant must trace his injury to a
definite time, place or circumstance. It cannot
be the result of a breakdown of a gradual
development. . . . [A] claimant must identify
his injury with a movement made or an action
taken at a particular time at work. When a
claimant cannot so identify an accident causing
his injury, he cannot recover compensation.
We understand the Supreme Court’s decision in Saunders to
suggest that this element of ‘injury by accident’ applies also
to an employee who claims injury as a result of work that is
unusual to him or unusually strenuous, repetitive or stressful.
[Lane Co., 229] Va. at [199–200], 326 S.E.2d at 703.
Moreover, we can discern no exception to the ‘injury by
accident’ test established by the Supreme Court in Starks,
Cogbill [223 Va. 354], and Saunders which permits a
different analysis in the heart attack cases, although each of
these decisions involved back injuries. Although other states
may allow a different result in unusual exertion or stress
cases, and the commentators have criticized a resolution of
heart attack cases under an accidental injury portion of a
statute, we believe that the requirement of showing ‘injury by
accident,’ as developed by the Supreme Court in cases of back
injury, applies equally to claims resulting from heart attacks.”
Woody v. Mark Winkler Mgmt., Inc., 336 S.E.2d 518, 520–21
(Va. Ct. App. 1985)
Washington

Mental-Mental
“(1) Claims based on mental conditions or mental disabilities
caused by stress do not fall within the definition of an
occupational disease in RCW 51.08.140.
Examples of mental conditions or mental disabilities caused
by stress that do not fall within occupational disease shall
include, but are not limited to, those conditions and
disabilities resulting from:
(a) Change of employment duties;
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(b) Conflicts with a supervisor;
(c) Actual or perceived threat of loss of a job,
demotion, or disciplinary action;
(d) Relationships with supervisors, coworkers, or the
public;
(e) Specific or general job dissatisfaction;
(f) Work load pressures;
(g) Subjective perceptions of employment conditions
or environment;
(h) Loss of job or demotion for whatever reason;
(i) Fear of exposure to chemicals, radiation
biohazards, or other perceived hazards;
(j) Objective or subjective stresses of employment;
(k) Personnel decisions;
(l) Actual, perceived, or anticipated financial reversals
or difficulties occurring to the businesses of selfemployed individuals or corporate officers.
(2)
(a) Stress resulting from exposure to a single traumatic
event will be adjudicated as an industrial injury. See
RCW 51.08.100.
(b) Examples of single traumatic events include:
Actual or threatened death, actual or threatened
physical assault, actual or threatened sexual assault,
and life-threatening traumatic injury.
(c) These exposures must occur in one of the
following ways:
(i) Directly experiencing the traumatic event;
(ii) Witnessing, in person, the event as it
occurred to others; or
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(iii) Extreme exposure to aversive details of the
traumatic event.
(d) Repeated exposure to traumatic events, none of
which are a single traumatic event as defined in
subsection (2)(b) and (c) of this section, is not an
industrial injury (see RCW 51.08.100) or an
occupational disease (see RCW 51.08.142). A single
traumatic event as defined in subsection (2)(b) and (c)
of this section that occurs within a series of exposures
will be adjudicated as an industrial injury (see RCW
51.08.100).
(3) Mental conditions or mental disabilities that specify pain
primarily as a psychiatric symptom (e.g., somatic symptom
disorder, with predominant pain), or that are characterized by
excessive or abnormal thoughts, feelings, behaviors or
neurological symptoms (e.g., conversion disorder, factitious
disorder) are not clinically related to occupational exposure.”
WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 296-14-300 (2020)
In addition, “[a]n injury or illness occurring in the work
environment is not recordable or considered work-related if it
meets one of the following exceptions:
The illness is a mental illness. Mental illness will not
be considered work-related unless the employee
voluntarily provides the employer with an opinion
from a physician or other licensed health care
professional with appropriate training and experience
(psychiatrist, psychologist, psychiatric nurse
practitioner, etc.) stating that the employee has a
mental illness that is work-related.”
WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 296-27-01103(2)(i) (2020)
Physical-Mental
A mental injury proximately caused by a physical injury may
be compensable, and “[t]he test for proximate cause or the
‘but for’ test does not require that the amount of causation be
quantified in terms of magnitude. It is sufficient that if the
expert testifying can state that ‘but for’ the conditions of the
industrial injury the worker would not have otherwise
suffered the condition complained of when, where, or how, he
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or she did. In re Robert B. Tracy, BIIA Dec., 88 1695 (1990).
Dr. Burlingame’s testimony established the required causal
connection when he stated that the, ‘industrial injuries under
consideration had exacerbated his anxiety and depression.’
Burlingame Dep. at 11. The impact of the carpal tunnel
condition created additional mental/emotional stressors due to
Mr. Albee’s inability to continue working at his job. Thus,
while Mr. Albee’s anxiety and depression conditions
preexisted his carpal tunnel condition, we find that this
physical condition worsened his mental difficulties.”
In re: David R. Albee, 2000 WA Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 204
(November 21, 2000)
In addition, “[a]n injury or illness occurring in the work
environment is not recordable or considered work-related if it
meets one of the following exceptions:
The illness is a mental illness. Mental illness will not
be considered work-related unless the employee
voluntarily provides the employer with an opinion
from a physician or other licensed health care
professional with appropriate training and experience
(psychiatrist, psychologist, psychiatric nurse
practitioner, etc.) stating that the employee has a
mental illness that is work-related.”
WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 296-27-01103(2)(i) (2020)
Mental-Physical
“The rule is well settled in heart cases that unless the attack is
precipitated by some unusually strenuous exertion on the part
of the workman (and hence ‘a sudden and tangible happening
of a traumatic nature’) there is no ‘injury.’”
Warner v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 414 P.2d 628, 630 (Wash.
1966)
However, a heart attack may qualify as an occupational
disease if the claimant proves proximate cause:
“[I]t is now clear that there can be a legal dichotomy between
the disease process underlying an occupational disease claim
and the disability arising out of such disease process. Under
Dennis [v. Department of Labor and Industries, 109 Wn.2d
467 (1987)], the disease process itself need not be
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employment-related to sustain the claim of occupational
disease. It is legally sufficient if the disease-based disability is
employment-related, i.e., related in the sense that the
disability arose naturally and proximately out of the
employment.
“In determining whether a disease-based disability arose
naturally out of employment, the Dennis court noted that the
focus is upon the conditions of employment alleged to be the
causal culprit of the disability. While these conditions need
not be peculiar or unique to the worker’s particular
employment, they must be distinctive thereto. The court
further noted that there must be a showing that such particular
work conditions more probably caused the worker’s diseasebased disability than conditions in everyday life or all
employment in general. In the case before us, assuming
arguendo that the work conditions of Mr. Swartz’s job as a
test board operator were distinctive from a stress-inducing
standpoint, the widow must still prove proximate cause.”
Orville E. Schwartz, Dec’d., 1988 WA Wrk. Comp. LEXIS
395 (August 15, 1988)
West Virginia

Mental-Mental
“For the purposes of this chapter, no alleged injury or disease
shall be recognized as a compensable injury or disease which
was solely caused by nonphysical means and which did not
result in any physical injury or disease to the person claiming
benefits. It is the purpose of this section to clarify that socalled mental-mental claims are not compensable under this
chapter.”
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-1f (2020)
Physical-Mental
“[T]his Court has held that, ‘[i]n order for a claim to be held
compensable under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, three
elements must coexist: (1) a personal injury (2) received in
the course of employment and (3) resulting from that
employment.’ Syllabus Point 1, Barnett v. State Workmen’s
Comp. Comm’r, 153 W. Va. 796 (1970). ‘A claimant in a
workmen’s compensation case must bear the burden of
proving his claim but in doing so it is not necessary to prove
to the exclusion of all else the causal connection between the
injury and employment.’ Syllabus Point 2, Sowder v. State
Workmen’s Comp. Comm’r, 155 W.Va. 889 (1972). This
Court has also stated that ‘a psychiatric disability arising out
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of a compensable physical injury may also be compensable.’
Harper v. State Workmen’s Comp. Comm’r, 160 W.Va. 364,
366 (1977).”
Hale v. W. Va. Office of the Ins. Comm’r, 724 S.E.2d 752, 755
(W. Va. 2012)
Mental-Physical
“It is settled law in West Virginia that under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act disease, whether occupational or not, is not
a personal injury within the meaning of Code, 23-4-1, and is
not compensable, unless it is attributable to a specific and
definite event arising in the course of and resulting from the
employment. It is equally well settled in West Virginia that
disease that is attributable to a specific and definite event
arising in the course of and resulting from the employment, is
compensable. [citations omitted] On the basis of these
decisions, it is clear that the term ‘personal injury’ as used in
the Workmen’s Compensation Act of this state contemplates
and includes the result of unusual exposure, shock,
exhaustion, and other conditions not of traumatic origin
provided that they are attributable to a specific and definite
event arising in the course of and resulting from the
employment.”
Montgomery v. State Comp. Comm’r, 178 S.E. 425, 426 (W.
Va. 1935)
However, “in case of heart attack or heat prostration
frequently occasioned by bodily and other conditions to which
the employment may not in any wise contribute, we have
great difficulty in determining what should be done. The
consideration which this Court has given to cases of this
character attests this difficulty. While we have awarded
compensation in heat prostration cases, within strictly defined
limits, . . . we are not disposed to extend the rule laid down
therein, and make it applicable to situations not there present,
and where the risks are less. Considering all that has been
written on the subject, and appraising this case in its entirety,
we are unable to see that the Commissioner and Appeal Board
were justified in awarding compensation. To do so they must
have held that decedent was exposed to a particular risk or
danger attendant to his employment, to which the general
public, as that phrase is herein interpreted, was not exposed,
and we do not think the facts of this case justified such a
holding.”
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Williams v. State Comp. Comm’r, 31 S.E.2d 546, 551 (W. Va.
1944)
Wisconsin

Mental-Mental
“[M]ental injury nontraumatically caused must have resulted
from a situation of greater dimensions than the day-to-day
emotional strain and tension which all employees must
experience. Only if the ‘fortuitous event unexpected and
unforeseen’ can be said to be so out of the ordinary from the
countless emotional strains and differences that employees
encounter daily without serious mental injury will liability
under ch. 102, Stats., be found.”
Sch. Dist. v. Dep’t of Indus., 215 N.W.2d 373, 377 (Wis.
1974)
Physical-Mental
“If the mental injury suffered by [the claimant] was the result
of an accident, the injury is compensable under the
Workmen’s Compensation Act. It is clear that the legislature
intended to impose liability against the employer for mental
and physical injuries which are caused by accident or disease.
[See WIS. STAT. §102.01(2)(c), “‘Injury’ means mental or
physical harm to an employee caused by accident or
disease.”]”
Sch. Dist. v. Dep’t of Indus., 215 N.W.2d 373, 375 (Wis.
1974)
Mental-Physical
“The underlying heart disease is a compensable occupational
disease ‘[i]f the work activity precipitates, aggravates and
accelerates beyond normal progression, a progressively
deteriorating or degenerative condition.’”
Schiller v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm’n, 1984 Wisc. App.
LEXIS 3577, at *2–3 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984) (unpublished
decision) (although the claimant in this case is a police
officer, the rule of law applies generally to all employees)

Wyoming

Mental-Mental
“‘Injury’ means any harmful change in the human organism
other than normal aging and includes damage to or loss of any
artificial replacement and death, arising out of and in the
course of employment while at work in or about the premises
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occupied, used or controlled by the employer and incurred
while at work in places where the employer’s business
requires an employee’s presence and which subjects the
employee to extrahazardous duties incident to the business.
‘Injury’ does not include:
***
(J) Any mental injury unless it is
(I) Caused by a compensable physical injury, it
occurs subsequent to or simultaneously with,
the physical injury and it is established by clear
and convincing evidence, which shall include a
diagnosis by a licensed psychiatrist, licensed
clinical psychologist or psychiatric mental
health nurse practitioner meeting criteria
established in the most recent edition of the
diagnostic and statistical manual of mental
disorders published by the American
Psychiatric Association. In no event shall
benefits for a compensable mental injury under
this subdivision be paid for more than thirtysix (36) months after an injured employee’s
physical injury has healed to the point that it is
not reasonably expected to substantially
improve.”
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-14-102(a)(xi) (2020)
Physical-Mental
“‘Injury’ means any harmful change in the human organism
other than normal aging and includes damage to or loss of any
artificial replacement and death, arising out of and in the
course of employment while at work in or about the premises
occupied, used or controlled by the employer and incurred
while at work in places where the employer’s business
requires an employee’s presence and which subjects the
employee to extrahazardous duties incident to the business.
‘Injury’ does not include:
***
(J) Any mental injury unless it is
(I) Caused by a compensable physical injury, it
occurs subsequent to or simultaneously with,
the physical injury and it is established by clear
and convincing evidence, which shall include a
diagnosis by a licensed psychiatrist, licensed
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clinical psychologist or psychiatric mental
health nurse practitioner meeting criteria
established in the most recent edition of the
diagnostic and statistical manual of mental
disorders published by the American
Psychiatric Association. In no event shall
benefits for a compensable mental injury under
this subdivision be paid for more than thirtysix (36) months after an injured employee’s
physical injury has healed to the point that it is
not reasonably expected to substantially
improve.”
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-14-102(a)(xi) (2020)
Mental-Physical
“Benefits for employment-related coronary conditions except
those directly and solely caused by an injury, are not payable
unless the employee establishes by competent medical
authority that:
(i) There is a direct causal connection between the
condition under which the work was performed and
the cardiac condition; and
(ii) The causative exertion occurs during the actual
period of employment stress clearly unusual to or
abnormal for employees in that particular
employment, irrespective of whether the employment
stress is unusual to or abnormal for the individual
employee; and
(iii) The acute symptoms of the cardiac condition are
clearly manifested not later than four (4) hours after
the alleged causative exertion.”
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-14-603(b) (2020)

